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Abstract
This work explores the material and cultural impact of road building in Mexico (19201952), how the public responded to socio-economic transformations wrought by new
infrastructure, and the role that state agencies and private companies played. It surveys public
and private promotion of transportation infrastructure, the organizational culture of the state
road-building bureaucracy, U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations related to technology transfer, and the
significance of motor travel in Mexican popular culture.
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Chapter One
Introduction: Road Building and the Path of ‘Progress’ in Modern Mexico
“Routes of Compromise” studies the creation and function of the government
bureaucracy that built motor roads and highways, and the everyday impact of those roadways on
public life in Mexico. It covers roughly thirty years of construction efforts from 1920 to the early
1950s as foreign and domestic actors, working at the transnational, national, state, and local
levels, established a series of policy and investment programs that became the primary model for
infrastructure development in Mexico during the mid-twentieth century. Road building offers a
unique perspective to the study of Mexican state formation, underscoring how the national
government sought to forge public consensus around economic modernization through political
compromises that ceded power to state governors and also responded to the particular demands
of local communities interested in access to regional motor travel. The field engineers and
construction brigades tasked with the technical aspects of this work represented one part of a
larger collection of agencies, specialists, politicians, laborers, contractors, and everyday citizens
who collaborated on, contested, and ultimately built Mexico’s motor road network. My work is a
social history of this bureaucracy in Mexico with special attention paid to the evolution of its
organizational structure at the state and local levels.
In the years after the armed phase of the revolution, many Mexicans saw the construction
of new motor roads as a means to improve their material conditions. Farmers and business
owners petitioned for them and formed pro-road committees to advocate for and coordinate
construction efforts. Domestic and foreign journalists wrote about the need for motor roads as a
cornerstone of “modernization” and described routes underway in the United States as a model
for Mexico. Mexican society, from average citizens and petty officials to state governors and
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federal administrators, engaged in dialogues that extended across socio-economic and political
boundaries, drawing on different levels of the nascent state that emerged out of the years of
armed conflict during the Mexican Revolution. Many local groups shared the goal of national
planners: the construction of a countrywide highway network connected to the United States as
well as ports on the Pacific and Gulf coasts. They envisioned bustling regional, national, and
transnational markets and looked to motor transportation to carry goods to consumers and bring
tourists to picturesque locales nearby.1
Realizing this ambition, however, required confronting significant environmental,
technical, and political hurdles. The engineers and laborers that surveyed, built, and maintained
the first motor highways faced remote locations with difficult terrains and harsh weather that
threatened construction efforts. Moreover, when labor brigades finally reached a given
population center, local political conflicts, combined with the need to carefully navigate the legal
and practical realities of built environments---homes, farms, and businesses, for instance--presented new tests for road workers and their supervisors. Although state and federal archives
indicate very little opposition to road construction in principle, once building neared a particular
property, threatening to negatively affect existing patterns of everyday life, property owners
often became less enamored with the direction of the projected route. Wealthier landowners
could individually wage court battles against the national and state governments, recruiting local
support that forced work stoppages and required engineers to reconsider their blueprints. In other
cases, local communities launched grassroots efforts that tapped into regional civic
organizations, including labor unions, agrarian networks, and chambers of commerce, in order to

1

"Las buenas carreteras harán aumentar el automovilismo," Excélsior, 16 August 1926, p. 2 Third Section.;
Modas para pasear en la carreteras,” El Porvenir, 19 September 1926; Leon A. Dickinson, “Highway Penetrating
into Heart of Mexico,” The New York Times, 2 February 1930.
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petition public officials for redress if road crews damaged communal property or failed to
adequately execute promises made by the government for new transportation infrastructure.
These local challenges to state road-building efforts, however, should not be
characterized solely as impediments to some vague “march of progress” in Mexico. Instead, they
represented how everyday people involved themselves in the planning and construction of these
large-scale projects. The pragmatic compromises that state and national bureaucrats made with
regional interests underscored the multi-layered realities of these endeavors as public works.
Road building was not a process imposed upon “peripheral communities” by the central state,
but rather operated as a series of overlapping political and bureaucratic activities addressing
spatial and socioeconomic issues. On the one hand, federal planners in Mexico City looked to
new motor roads as a means to develop the country’s economy, connecting key population
centers together and promoting greater commercial activity. On the other hand, although state
and local leaders may have shared this general desire for economic development with their
national counterparts, they also wanted to ensure that motor routes improved regional access and
mobility. In this sense, whereas the federal government endeavored to build the network of roads
and highways, it was at the state and local levels that public officials, agency planners, and
community leaders debated how best to realize this ambition within a particular region’s
environmental, economic, and socio-political contexts.2
The routes that construction brigades etched across the landscape, moving southward
from the U.S.-Mexico border, and outward to the coasts from Mexico City, had a profound and
lasting impact on Mexican economic development. Road building occurred within a larger socio2

John Welsh, "Good Roads Lead into the Mexican Republic," The New York Times, 24 February 1929;
Telegrams and letters on Calhoun Highway Association in, FP Obregón-Calles, 1921-1928, Volumen 27,
Expedientes 104-C-60, 104-C-139, AGN; Miguel W. Guerrero, chief litigator for HPC, complaint against
government of Veracruz, 11 October 1930; State response to HPC, 18 October 1930; Order to Attorney General of
Veracruz, 17 November 1930, Fondo Legal (FL), 1930-1935, box 86, AGEV.
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cultural discourse of modernity, becoming a symbol indicating Mexico’s level of “progress,” and
a metric by which to gauge whether the country continued its “move forward” in subsequent
years. In this sense, motor roads carried a dual narrative: on the one hand, they embodied the
promise of technological modernization as footpaths and horse-drawn carts gave way to asphalt
thoroughfares and automobiles. On the other hand, the effects of entropy due to use, weather,
and the passage of time could transform these modern arteries into symbols of “backwardness,”
decried by journalists and state and local leaders alike if not properly maintained and regulated.3

Methods and Historiography
This dissertation is built around regional case studies from Nuevo León and Veracruz.
Both states represented important economic zones for Mexico, but had distinct demographics,
politics, and ecologies that provide for ample comparative analysis. The former shares its
northern border with the United States and contains the industrial hub of Monterrey, a key
commercial center with one of the largest populations in northern Mexico. The latter state
extends along the Gulf of Mexico and is home to the port of Veracruz, historically the principal
entryway to Mexico City. The state of Veracruz contains a large population, but one that is
distributed much more widely than Nuevo León’s. In addition, northern Veracruz emerged as
one of the first major centers of oil production in the country and as such private and public
entities made infrastructure development there a priority. Given that both states are located on
the geographic periphery of Mexico, they provide plentiful opportunities to explore how regional
and local spaces could stage broader transnational processes. State and local leaders in Nuevo
León and Veracruz were mindful of the importance that road building had not only to connect

3

Anita Brenner, “Old Mexico Changed by a New Highway,” The New York Times Magazine, 18 August
1935; "Transporte automotriz la base del progreso," El Porvenir, 5 September 1942.
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their communities to the national economy, but also in creating new points of contact with the
United States and other foreign countries. The objective in using this comparative approach is to
demonstrate that although broad support existed for road building, when studied from regionally
oriented perspectives, national policy was not uniform, but rather operated in response to local
socio-political, economic, and environmental conditions within individual states. Moreover,
Nuevo León and Veracruz reflect many of the regional political and socioeconomic issues facing
Mexico after the revolution; they also highlight the ranged of different policy models---from
rural mobilization strategies to the use of unionized construction brigades and private
contractors---implemented to build roads in response to developmental needs.
Road building as a topic of study in the historical scholarship of Mexico is still relatively
new. Wendy Waters has produced one of the most comprehensive inquiries into this subject to
date. Her dissertation, "Re-Mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in PostRevolutionary Mexico, 1925-1940," charts the creation of the National Road Commission and its
countrywide program to renovate and expand the highway system. Waters transitions from
national-level inquiries to case studies based in Morelos, Veracruz, and Sonora that allow for
useful contrasts related to regional engagement in road-building efforts in the late 1920s and
1930s.4 In many ways, Ben Fulwider’s dissertation, “Driving the Nation: Road Transportation
and the Post-Revolutionary Mexican State 1925-1960,” follows the nationally oriented aspects of
Waters’s general narrative model, charting the contours of federal policy that emerged after
1925. His most important contributions, however, come in work on the 1940s and postwar
period, as he describes the development of interstate trucking networks that capitalized on

4

Wendy Waters, "Re-mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in Post-Revolutionary
Mexico, 1925-1940," (PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1999).
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Mexico’s burgeoning highway system. 5 J. Brian Freeman, meanwhile, explores the diplomatic
and cultural significance of the Pan-American Highway and other road building projects from
the late Porfiriato to the 1950s. In "'La carrera de la muerte': Death, Driving, and Rituals of
Modernization in 1950s Mexico," he incorporates an appreciation of popular culture at the
national level as everyday Mexicans gathered along the transcontinental route to view racers
traveling the countryside. Freeman is interested in how technology reinforced notions of postwar
progress and modernization. He also views this race within the context of U.S.-Mexican relations
and alludes to the competition’s connection to a larger, global audience of spectators.6 These
scholars, however, only describe Mexico’s road-building bureaucracy from the context of
national policy implementation and do not adequately explore how state and local politics
affected the composition of its organizational structure.
My work makes three main interventions in the study of Mexican road building. First, it
is the only work that emphasizes the importance of examining failed policy and construction
efforts in the early 1920s to better understand the challenges that faced Mexican road-building
ambitions. I argue that accentuating the 1925 creation of the Comisión Nacional de Caminos
overlooks key points of context, and also privileges President Plutarco Elías Calles’s role in
shaping road policy. In fact, my work finds that Mexico had already spent much of the first half
of the decade promoting and planning new motor roads. In 1922, President Álvaro Obregón
launched a campaign to build highways from Mexico City to the U.S.-Mexico border, but the
program became mired in budget cuts after foreign creditors forced the national government to
embrace austerity measures to pay back debt incurred in the 1910s. Likewise, newspapers, state

5

Benjamin Fulwider, “Driving the Nation: Road Transportation and the Postrevolutionary Mexican State,
1925-1960,” (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2009).
6
J. Brian Freeman, "'La carrera de la muerte': Death, Driving, and Rituals of Modernization in 1950s
Mexico,” Studies in Latin American Popular Culture, Vol. 29 (2001): 2-23.
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governors, and local associations had been calling on the federal government to do something
about the nation’s road system for years. Prior to 1925 not only was there already wide support
across Mexico to build motor roads, but also, in many ways, Calles’s policies borrowed
Obregón’s original program and adapted it in response to the initial setback in construction
efforts.
Second, “Routes of Compromise,” is the first work to study road building in Nuevo León,
examining economic and regional impact of this state, and drawing linkages with Veracruz that
highlight its importance to Mexico and the broader U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. A comparison of
road-building efforts in Nuevo León and Veracruz highlights the divergent models pioneered in
postrevolutionary Mexico to subsidize and build new regional transportation infrastructure.
Ultimately, the policies and construction program utilized in Nuevo León was adopted not only
in large part by state officials in Veracruz, but also became the model the national government
embraced, which used infrastructure development as a means to attract private investment capital
and drive industrialization.
By focusing on regional political factors related to countrywide road-building efforts,
however, this work agrees with Mary Kay Vaughan, who cautions against viewing national
projects as “systematically planned and implemented from a central government-unified
command post in Mexico City.” She joins scholars, including Waters, who have called for a
greater appreciation of how state power takes on different social, economic, and political
contexts at the regional and local levels. Along similar lines, Jeffrey Rubin writes that the
Mexican state had an “uneven and incomplete” impact on the nation and forged “multiple

7

regional arrangements--each a distinct combination of bargaining, coercion, and alliances--that
together reinforced the power of the center.”7
Drawing on Rubin’s notion of multi-polar formations of state power, my work agrees
with recent scholarship revising interpretations of the national government’s power to impose
policy within Mexican society. Writing about the limits of reform in 1930s Yucatán, Ben Fallaw
critiques classical and revisionist depictions of the central government as an all-powerful,
political leviathan. He notes that President Lázaro Cárdenas attacked local landed interests,
arguing that they had long stifled the development of Yucatán’s indigenous people and working
class. The president’s reforms sought to change this situation, ceding greater power to
campesinos, while also promoting popular class-consciousness that could be transformed into
grassroots movement to further spur change. Landowners, however, slowed reform and unseated
powerful state supporters of the president by exploiting fissures within the Yucatan’s leftist
political bloc. Fallaw concludes that regional elites successfully checked Cárdenas’s power,
delaying the implementation of new social and economic policies or bending them to their own
needs. By 1938, he notes that Cárdenas was forced to abandon many of his promised social and
economic reforms in the Yucatán as he grappled with the question of nationalizing the oil
sector.8 In road-building policy, similar processes were at work in the decades after 1920, and
“Routes of Compromise” addresses the critical role that regional power blocs played in shaping
the agendas of national leaders.

7

Mary Kay Vaughan, “Transnational Processes and the Rise of the Mexican Cultural State: Notes from the
Past,” Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico since 1940 (Durham: Duke University Press,
2001), Kindle Edition, 471-487; Jeffrey Rubin, “Decentering the Regime: Culture and Regional Politics in Mexico,”
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1996), 86.
8
Ben Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2001), get pages.
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Lastly, this dissertation uses the everyday activities of the government agencies and
regional organizations involved in planning and implementing new roads and highways as
primary units of analysis. Although other works have studied the impact of federal road-building
policy within individual states, my work extends this analysis a step further, exploring the
contours of the state-level agencies themselves and their essential contributions to regional
construction efforts. This approach is influenced by Raymond Craib’s examination of the mapmaking bureaus in nineteenth and twentieth-century Mexico. “In rural Mexico,” Craib writes,
“both before and after the revolution, surveyors were among the most prominent figures through
which villages experienced something known as ‘the state.’”9 In many ways, a similar process
occurred between the field engineers and labor brigades that represented state and federal roadbuilding agencies when they entered a new area and engaged local citizens. By focusing its study
on these day-to-day interactions, my work uncovers how the federal and state bureaucracies that
surveyed routes, wrote budgets, and built thoroughfares, was often punctuated by multitudinous
disputes that could confuse, delay, and rework original agendas. I argue that heterogeneous
economic and political priorities existing at the transnational, federal, state, and local levels
fostered the creation of distinct road-building agencies with a dynamic organizational structure
capable of responding to individual needs, engaging in careful political negotiation and
compromise to build consensus.
These interventions raise important questions. What were the political and environmental
challenges facing Mexican highway construction after the armed phase of the revolution, and
how did they influence policy decisions? How did road building in Nuevo León and Veracruz
take on distinct characteristics related to regional political and economic priorities, and how did

9

Raymond Craib, Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2004), 9-13.

9

this affect local, state, and national relationships? In what ways did popular culture and everyday
citizens respond to the introduction of motor transportation and new roads? How did everyday
Mexicans in the countryside construct populist discourses that sought to address national rhetoric
about the ideals of the revolution and the government’s responsibility to ordinary citizens?
Finally, how did local and regional discussions of road building reflect (and respond to) broader
national and international discourses related to such key historical events as oil expropriation,
World War II and the early Cold War?
By asking questions that emphasize political culture and issues related to the notions of
modernity and progress, this dissertation seeks to understand how road building served as a
means for elites and non-elites to contest power within society. James Scott has argued that the
building of modern road networks and other transportation infrastructures, including railroads,
made regional populations easier to manage, and thus increased the central state’s power.
Highway maps and cadastral surveys helped to reduce outside officials’ reliance on local guides
to navigate the economic, political, and environmental spaces of a given place. These
technologies aided the spread of capital markets through standardization that facilitated longdistance shipping and rationalized prices.10 Michel Foucault also notes that notions of modernity
facilitated the rise of states that were increasingly concerned with the "health" of their subjects.
In the eighteenth century, increasingly bureaucratic regimes sought to regulate and quantify their
realms. The objective study of populations as something to be managed and controlled became a
central concern of these governments, and security emerged as an issue to "protect" the safety of
the social body.11

10

James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Kindle Edition.
11
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1978),
116-17.
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In terms of road building, the Mexican state attempted to regiment notions of space
within society. It employed engineers and surveyors to "rationalize" the natural landscape and
implement a series of "modern" thoroughfares that increased the use of new technologies in the
construction process and in transportation. Newspapers and public officials tied the need for
high-quality roads to the health and prosperity of the nation, and regional elite and non-elite
groups reproduced this paradigm within their own activities and correspondence.
Both state and society in twentieth-century Mexico conflated road building and modern
technology with the vitality of the nation's social order. For example, in 1925 an article in the
Mexico City-based newspaper Excélsior argued that new roads helped to "promote and spread
general and individual well-being" and served as "moralizing, educative, and civilizing
influences for the good of society."12 In this sense, the modern Mexican state attributed notions
of physical vigor to the construction of new highways. It served as an example to underscore
how Mexico's ruling elites sought to galvanize the social body by transforming it through
technological processes that "subdued" the natural environment and reordered physical space
into quantifiable units on an engineer's building blueprints.
While Scott and Foucault emphasize the central state’s power to impose spatial legibility
on the countryside, the everyday experience of negotiating and deploying new transportation
infrastructure reveals a much different perspective. Richard White argues that far from operating
as "harbingers of order, rationality, and effective large-scale organization," the corporations and
governments that engaged in building railroads did so with imperfect knowledge of the
economic, environmental, and social costs involved. This shortcoming led to frequent quarrels
within and among the agencies set up to engineer the routes, as local residents, workers,

12

Luis Mayer, "Los modernos caminos crean nuevos valores," Excélsior, 30 August 1925, p. 2 Second

Section.
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managers, financiers, and politicians clashed over disparate issues and faulted extenuating
circumstances for delays.13
Whereas Scott particularly underscores the “high-modernist” qualities of road-building
efforts with the central state imposing a certain spatial legibility on the countryside, my work
aligns more closely with White’s view on new transport infrastructure. It emphasizes the
dialectic, negotiated process that occurred between (and among) local and state groups as they
wrestled over the technical questions of where, when, and how a new road would be built (and
who would do so).14 The ramifications of a completed highway left lasting marks on a
community's socio-ecological character. Not only did roads alter the sense of space in a given
place, they also brought other pressing considerations for the people that lived around them. A
road could mean greater economic and social mobility thanks to easier access to bus routes and
new markets to sell local goods, but for some residents it could also lead to destruction of arable
land and the loss property and savings. The reassuring view of road building as a conveyor of a
prosperous modernity in the national discourse had a sometimes-ambiguous quality at the local
level, where new routes boded positive and negative consequences.
The confluence of transportation infrastructure development with notions of modernity
and progress has long been studied in Mexican historiography. Work on the history of railroad
construction, one of the most developed areas of this scholarship, provides a useful point of
departure to contextualize and historicize motor road-building efforts. In his study of railroads in
the late nineteenth century, John Coatsworth argues that Mexican officials drove economic
development through infrastructure building via foreign investment and the creation of export

13

Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2011), Kindle Edition.
14
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Kindle Edition.
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markets for commodities, including copper. He asserts that this arrangement concentrated wealth
in the national government and hacendado elites, divorcing many of the benefits of commercial
growth from the countryside, while also making the country more reliant on the United States. In
many ways, Coatsworth’s work on railroads in 1870s Mexico supports Scott’s view of expanded
state power, as wealthy property owners relied on the regime of Porfirio Díaz to check
significant peasant opposition to land consolidation and rail construction.15
In response to these conclusions, Sandra Kuntz-Ficker cautions against characterizing
railroads solely as a force for integration with foreign markets. Instead, she contends that close
studies of the Ferrocarril Central reveal a much more nuanced picture: actual percentages of
carriage rates show that as much as seventy percent of goods in circulation went to domestic
markets. Where she does find common ground with Coatsworth and Scott, however, is in in
noting that railroads could exacerbate economic difficulties and regional economic inequality
when reduced transport costs concentrated investment in places already connected to existing
lines. Kuntz-Ficker writes, “Adverse economic conditions could not simply be transformed with
the introduction of modern means of transportation.”16
This last point is particularly important as it addresses the larger challenges of
coordinating policy efforts. Juan Mora Torres’s work on industrialization and economic growth
in Monterrey during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries agrees with Kuntz-Ficker
and Coatsworth’s assessments about developmental challenges. He finds that the initial
deployment of railroads actually had a detrimental impact on the city’s productivity. Railroads
allowed for the importation of lower-cost goods to Monterrey from the United States, and also
15
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facilitated the departure of skilled artisans to other parts of the country. Mora Torres argues that
it was not until new federal protectionist measures went into effect after 1899---which shielded
local industries in Nuevo León from foreign competition---that the city was able to effectively
utilize railroads to drive regional economic expansion. 17
Similar processes were at work in the development of policy that governed motor road
building. National leaders set rules limiting the role of foreign companies in this work and
stipulated that Mexican engineers and laborers should receive hiring preferences. President
Calles touted these policies as a means to ensure road building remained a nationalist endeavor
that put Mexico’s needs ahead of foreign interests.18 In certain ways this policy worked well, as
highway construction successfully employed thousands of Mexicans as laborers and also trained
a new generation of Mexican engineers. At the same time, however, as Kuntz-Ficker found in
her study of the Ferrocarril Nacional, construction budgets were not boundless, necessitating
prioritization of public works that helped some communities and ignored others. Big regional
cities like Monterrey and the port of Veracruz benefited most from official attention that placed
them at the center of highway designs, while other places waited years for new transport
infrastructure. Rural communities that found themselves in remote locations complained of
having “been forgotten” by the Mexican state in letters that petitioned for aid in support of local
roads.19 As with railroad building, new motor routes successfully integrated regional markets
into Mexico’s national economy, but did not necessarily reduce overall problems of economic
inequality.
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Postcolonial historians corroborate this trend, exploring questions of how infrastructure
quality marked economic inequality. Libbie Freed finds that in twentieth-century French Central
Africa, the state built few roads that could resist year-round weather conditions due to a
combination of limited budgets and general prejudice. Instead, colonial officials favored earthen
routes and wooden bridges in low-lying areas due to the low-cost of construction. Whereas
metropolitan France championed the construction of modern roads as a symbol of national
progress, in its colonies the imperial government simply redefined what "working" transportation
described. The promise of development ultimately rendered a socio-economic landscape that
handicapped colonized peoples' ability to sustain themselves as a result of shortsighted policies
and a lack of local knowledge on the part of colonial officials.20 Brian Larkin broadens this
discussion, considering colonial and national states' responses to the challenge of incomplete or
degraded infrastructures. He finds that breakdown not only threatened the continuity of official
communication networks and supply lines, but also affected everyday life as individuals adapted
their routines to unreliable infrastructures. Ultimately, he argues that repaired and repurposed
equipment reflected local environmental conditions and social needs, representing practical
innovations that made technology more accessible to these communities.21
Inequality is only one part of the story, however. Studying the long-term economic
impact of road building on everyday life in Mexico reveals a correspondingly complex image.
National and state elites did not benefit alone, to the detriment of all other groups. Rather, fierce
competition often emerged at local and regional levels to influence construction efforts. Leaders
in towns and smaller cities recognized that the particular route a road or highway took through
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their municipios (counties) could have a profound impact on their individual and communal
fortunes. Returning to Mexican historiography, Teresa Van Hoy provides a nuanced study of
communities in Oaxaca and Veracruz that were affected by railroad policy. Writing against
Coatsworth’s contention that railroads largely benefited elites, she finds that many average
Mexicans actually utilized this mode of transportation. Travel records indicated that poor and
working-class people used third-class passenger service, which proved so popular that railroad
managers increased the availability of low-cost fares.22
My work on everyday motor road usage finds much common ground with Van Hoy’s
observations on the ways that average people used modern transport infrastructure. On the one
hand, wealthy and middle-class Mexicans and foreigners did extract considerable benefits from
new roads and highways. On the other hand, these were not the only kinds of people travelling
the countryside. Regular bus service emerged alongside new motor routes, facilitating rural trade
with outside markets and providing greater access to healthcare, education, and other public
services. In this way, roads were not divorced from everyday life, but rather became deeply
integrated into how farmers, working-class Mexicans, and others engaged what they perceived as
economic opportunities. Although motor routes did not eliminate underlying problems of
inequality, non-elite Mexicans were still able to utilize them in ways that extracted individual
and communal benefits.

Chapter Outline
This dissertation is largely organized chronologically, each chapter beginning with a
broadly focused national-level view of road building to contextualize subsequent sections with
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state and local case studies from Nuevo León and Veracruz. It places international, national,
state, and local processes in conversation with one another, highlighting the interactions of
agencies, groups, and individual actors operating at these different levels. Chapter two describes
how contrasts in environmental, demographic, and socioeconomic factors played important roles
in this process. It also explores the broader historical context of road building in the early 1920s
to better understand why Calles ultimately succeeded where Obregón failed in launching a
successful highway construction program.
Chapter three outlines the form and function of the national and state bureaucracies
charged with carrying out road-building policy. Whereas other scholars have emphasized the
roles of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas and the Comisión Nacional de
Caminos, this chapter argues that together they were only one half of a larger whole that relied
closely on agencies created by state governments in Nuevo León and Veracruz to make sense of
infrastructural needs. This chapter also charts the beginning of a gradual shift away from Calles’s
original vision for road building with the creation of a bond program to finance new roads and
the restructuring of the Comisión Nacional due to the economic exigencies of global recession
after 1929.
Chapter four extends the narrative into the sexenio of President Lázaro Cárdenas. At the
level of national policy, I look to revise the general interpretation of Cárdenas’s administration,
arguing that he charted a relatively conservative political path that created new opportunities for
private sector involvement in financing and building roads. In fact, Cárdenas continued and
notably expanded the road bond program and, in doing so, laid the groundwork for massive
foreign investment in Mexican highway building in the 1940s under his successor. In Nuevo
León and Veracruz, regional dynamics of the road-building bureaucracy presented considerable
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contrasts in how national policy was implemented. Whereas Monterrey dominated Nuevo León’s
road plans, no single city exerted nearly as much influence in Veracruz, which created
considerable competition for resources and may have led to inefficiencies and redundancies in
the state road-building bureaucracy. The chapter ends with a discussion of local interventions in
road construction efforts as well as outlining the contours of the economic impact on the
financing of transport infrastructure following the 1938 decision to nationalize the foreigndominated petroleum industry.
Chapter five charts the history of road building during Mexico’s involvement in the
Second World War. It finds few notable changes in federal policy between President Cárdenas
and his successor Manuel Ávila Camacho. In many ways, the differences that occurred were
rather a matter of degree than substance. The new president continued the debt-financing
program started in the 1930s, but used diplomatic agreements reached with the United States in
1941 to provide dramatic amounts of new foreign investment in transport infrastructure. During
the war, American aid helped to ensure that Mexico’s road-building agenda continued apace;
moreover, state governments articulated funding proposals for road construction that drew on
language highlighting notions of continental defense and Mexican military preparedness. For
everyday Mexicans, however, this chapter finds that commodity shortages related to the war
effort reduced much-needed access to public motor transportation options, creating considerable
amounts of civil unrest.
The last chapter covers the early post-war period during the sexenio of Miguel Alemán. It
explores the popular surge in enthusiasm for public works projects that promised to bring
economic benefits more equitably to more Mexicans. Again, I have sought to challenge general
interpretations, arguing against views that largely framed Alemán’s sexenio as a creature of “big
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business” divorced from the needs of agrarian and labor groups. My work finds that the late
1940s not only witnessed redoubled efforts to fund and build motor highways, but also construct
new caminos vecinales---local roads---that were so critical to the economic development of rural
Mexico. In fact, one key aspect of Alemán’s policy that was enthusiastically supported by local
groups was its renewed emphasis on building these local roads, designed to reduce regional
isolation by connecting more of the countryside to the national highway network. Likewise, at
this time, rising rates of motor tourism and greater access to public transportation via regional
busing associations helped to foster a dynamic postwar economy tied to road building that
became a model for succeeding presidents.
The goal of this dissertation is to emphasize the day-to-day activities of the federal and
state road-building bureaucracies as they interacted with regional and local groups. Far from
faceless, indifferent entities, the government agencies tasked with road building were composed
of many different kinds of people with a variety of priorities and motivations. They engaged in
everyday exchanges with municipal councils, civic groups, business associations, and unions that
had a profound and lasting impact on the national vision for Mexico’s highway system. In this
way, “Routes of Compromise” joins with the historiographical views held by Vaughan, Rubin,
Fallaw, and others who identify the Mexican post-revolutionary state not as a systematic,
centralized leviathan that imposed its will on the “periphery,” but rather a patchwork of
overlapping interests that often engaged in careful negotiations to address the needs of state and
local actors in order to achieve its ends.
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Chapter 2
“A Good Road… Brings Life to All of the Towns It Passes”:1
Paving the Way for Mexico’s National Road-Building Program, 1920-1926
In 1921, Francisco Malpica Silva, the general manager of Veracruz’s El Dictamen, joined
one of his staff reporters to make a highly publicized journey in a motor vehicle from the port of
Veracruz to the state capital, Xalapa. The road they travelled on was an earthen path that snaked
across roughly one hundred kilometers of mountainous terrain and forest from the humid shores
of the Gulf coast. It was a notorious example of the toll weather and institutional neglect often
took on even economically important routes. Built by the Spanish, the road had helped transform
Xalapa into an integral commercial hub by the eighteenth century; however, state authorities
largely abandoned it following the introduction of railroads to the region after 1880. The next
forty years witnessed the road succumb to the effects of entropy as harsh weather conditions
gradually made it difficult to traverse.2 Silva’s journey from the port to Xalapa helped to focus
public attention on the poor travel conditions on roads in the region. El Dictamen wrote of the
experience:
The car was only able to accomplish the trip, overcoming tremendous difficulties,
because [the drivers] had used oxen and mules to help the vehicle navigate through some
of the most treacherous parts of the route. Nevertheless, the amount of public enthusiasm
awakened by this trip helped to plant the first seeds in favor of automobile-centered
development. 3
This chapter examines the political, economic, and environmental obstacles to road
building that the Mexican state and society faced in the early to mid-1920s. In the first section, I
1
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outline the topography, ecology, weather, and population distributions of Veracruz and Nuevo
León to highlight the distinct spatial considerations that officials confronted as they surveyed
potential routes. The next section studies the condition of the nation’s road system after the
Mexican Revolution and the practical challenges to construction efforts at this time. It also
explores the impact of the political and legal battles that erupted as the Mexican state tried to
prioritize its road-building budget, grappled with a mounting debt crisis, and attempted to assert
control over regional transport infrastructure. The chapter concludes with an examination of the
important policy changes instituted after 1925 as a new president looked to revive Mexico’s plan
for modern roads and highways after years of political and practical disappointments.

Geography, Climate, and Population
Veracruz occupies more than seventy-two thousand square kilometers of territory,
extending like a narrow strand along the Gulf of Mexico. It contains a wide range of elevations,
from 684 kilometers of hot and humid coastal lowlands to the snow-capped Pico de Orizaba, a
dormant stratovolcano that rises 5,636 meters above sea level. The Sierra Madre Oriental, a
chain of mountains and foothills, crosses into Veracruz from the north and runs down to the
Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt that begins at the Gulf and spreads westward into neighboring
states. Amid this mountainous terrain are nine prominent plateaus and valleys, including the
northern highlands of the Huasteca Veracruzana, and the valleys of Córdoba and San Andrés
Tuxtla in the center and south of the state, respectively. Six major river systems water the land
and form a network of seventy-four rivers and tributaries that support Veracruz’s diverse flora
and fauna.4
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Six different categories define the majority of ecosystems in the state. By far the most
common is the tropical evergreen, with forests covering more than fifty thousand square
kilometers of land. Tropical deciduous biomes are second, occupying over seven thousand
square kilometers, while montane forests--found at elevations between 4,000 and 450 meters
above sea level--cover four thousand square kilometers. Other ecological niches include
coniferous and oak forests, scrub-like thorn forests, and aquatic and sub-aquatic vegetation
zones, each occupying between two thousand and thirty-six hundred square kilometers. More
than eighty percent of the state is classified as humid and semi-humid, with an average
temperature that varies between 22 and 26 degrees Celsius (71-84°F) and annual precipitation
rates from 2000 to 3500 millimeters (78-137in).5
In 1921, Veracruz contained one of the largest human populations in Mexico. It was one
of only three states listed in that year’s census that boasted over one million persons and had a
population density of sixteen inhabitants per square kilometer (km2). Twenty-nine of its cities
and towns counted more than 10,000 residents apiece; the largest were Veracruz port (58,225),
Orizaba (39,568), Papantla (34,870), Xalapa (29,998), Córdoba (26,892), San Andrés Tuxtla
(21,778), and Tuxpan (20,765). Veracruz port was also one of Mexico’s most important shipping
centers, and Xalapa served as the administrative and political center of the state. The sister cities
of Orizaba and Córdoba---145 kilometers south of the capital and only twenty-three kilometers
apart from one another---were important industrial hubs and economic rivals. In the north,
Tuxpan emerged as a principal port for oil exports to the United States and Europe in the early
1900s, while San Andrés Tuxtla in the south was known for tobacco production.6
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The majority of Veracruzanos, however, lived in small towns and hamlets located
throughout the state’s largely mountainous territory. The combination of rugged terrain, heavy
rainfall and a dispersed population contributed to geographic isolation. Contemporary
engineering surveys and local correspondence reiterated the problem that physical spaces posed
to everyday mobility for many rural communities. Some of the earliest examples of human
intervention into the natural environment in the late nineteenth and twentieth-centuries in
Veracruz focused on addressing this challenge. The construction of railroads linked the Gulf
coast ports to Xalapa, Córdoba, and Orizaba, while also providing easier access to Mexico City.
The Huatusco and Perote railroads contributed to a robust flow of internal commerce that
complemented export-driven growth tied to the extractive industries and agriculture. Yet, there
were notable limitations to this new technology, including cost and technical challenges.
Railroads were expensive to build, which tended to concentrate investment rather than
distributing it more equitably to other regions that also needed new infrastructure. Likewise,
tracks could only be laid at a relatively shallow grade, which prevented them from reaching some
of the most isolated, mountainous communities due to the steepness of the local terrain. 7
The construction of motor roads after the revolution addressed some of these problems.
First, gravel and asphalt-concrete routes could be built at much steeper grades than railroads,
which allowed them to reach more isolated communities. Second, thanks to a variety of different
kinds of surface materials and construction techniques, motor roads could be built much more
cheaply; oftentimes, rural thoroughfares were little more than wide earthen lanes, cleared and
graded by local residents under the supervision of a state engineer. In other cases, key federal
highways were paved with asphalt-concrete, while many secondary state roads were made of
7
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gravel. This allowed for a greater number of roads to be built, but also made them much more
susceptible to weather conditions, greatly restricting vehicle access during Veracruz’s frequent,
heavy springtime rains.8
In Nuevo León, local topography has some similarities to natural formations in Veracruz.
The Sierra Madre Oriental mountain range that extends one thousand kilometers from the TransMexican Volcanic Belt to the U.S.-Mexico border covers much of the southern, western, and
northern portions of the state. Average elevation is 2,100 meters above sea level, with its tallest
point exceeding 3,600 meters. Nestled between the eastern foothills of the Sierra Madre Oriental
and the flatlands of the Northern Gulf Plateau are a number of important population centers,
including the capital Monterrey, and the municipios (counties) of Apodaca, Cadereyta Jiménez,
and San Nicolás de la Garza. The average annual temperature in the region is twenty-two degrees
Celsius, with highs and lows of forty-two and negative-six degrees Celsius.9
The state contrasts sharply with Veracruz in weather, biodiversity, and population,
however. It receives much less rainfall, usually 300 to 600 millimeters per annum and features a
climate that is largely dry to sub-humid throughout the year. The rivers that irrigate Nuevo León
are part of a hydrological system that begins in the Sierra Madre Oriental and flows into the
fourth largest river basin in North America, the Río Bravo del Norte (Rio Grande). The most
powerful of the Río Bravo’s local tributaries is the San Juan River, which begins in the
neighboring state of Coahuila and crosses southern Nuevo León into Tamaulipas. A network of
arroyos and five tributaries support it, including the rivers Pesquería and Salinas, which also
enter from Coahuila and water biomes in the central plateau before joining the San Juan in
8
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eastern Nuevo León. Above this system, the Salado River enters northwestern Nuevo León
traveling southeast for 120 kilometers; the Río Sabinas branches from it and continues for eighty
kilometers across the central highlands before entering Tamaulipas.10 Ecosystems in Nuevo León
divide roughly into two main categories: low-lying Tamaulipan thornscrub and sub-montane
scrub are found throughout much of the central plateau, while desert scrub such as nopal and
mesquite are native to mountain areas.11
In 1921, Nuevo León’s state population numbered just over 336,000 persons. This figure
represented a net loss of nearly nine percent ---29,000--- from the census recorded just before the
start of the revolution. By 1930, however, the state had fully recovered from this decrease and
grown an additional 14.4 percent to more than 417,000 people. Nevertheless, with fifty-one
counties covering a total of 65,103 square kilometers, the state recorded a relatively low
population density of only four occupants per km2. This figure, however, fails to take into
account the outsized importance of Monterrey vis-à-vis the rest of Nuevo León; the city counted
137,388 residents in 1930---roughly a third of the statewide population---and had a density of
over 300 persons per km2. In contrast, the next largest cities---Linares (9,590), Sabinas Hidalgo
(5,828), and Montemorelos (5,574)---had only a fraction of that number of inhabitants, while the
typical regional town contained fewer than 2,500 residents.12 The sharp contrast in population
density between Monterrey and other parts of the state, in addition to Nuevo León’s proximity to
the United States, significantly influenced regional road policy. There were few neighboring
places---besides Saltillo, Coahuila---viewed as important enough to connect Monterrey to, so
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from the early 1920s, construction proposals emphasized integrating the state capital more
closely with the U.S.-Mexico border as part of a larger project of transnational industrial and
commercial development.

The State of Mexico’s Roads and the Challenges to Reform after 1920
As the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution came to a conclusion in the early years of
the 1920s, the nation faced an acute shortage of adequate transportation infrastructure. Fewer
than 19,000 kilometers of railroad tracks and 28,000 kilometers of roads---most unsuitable for
automobile travel---existed in a country that covered about two million square kilometers. The
decade-long conflict that grew out of the 1910 revolution in Mexico had exacerbated long-term
problems of neglect that had left roads and highways---many dating from the colonial period---in
disrepair. In Mexico City, officials estimated that fighting had damaged roughly four thousand
kilometers of streets and roads that served the federal capital and connected it with much of
central Mexico. In contrast, at this time, the United States boasted one hundred thousand
kilometers of roads suitable for motor vehicles, and also neared completion of the Lincoln
Highway, the first all-weather transcontinental motor road that extended 5,454 kilometers from
New York to California.13
Damaged and neglected transportation infrastructure contributed to increased regional
economic isolation in Mexico, which negatively affected productivity and kept prices for basic
commodities high in many areas. Initially, public officials responded by working to restore
streets in towns and cities across the country; however, Mexicans increasingly called for the
13
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government to address the problem of national and regional travel by repairing roads and
building new ones suitable for motor vehicles. It proved to be a challenging task, since many of
these routes---like the one from Xalapa to Veracruz---were little more than well-worn footpaths.
In addition, the government faced acute political and financial issues stemming from years of
armed conflict, which posed major hurdles to rebuilding and expanding the road system.14
In 1921, the national government under President Alvaro Obregón outlined its plan to
invest in the repair of existing roads and the construction of much needed all-weather routes.
During his state of the union address in September, the president framed road building as part of
a larger program of economic and infrastructural reform that he promised for the country. He
noted that the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (SCOP---Secretariat of
Communications and Public Works) had earmarked more than $680,000 pesos in its annual
budget for national road-building efforts. In the speech, Obregón also praised the foreign-owned
oil companies that operated in Veracruz and Tamaulipas for building motor roads from interior
oil-producing regions in the huasteca veracruzana to the ports of Tuxpan, Tampico, and
Veracruz.15
The federal government emphasized the construction of roads that connected the nation
with its coastal and overland borders. It announced new motor routes from Mexico City to the
ports of Acapulco and Veracruz, and also planned a major road to the border from Enseñada to
Tijuana, Baja California.16 Federal authorities looked to develop intermodal projects that served
to expand shipping options for regional commercial activity by building new motor roads to
railroad depots and coastal ports. In 1921, the proposed Zaragoza-Tecolutla highway reflected
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this new policy; the 155-kilometer motor road connected the Interoceanic Railway of Mexico to
the port of Tecolutla located in the oil-producing zone of northern Veracruz. It opened another
path for trade between the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf Coast and also improved regional access
to rail freightage. Local boosters in Puebla and Veracruz used modernist language that framed
the project as an example of the “march of progress” that promised to push back against
“ignorance” and “superstition” once the route was completed and the region was opened up to
outside market forces. The national government assigned a budget of $40,000 pesos, which it
dispersed in monthly allotments of $5,000 to state and local construction crews to build the
road.17
Another ambitious project that emerged out of this period was the plan for a tri-national
road that united Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Automobile enthusiasts and probusiness associations in the U.S. Midwest had developed the idea inspired by other continentspanning projects like the Lincoln Highway. They envisioned a route that began in Winnipeg,
Manitoba, crossed the border near Pembina, North Dakota, and then continued until Laredo,
Texas where it entered Mexico with its terminus at Mexico City. By the end of 1920, American
construction crews had completed the route to Laredo and U.S. representatives of the
International Meridian Road Association met with officials from the new Obregón
administration, the state governors of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, and local pro-business
associations to discuss the next phase of the highway.18
The Chambers of Commerce in Laredo and Monterrey played an important role in
generating early cross-border collaboration on the Meridian project. In March 1921, a group of
Texans involved in the project offered to provide financial data and survey maps to support any
17
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feasibility studies their Nuevoleonense counterparts needed to conduct. By the following month,
Governor Juan M. Garcia had signaled his support and instructed the state Departamento de
Justicia, Instrucción Pública y Fomento (Department of Justice, Public Education, and
Development) to begin working with federal, local, and foreign groups already involved in
construction planning.19 Supporters in Nuevo León saw the Meridian Highway as a potential
boon to regional trade, especially the tourism industry, as automobile clubs from the United
States organized driving tours into Mexico. The initial draft of the road project envisioned a
route that travelled south from Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas to Monterrey and then turned
westward to connect to the picturesque capital city of Coahuila, Saltillo, before continuing to
Mexico City.20
The creation of cost effective and weather-resistant routes was an important priority for
the national and state governments in Mexico. In the 1820s, the Scottish civil engineer John
Loudon McAdam pioneered new methods for road building that came to be known as
“macadamization.” He successfully demonstrated that the natural topsoil, properly graded, could
serve as a sturdy base with a thin layer of surface materials on top to accommodate vehicular
traffic. Under his guidelines, road crews cut level paths about nine meters wide with a rise that
did not exceed three inches, and then set a coating of fine rock over the earthen road as a surface
that formed into a solid mass with regular traffic. Advances in building techniques over
subsequent decades introduced tar-bounded macadam or “tarmac” to provide a better seal for
roads against the effects of rain and snow. By the 1920s, Mexican engineers followed the
19
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procedures designed by their counterparts in the United States and Europe, relying on a
combination of asphalt-macadam and concrete to produce strong and cost-effective “all-weather”
motor roads.21
The construction of automobile-grade, all-weather routes required precise engineering
specifications. After labor crews cleared away vegetation and cut an earthen lane, all excavated
materials had to be removed and the lane swept clean. Next came the first layer of macadam rock
and any irregularities discovered in the evenness of the plane had to be addressed immediately;
afterward, a steamroller sealed this initial tier. The asphalt-concrete coating, which consisted of a
mixture of petroleum, sulfur, rock, and sand followed, and was applied to the road at a
temperature between 232 and 260 degrees Celsius. All materials had to remain absolutely dry
and also conform to limitations in size and weight to ensure that the concrete blend remained free
of impurities. The introduction of water or deviations in material proportions would weaken the
road’s structural integrity and lead to premature deterioration.22
Even under ideal circumstances, however, road building was difficult. Heavy vegetation,
harsh terrain, and high amounts of precipitation slowed construction and forced engineers to
contend with the threat of washout. Across Mexico, uneven mountainous terrain complicated the
grading process and---combined with weather---led to landslides that forced crews to clear away
the debris before they could proceed. Moreover, these environmental conditions took their toll on
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equipment and bodies, as mechanical breakdowns and physical exhaustion ensured a regular
turnover in the machines and personnel used to build roads.23
High-profile engineering failures dampened popular enthusiasm and endangered
President Obregón’s entire road-building program. One of the persistent problems that SCOP
faced in the early 1920s was finding qualified specialists from within its ranks to grapple with
the scope of executing a nationwide road-building program. During the 1910s, foreign oil
companies---looking to connect their inland operations to coastal ports---had built most motor
roads; much of this expertise, however, remained in the private sector and out of reach for
Obregón’s government. By the 1922 state of the union address, the president was forced to admit
that a dearth of experienced civil engineers had led to considerable delays in road building
timetables. For example, crews working on the road from Tijuana to Enseñada had failed to
correctly surface the route, which resulted in its complete loss during heavy rains, costing the
government tens of thousands of pesos in wasted labor hours and materials.24
The national government also faced a brewing budget and diplomatic crisis stemming
from the debt it had incurred with foreign creditors during the revolution. In October 1921,
Thomas W. Lamont, a high-ranking official with J.P. Morgan and Company, travelled to Mexico
City as a special representative of the International Committee of Foreign Bondholders. They
tasked him to negotiate renewed payments of Mexican debt that had lapsed due to the last
decade’s political and military conflicts. U.S. President Warren Harding heightened the pressure
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placed on Obregón’s administration by tying Washington’s diplomatic recognition of the new
government in Mexico to whether it successfully reached a deal with Lamont.25
The following months witnessed a series of difficult negotiations that initially led to the
U.S. State Department’s termination of loan guarantees in March 1922. The agreement finally
reached between the bondholders and the Mexican government in June stated that Mexico would
set aside fifteen million dollars in 1923 for a new fund to repay the debt, followed by an
additional 2.5 million annually.26 Facing a hardline policy from the Harding administration, the
Mexican Finance Secretary Adolfo de la Huerta had already begun to take steps in the federal
budget to ensure the viability of a repayment program, cutting projects he deemed as
nonessential. Linda Hall argues convincingly that de la Huerta was an unreliable negotiator for
the Obregón administration, whose personal ambition and inexperience ultimately undermined
many of the president’s policies. Throughout this process, she notes that the minister had tried to
ingratiate himself with Lamont by relying heavily on his counsel during the debt negotiation,
ultimately agreeing to key concessions with the foreign bankers without first consulting
Obregón.27
The debt arrangement reached between the U.S. and Mexican delegations had a
significant impact on the president’s road-building priorities. While the foreign bankers had
managed to force Mexico to levy a tax on oil exports and railroad operations, these monies were
not enough to cover the stipulated amounts. In April 1922, de la Huerta instructed SCOP to
suspend the majority of its road-building projects and to set that money aside to cover national
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debt payments.28 The repercussions were quickly felt across Mexico as the government ordered
construction crews to simply abandon building materials and equipment at job sites.29 Although
the Zaragoza-Tecolutla road was one of six projects reportedly spared the new austerity
measures, the national government failed to make timely payments to cover the costs of
construction. This problem caused considerable frustration among regional road-building
representatives who finally wrote Obregón in the summer and fall of 1922 for help. In
September, the municipal council of Cuetzalan, Puebla summed up the larger regional challenge:
“The towns across the sierra have not given up on building the road... but our individual labor is
not enough. WE LACK MONEY [sic] and that is the reason we come to you, Mr. President… to
ask for some small financial aid.” Ultimately, the national government acquiesced, sending out
payment of the final five thousand peso road subsidy, but only months after the original deadline
had elapsed.30
One of the highest profile roads to fall victim to the new austerity measures was the
Meridian Highway. Originally, in early 1922, federal authorities had agreed to allocate 21,000
pesos for the project and news outlets published a proposed draft of the full route from Laredo to
Mexico City. By May, however, state officials in Nuevo León began to worry about the national
government’s actual commitment given the brewing foreign debt crisis. In Monterrey, the
Chamber of Commerce wrote private banks for help, but was unable to secure sufficient amounts
of alternative financing. In July, El Universal reported that the SCOP had abruptly cancelled
plans to build the road due to budgetary constraints; instead, work proceeded on a significantly
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truncated route between Monterrey and Saltillo. Federal officials also continued to provide
Nuevo León with limited funds for road maintenance, but this support evaporated by the end of
the year. In 1923, as a stopgap measure, the state legislature allocated six thousand pesos in the
yearly budget to pay for critical road repairs.31
Mexican newspapers criticized the national government’s severe austerity measures.
Excélsior wrote:
The government will experience a heavy and lasting loss. Abandoning all of the
highways of the Republic, and with no one to attend to them, in less than two months
they will be… heavily damaged, which will be very costly to repair.
Other newspapers, however, were much less restrained in their anger towards the policy.
Silva’s El Dictamen decried austerity’s regional impact:
Motor highways have now become the lifeblood of nations… it is inconceivable that the
port of Veracruz---in this day and age---finds itself disconnected from all of the important
populations of the country, lacking even a modest road to go from here to the state
capital.32
El Universal had even sharper words; with it sarcastic tone, it not only criticized the
seemingly perennial budget challenges facing the national state, but also argued that the
country’s officials were willfully giving up many important opportunities for economic growth:
When Don Amado Aguirre, the secretary of Communications and Public Works, arrived
at the ministry, he wanted to develop an intelligent and patriotic policy for road
construction. He wanted new highways, to restore old ones, and bring together municipal
labor for the construction of local thoroughfares.
Disgracefully, in Mexico, on the rare occasions that it wants to develop sound
policy, it is tripped up by an eternal difficulty: the lack of money… It is a true shame that
it has happened this way, because the expansion and improvement of our network of
public roads is the secret to our prosperity.
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We want nothing to say of the boom that countries with good roads, and the
irreplaceable utility of trucks and automobiles---those modern elements of civilization--have had in the commercial development of their communities.
Even less still do we want to talk about the importance of tourism to our Mexico--which would have translated into public wealth and the arrival of civilized elements--because, disgracefully, tourism not only needs good roads, but also the absolute security
and guarantees for order that we are still so far from being able to offer.33
In Veracruz, state and local actors responded to this erosion in federal support by
proposing new regionally focused initiatives. In September 1922, the same month that the
Lamont Treaty went into effect, Governor Adalberto Tejeda unveiled a new labor program
designed to strengthen the power of statewide workers’ cooperatives. As part of this plan, he
proposed to continue rebuilding and expanding the road network in Veracruz through local
coordination with municipal officials and others to organize financing drives. The work began at
a small-scale as public officials in towns and cities across Veracruz focused on making
improvements to urban streets and repairing and building shorter regional roads suitable for
motor vehicle travel.34 Pro-business associations and automobile enthusiasts had already begun
collaborating alongside state officials to fundraise and coordinate planning efforts. In 1922,
Xalapa’s Chamber of Commerce hired day laborers to clear portions of the road to Veracruz port
and also make structural improvements to the route.35
State authorities also began careful negotiations with private companies to acquire land to
build new public roads. In the early and mid-1920s, however, public officials lacked robust
powers to expropriate land---these laws and precedents, which clarified and streamlined the
annexation procedures, did not begin to come into effect until later in the decade. Instead, the
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process was fraught with legal complications that ultimately slowed and altered planning
proposals. For example, in the spring of 1925, Veracruz officials unveiled tentative plans to build
a new road in the southern municipio of Lerdo de Tejada, which travelled from the eponymous
county seat to a nearby cemetery. They called for the purchase of land owned by the Ingenio San
Francisco, offering to pay the company ten-percent above market value for the parcel. Initially,
the mill’s head manager, Ramón Sain, refused the deal, explaining that the company was
bankrupt and in the process of being liquidated by a judge. He argued that the sale would divide
the ingenio’s remaining properties, greatly reducing their value. In August, Sain wrote to the
governor about an alternative offer the company had drafted months previously, but which local
authorities had rejected:
On 27 April of this year, we went before [the authorities] with a blueprint for the route. It
was the capriciousness of the local government of Lerdo de Tejada that guided the
existing path…[although] the work is more costly and of less public use... The reason the
route begins where it does is due to the presence of houses belonging to two or three
persons of influence within the municipal government.36
Whereas the local authorities had wanted a path that cut directly through the ingenio’s
southernmost property, Sain’s alternate proposal called for a route that instead skirted those
lands. He noted that it would also travel more closely to the hamlets of San Gabriel and San
Rafael, providing local residents there with better access to the cemetery grounds as well.37 By
November, officials correspondence indicates that the state government agreed with the
company’s plan, agreeing to a purchase that kept remaining land values intact and facilitated
improved regional mobility.38

36

Ramón Sain, letter to Governor Heriberto Jara, 21 August 1925, Exp. II.552, Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas
(COP), 1931, box 20, 1931, AGEV.
37

Croquis de parte del Ingenio de San Francisco (blueprint), 7 April 1925, Exp. II.552, COP, 1931, box 20, AGEV.

36

At the same time as state officials sorted through options to build new roads, there existed
a contentious debate over whether roads built by private companies could be opened to
unrestricted public access.

Since the early 1900s, British and American petroleum companies

operating in northern Veracruz had built some of Mexico’s first asphalt-concrete roads. These
firms had cleared away much of the existing triple-canopy rainforests that had covered the region
for thousands of years, and built the technical infrastructure used to develop the country’s oil
fields. In the case of road construction, privately financed technical crews over-engineered the
routes to withstand formidable local weather conditions. They cut wide clearings into the
deciduous forests to ensure roads received uninterrupted sunlight to keep the paths dry and
prevent overgrowth that would have increased ambient moisture. Initially, much of this work
was completed with manual labor as workers used machetes, shovels, and pick axes to remove
vegetation and open a route for subsequent paving. By the 1920s, construction teams augmented
these activities with new mechanical excavators to assist in opening thirty meters paths where
workers then used oil-powered steamrollers to grade dirt lanes and later coat them with rock and
asphalt.39
In contrast, the local footpaths in this region---many of which had existed since the
colonial period---were difficult to traverse and vulnerable to bad weather. In the springtime,
these crude routes were impassable due to heavy precipitation that also led to gradual
reclamation by the jungle. As a result, the new paved motor roads that connected coastal ports in
northern Veracruz with the oil fields further inland quickly emerged as popular alternatives for
people living in the Huasteca Veracruzana. Rival petroleum companies, however, tried to
38
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regulate regional traffic in an attempt to deny access to their competitors. They built barricades
that blocked roads and imposed a system of internal passports to regulate public use.40 Laws
dating to the nineteenth century governed this existing structure; the 1842 Ley de Caminos
granted landowners significant power over who could use the roads that were built on their
property. In the 1920s, however, this practice came under legal attack in a series of court cases
that raised questions about whether private businesses could continue to fully control access to
the roads they built.
In 1922, Governor Tejeda’s office received a complaint from E. Reyes, the municipal
president of Tepetzintla, about closures that the American-owned Huasteca Petroleum Company
(HPC) had imposed on its road to the port of Tuxpan. The governor’s secretary responded with
an order to allow local residents in the area continued access to the route and the matter appeared
resolved. Within days of this correspondence, however, the state received a letter from HPC
manager William Green, stating that area residents already enjoyed access to the road in
question. He accused the Compañía Petrolera El Agwi of waging a “dirty war” against HPC,
conspiring with local officials to file complaints on its behalf. Green asserted that since HPC
owned the road, and portions of the lands it crossed, the company could deny El Agwi’s vehicles
access.41
Green had left key details out of his defense of HPC policies for the Tepetzintla-Tuxpan
road, however. On 27 April, Reyes wrote another letter to the governor explaining that although
residents could use the route, they needed to carry company-authorized passports in order to do
so. HPC had also constructed a series of manned gates along the road that stopped traffic and
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turned away anyone the guards disapproved of; moreover, the municipal president argued that
local authorities on official business---driving vehicles El Agwi had conveniently loaned to
them---had been blocked by HPC’s sentries. Reyes declared the whole matter a violation of
rights protected by the Constitution of 1917, citing Article 11, which states, “Every man has the
right to enter the Republic, depart from it, travel within its territory, and change residence
without the need of security card, passport, or any similar device.” HPC responded that since the
gates had been built on portions of the road that crossed through property the company owned it
had the right to continue to restrict access due to the 1842 law. In September, after the governor
rejected HPC’s claim on the grounds that the road was necessary for local mobility in
Tepetzintla, Green sued the state of Veracruz and El Agwi in court.42
The lawsuit accused the state government of having violated the rights of property
ownership that protected HPC. Green said that Governor Tejeda had ordered Civil Defense units
onto company land to forcibly keep the gates on the road to Tuxpan open and had later tried to
divest HPC of its control of the property. He argued that these actions had denied HPC its right
to due process under the law and demanded that the court grant it legal protection from state
authorities. As part of the suit, Green showed proof of ownership of the Hacienda de San Felipe,
which the company had acquired in November 1920 to support its operations and accommodate
the road. In December 1922, the District Judge in Tuxpan ruled that the state government did not
have grounds to intervene in the dispute, because the matter had occurred on private property. At
the same time, however, it also denied Green’s motion to extend further legal protections to
HPC, stating that the company had failed to produce sufficient tangible evidence in favor of their
claims of abuse by state authorities. For the time being, private companies continued to enjoy
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limited rights to control public traffic on the roads they owned.43 This would soon change,
however, with a new president in office.

New Policy and Legal Paths for Road Building after 1924
In 1924, national elections brought to power a new leader who introduced policy changes
that gradually altered the legal foundation the foreign companies had relied on to regulate access
to their roads. Initially, however, president-elect Plutarco Elías Calles embarked on a series of
national and international tours, signaling that an era of economic prosperity was dawning in
Mexico. He wanted to reassure American and European investors that his incoming government
would continue to honor repayment agreements in response to growing fears of a potential
default.44 Calles also reaffirmed a commitment to national reform and the modernization of the
country’s transportation infrastructure. In his inauguration address, he tied the success of his
presidency to the material progress of all Mexicans, in particular the peasants who had witnessed
only limited improvements to everyday life in recent years.45
As president, Calles revived the national road-building program, instituting policies and
bureaucratic structures that had a lasting impact on the way Mexico planned and implemented its
highway network. In January 1925, he dispatched a team of civil engineers to the United States
to survey road building and create working relationships with American officials. The federal
government also instituted a new tax on gasoline sales, which collected an estimated 1.6 million
pesos monthly for the road construction budget. In March, Calles established a new agency
43
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within SCOP to centralize and coordinate all federal road-building efforts. The Comisión
Nacional de Caminos (National Road Commission) was used to improve the Mexican
government’s ability to negotiate with the foreign companies invited to submit bids on new roadbuilding contracts. The goal of the agency was two-fold: first, the president wanted to ensure no
single foreign entity dominated the entire road-building agenda in Mexico. Second, the president
envisioned the Comisión Nacional as a mechanism to train a new generation of Mexican civil
engineering and road construction crews.46
The Mexican print media supported and reiterated the new president’s road-building
policy to a national audience. In 1925, Excélsior journalist Luis Mayer wrote that years of poorly
maintained roads only served to hold back the economic and industrial potential of the nation. He
argued that paved roads and highways not only contributed greatly to productivity, but also had
an additional impact on modernizing society in general. They helped to "promote and spread
general and individual well-being" and served as "moralizing, educative, and civilizing
influences for the good of society." Mayer cited the need to remain competitive with other
nation-states on a global scale and juxtaposed the horse-drawn cart with the automobile as an
example of the challenges facing Mexico. He wrote that the former, which symbolized the past,
also represented economic stagnation, and concluded that it was necessary to replace outdated
modes of conveyance, urging readers to support “the modern road… as one of those
indispensable fundamentals for the incorporation of more intensive and equitable growth."47 In a
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subsequent editorial, Excélsior further expounded on this appeal, calling for "every man, woman,
and child of Mexico to fight for good highways."48
U.S. reporters also touted the possibilities for new transnational and economic
connections that stemmed from the policy changes occurring in Mexico. In January 1925, the
New York Times characterized Mexican road building as a means to develop a new market for
the American automobile industry.49 Later that year, U.S. carmakers offered to extend a thirty
million dollar loan to Mexico to help finance the national highway network. Company managers
agreed with the contemporary media consensus and saw Mexican consumers as a potential boon
for automobile sales. Moreover, there was a pressing need to cultivate foreign markets as the
industry had recently suffered financial setbacks due overproduction that left large quantities of
unsold stock in the United States.50
Calles rejected this loan offer, however, reaffirming his position that financing of the
nation’s roads had to come from domestic sources. In August 1925, the Comisión Nacional
publically stipulated that all agreements signed with foreign construction firms had to hire
Mexican citizens for seventy percent of available administrative and engineering posts and one
hundred percent of all labor jobs.51 This policy directly responded to hiring controversies in other
industries dominated by foreign managers, particularly the petroleum sector, where the national
government was embroiled in a long-simmering dispute with U.S. and British corporations over
how they conducted operations. Myrna Santiago shows that the foreign-owned oil firms typically
reserved the highest paying jobs for white foreigners, while local Mexicans were paid
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considerably less for dangerous work and were also housed in areas exposed to higher amounts
of environmental contamination.52
National politicians had resolved not to allow these outstanding problems to carry over
into the new road-building program. In the summer of 1925, SCOP signed its first foreign
consulting and construction deal with Byrne Brothers of Chicago. The company cited its
experience in designing the highway network in North Carolina as evidence of its expertise in
overseeing large-scale, infrastructure projects. Mexican officials commissioned Byrne to
undertake a series of projects that included the revival of the Laredo-Mexico City leg of the
canceled Meridian Highway, and also construction of a new road from Mexico City to Puebla,
among others. They also wanted Byrne to participate in training a new generation of Mexican
road engineers to avoid the problem of inexperience that had complicated construction initiatives
in past years.53
While Byrne Brothers was given considerable influence over the practical aspects of
Mexican road building, the national government reaffirmed to the public that it held final say
over the decision-making process. In an interview with Excélsior, the Comisión Nacional
spokesperson León Salinas noted that the agreement made with Byrne reserved Mexico’s right to
terminate the contract at any time if construction efforts did not meet expectations or if they
exceeded budget limits after one year. He also dispelled rumors that this foreign company had
won exclusive control of road planning in Mexico, clarifying that the national government
planned to seek out other contractors as well.54 In fact, by the end of 1926, Mexican authorities
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had exercised their power to terminate the deal with Byrne, citing budget overruns. They
transferred construction duties of the Laredo-Mexico City route to an engineering team within
SCOP, while also evaluating new contractors, including the Calhoun Highway Association of
Cheraw, South Carolina to consult on other road-building projects.55
By 1926, with the establishment of the Comisión Nacional and a policy framework that
emphasized nationalistic development, federal authorities and state legislatures turned their
attention to legal reforms of existing road law. The Congress of Deputies directly addressed the
problem of public access that local communities in Veracruz had encountered in 1922 when it
approved a new Ley de Caminos y Puentes (Law of Roads and Bridges), overturning the 1842
law. The new law granted state officials the authority to declare open any private routes
identified as important to regional mobility and economic growth.56
A subsequent legal dispute between the Huasteca Petroleum Company and the state
government of Veracruz tested the 1926 law and underscored a shift in the political fight over
control of privately funded roads. In July1930, Governor Tejeda signed into law a series of new
statutes that redefined caminos vecinales and caminos privados in the state. All roads that
connected townships and municipalities together, and which also served regional economic
needs were to be labeled caminos vecinales and thenceforth considered “public and free to use,
without any limitations placed on them beyond state-mandated tolls and transit laws.” The law
also very narrowly defined caminos privados as “roads which serve to give exit to a property…
or which connect two or more contiguous private estates.” No longer could simply financing a
road, or routing it across a portion of privately owned land, give a company a claim over it; state
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legislatures were now able to seek a more active role in determining regional infrastructure
accessibility.57
The state law, which directly threatened the power of the foreign-owned oil companies in
northern Veracruz, was quickly challenged. In October 1930, Miguel W. Guerrero, a litigator for
Huasteca Petroleum, brought a suit before the Third District Court in Villa Cuauhtémoc, asking
it to strike down the new regulation. He argued that the road in question, a route that served the
northern county of Panuco along the border with Tamaulipas, was too important for servicing
pipelines in the region to be turned over to control by the state. Guerrero cited decisions that
SCOP and the Supreme Court had made in 1919 and 1921, respectively, which had reaffirmed
the road as private and given HPC the power to regulate access to it.58
The merits of the case turned on the question of whether roads built across private land
could be claimed as public thoroughfares. Guerrero had also used the 1842 road law as precedent
and justification for the company’s position. HPC had won its partial victory in the earlier 1922
case, in large measure because it had limited the suit to portions of the road on territory it owned.
Since the 1926 federal law had empowered state legislatures to pass new statutes, however,
lawyers for the government of Veracruz argued that it had simply acted within its power when it
declared the road to Panuco as a “camino vecinal,” providing for unrestricted regional traffic.
The district judge agreed and threw out Guerrero’s suit as baseless; no additional appeals were
recorded in the state archives. By upholding the new laws on roads and bridges, the ruling
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ultimately delivered a major legal victory to local communities and state officials on the issue of
regional mobility and public access to transport infrastructure.59
The 1930 road laws that Tejeda had ratified also raised legal objections about who was
responsible for paying for public infrastructure costs. In October 1930, María Luisa Esteva, a
local property owner in Xalapa, named the city’s municipal council, the state legislature, and the
governor in a lawsuit filed in federal court, claiming a tax created by the new laws violated her
constitutional rights. The municipal government had levied fees on land she owned in Xalapa,
directing the monies generated through the tax to pay for asphalt paving and other improvements
to roads adjacent to her properties. In a letter to the federal court in Xalapa, Esteva wrote, “On
October 23, an employee of the municipal treasury demanded that I pay the expressed sum of
$77.50 pesos for paving as well as a twenty-two peso fine.” She argued that the amount
demanded of her was more than six percent of the value of her farmland, which violated one of
the limits capping tax burdens written into the laws. The state gave her three days to pay, and
when she refused, local authorities in Xalapa garnished the rents she collected on the land,
leading to the lawsuit.60
Within days of opening the case, the judge in Xalapa ordered a 72-hour freeze on any
further actions taken by government authorities against Esteva. In response, Governor Tejeda
appealed to a higher court. On 15 November, the First District Judge of Veracruz, Arturo
Martínez, upheld Esteva’s case in a limited ruling that ordered the government to drop further
prosecution of the property owner, but did not require authorities to return the embargoed
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funds.61 Ultimately, the case highlighted the potential for conflict over transactions related to
local road-building efforts. Although lawsuits remained a common facet of contentious transport
infrastructure projects, in succeeding years, state officials typically avoided specific duties levied
on individual property ownership. Instead, they increasingly relied on sales taxes on alcohol,
gasoline, tourism, and related goods and services in funding future construction budgets.

Conclusion
The policy initiatives that Calles launched at the beginning of his tenure built on his
predecessor’s agenda and attacked many of the problems that had plagued road building in the
early 1920s. Federal authorities and the national legislature cultivated new funding sources via
the gasoline tax, allowing construction projects to proceed regardless of the pressures of foreign
debt repayments. The centralization of national road-building projects into a powerful new
agency facilitated negotiations with private contractors, leading to contract terms that not only
benefited Mexico financially, but also helped to train a new generation of civil engineers. All of
these policy achievements occurred alongside changes in the legal framework on roads that
stressed a nationalistic discourse and addressed questions of mobility and ownership. In doing
so, the Mexican state also reasserted its authority vis-à-vis powerful foreign interests operating in
the country. The next chapter explores the everyday impact of these policies as the Comisión
Nacional confronted a host of new political, social, and environmental challenges that emerged
once labor crews broke ground on the president’s ambitious road-building agenda after 1925.

61

Luis Monterogüido, Judge of the First Instance, letter to Governor Tejeda, 4 November 1930; Governor Tejeda,
letter to Monterogüido, 5 November 1930; Arturo Martínez, First District Judge of Veracruz, ruling on the Esteva
case, letter to Governor Tejeda, 15 November 1930, Exp. 2.069, COP, 1930-1935, box 86, AGEV.

47

Chapter 3
Bureaucracy, Politics and Culture:
Building Roads and Shaping the Nation, 1925-1935
When Salvador Toscano first looked out across the arid and mountainous landscape of
northern Mexico he may have sensed the enormity of the task ahead. In 1927, he arrived in
Monterrey, Nuevo León, as the first chief engineer of the Northern Division of the Comisión
Nacional de Caminos, the agency President Plutarco Elías Calles created to supervise and build
federal motor highways. At the time, the region---like much of the rest of the nation---contained
a patchwork web of roads that varied considerably in quality and coverage. Local chambers of
commerce in towns and cities across the eastern U.S.-Mexico borderlands had advocated for and
attempted to finance small regional projects that fed into larger ambitions. Toscano’s objective in
northern Mexico was to build a new two-lane, asphalt-concrete highway from the border at
Laredo, Texas to Monterrey, and then continue that route on to Mexico City.1 In a profile, the
New York Times described him as a stoic individual, “a man who never smiles,” who built roads
"with the finest masonry... trimmed to a point where the most dilapidated flivver can negotiate
without trouble."2 With a U.S. education and laconic, scientific professionalism, the paper
portrayed Toscana as the embodiment of a new kind of Mexico that eschewed the political chaos
of previous decades in favor of technological “progress.”3
President Calles echoed these sentiments when he characterized the road-building
program as an important component of national rejuvenation. He articulated an agenda that not
1
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only looked to construct and maintain new roads, but also used the Comisión Nacional de
Caminos to imbue Mexican society with an appreciation for the benefits of modern transport
infrastructure. In 1928, he boasted that the agency had organized a new National Roads
Congress, which served as a forum to bring together specialists from each of the states to meet
and collaborate with federal authorities and representatives from the private sector. The event
also included exhibit space for the debut of new technical equipment that vendors hoped to sell
to Mexican road-building officials.4
In 1930, the newly elected president, Emilio Portes Gil, reflected on the federal
government’s accomplishments in coordinating road-building efforts with its state and local
counterparts.5 Five years after its establishment, the national commission had completed work on
1,420 kilometers of new federal highways, including the strand of road that connected Laredo to
Monterrey. The remainder of the fledgling network of highways extended out from the federal
capital, connecting it to Cuernavaca and Acapulco to the south, Toluca to the west, Pachuca in
the north, and the city of Puebla to the east. These were not static achievements, however.
Federal authorities envisioned them as dynamic parts of a greater whole, actively planning and
surveying routes to extend the network, while state agencies also made significant contributions,
building thousands of kilometers of state highways and local roads.6
This chapter considers the organizational culture of the new road-building bureaucracy
and its everyday impact on local communities and regional mobility as it began operations in the
mid-to-late 1920s. The first section outlines the structure of the national commission and the
4
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early state agencies that built roads to better understand how these groups executed new projects;
it also considers how road-building policy evolved to provide for greater federal-state
collaboration. The second part of the chapter is divided into two sections, examining case studies
of major road-building projects in Nuevo León and Veracruz, respectively, after the creation of
the Juntas Locales de Caminos---state-operated Local Road Boards---in 1933. It considers locallevel progress in roadwork and highlights the differences in population distribution, politics, and
construction priorities in these states that led to differences in the formation of their regional
road-building bureaucracies. The chapter ends with an exploration of the national and foreign
media’s coverage of road construction and “motor culture” that took shape in personal interest
stories, travelogues, and advertisements related to automobility.

Organizational Structure and National Policy after 1925
Between 1925 and 1933, the Comisión Nacional de Caminos operated largely
independent from the rest of SCOP, and maintained close ties with the office of the president.
Calles appointed a special three-member board to oversee the new agency and administer the
gasoline tax that financed its budget. From Mexico City, the national commission directed
engineering work and played a critical political role that managed media inquiries, organized
technical conferences, and supervised work with private contractors. It established a plan to
initially build five major highway projects
These included routes from the capital to Laredo, Guadalajara, Acapulco, and Veracruz as well
as a separate thoroughfare from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to Mazatlán, Sinaloa, known as the
Inter-Oceanic Highway. The total cost, representing more than a decade of construction, was
estimated at 73,000,000 pesos; the Laredo-Mexico City road---1,240 kilometers in length---was
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the most expensive, representing almost a third of this budget at 20,000,000 pesos. In contrast,
the 463-kilometer highway from Veracruz port to the federal capital was priced at 8,000,000
pesos.7 The national commission prepared and delivered detailed, monthly progress reports on
construction efforts to the president’s personal secretary. It also collected data that regional
managers submitted via telegraph from job sites. The composition of the commission’s field
teams usually included technical crews, consisting of a senior engineer and two to four junior
engineers who conducted topographical surveys ahead of a series of larger construction brigades,
each of which could employ as many as 120 workers.8
In May 1928, an eight-page dossier prepared for President Calles revealed the activities
of these brigades and associated costs as they worked on the Pan-American Highway. In Nuevo
León, the national commission had two technical groups and four separate work crews in
operation. The report stated that they had excavated more than 10,000 cubic meters of earth,
employed explosives teams to cut openings through the state’s mountainous terrain, and also
built a series of dirt embankments to facilitate road construction with the loose material.
Additional work details had installed concrete tubing and built drainage ditches to guard against
flooding, while pavers surfaced 46,760 cubic meters of dirt road with gravel coating, and
painters applied traffic markings to the finished routes to facilitate motor travel. The national
commission estimated that it paid 2.5 pesos per cubic meter of highway built; this figured
translated into an estimated monthly operating budget of more than 116,000 pesos for the PanAmerican Highway’s field crews alone. At the time, taking the commission’s five major
7
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highway projects into account, the work underway likely equated to nearly 600,000 pesos in
nationwide labor and material costs each month.9
Although well staffed in technical and labor terms, what the national commission lacked
was a clear mechanism for communication with local communities to directly address grievances
that arose during road building. In the 1920s, it relied on a variety of informal federal and state
political channels to address problems; in some cases, citizens wrote directly to the president’s
office, which then forwarded the correspondence to the national commission for an answer. In
other instances, queries went through state governors, who in turn contacted the appropriate
federal officials. For example, in 1929, residents from Ciénaga de Flores and Linares, Nuevo
León wrote separately to the governor about the local impact of construction efforts related to the
Pan-American Highway. The former wanted assurances that the national commission would not
damage nearby properties, while the latter implored the agency not to alter its original plan for
the highway, fearing the newer course would cause undue harm to the town’s agricultural
productivity. In each of these cases, the governor’s office---acting as an intermediary---reported
to local constituents that the federal agency had taken the matters under consideration. For
Ciénaga de Flores, it promised to reimburse in full any property claims the town filed, while for
Linares, it agreed to proceed with the original survey route.10
Far from a political leviathan, the national commission responded to local concerns--albeit in an indirect fashion---while conducting a narrow mission that focused on the
construction of federal highways. Nor was it the only public entity dedicated to road building at
9
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this time as state-level agencies across Mexico---separate from the national bureaucracy--worked on a number of smaller-scale transport infrastructure projects. For example, from its
creation in 1927, Nuevo León’s Comisión de Caminos del Estado (CCE---Commission for State
Roads) had an average yearly operating budget of 300,000 pesos; in 1931, alone, it worked on
half a dozen asphalt-concrete motor routes, including Monterrey-Saltillo, Linares-Galeana, and
Cadereyta-Altotonga.11 Field crews on these projects typically employed between seventy and
one hundred individuals, the majority working as manual laborers, or peones, for an average
daily wage of 1.37 pesos, while specialized staff, including clerical personnel, mechanics, and
tractor operators, earned between three and nine pesos a day.12
Although the CCE took the lead on road building in the state, it also out-sourced projects
to private contractors. In the mid-1920s, General Juan Andreu Almazán, an associate of
President Calles founded the Anáhuac Construction Company, which supervised and built roads
across a number of states. In Nuevo León, the CCE used Anáhuac in a support role, assigning it
to build bridges, widen existing motor lanes, and conduct road repairs and maintenance. In 1928,
for example, state documents indicate that the agency paid Anáhuac 75,000 pesos to build a
motor bridge in Monterrey that connected the neighborhood of San Luisito in the southern zone
of Colonia Independencia to the rest of the city. The terms of the agreement tasked the company
with surveying and grading the project as well as coordinating the materials to construct the
bridge. The CCE, however, did supply motor vehicles, including work trucks, to Anáhuac to
facilitate its activities.13 The company maintained a close relationship with the state; engineers
11
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who worked for Anáhuac later appeared in the employment and payroll registries of the state
road-building bureaucracy in the early 1930s. As further indication of the overlap that existed
between public and private sector road-building organizations, Almazán later served as head of
SCOP (1930-31) in the administration of President Pascual Ortiz Rubio.14
The structure of state-level road construction policy was not uniform across Mexico,
however. In Veracruz, for example, the state government initially lacked a special road-building
office, and instead used its Departamento de Fomento y Agricultura (DFA---Department of
Development and Agriculture) for projects. State archives from the late 1920s indicate that
government officials emphasized urban road improvement projects, such as the repair and
asphalt coating of city streets. One of the largest undertakings the DFA managed was the 1926
construction of a new road and installation of modern sewage and artificial lighting in Xalapa’s
Carrillo Puerto neighborhood, two kilometers south of the city center. The plan enhanced access
to intermodal transport options as well as to popular tourist destinations. It connected the railroad
station at Avenida Bolivia to El Dique Street, which ran alongside a picturesque lake near the
local shrine to the Virgin of Guadalupe. The DFA spent 20,000 pesos over three months on the
project and relied on a diverse set of partners: it recruited 350 day laborers, hired local
contractors for specialized services, and paid foreign-owned companies for various inputs. These
corporate vendors included El Águila and Pierce Oil and the Mexican subsidiaries of General
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Electric and Westinghouse---made up of shareholders from the local Chamber of Commerce--which supplied construction equipment, tools, asphalt, and other building materials.15
Local civic improvement committees also formed across Veracruz to operate fundraising
campaigns and recruit labor in support of road building. In Tuxpan, in 1926, the inaugural issue
of the Boletín de Mejoras Materiales de Tuxpan reported that the local lady’s guild and five
private citizens donated 4,937 pesos to coat the city’s main street with asphalt and concrete,
while the state government contributed an extra five hundred pesos to the effort. The newspaper
noted that local oil company managers had offered to lend construction equipment, while other
residents volunteered their labor. The bulletin framed the work as a broad, grassroots social
collaboration that involved “workers, capitalists, men, and women; everyone was ready to do
their part enthusiastically to beautify Tuxpan and advance it along the road to progress.”16
Similarly, in 1928, in Paso del Macho, citizens formed a local road board, which collected
donations that ranged from 5 to 300 pesos. They held dances, festivals, and other civic events to
help boost income when construction funds were low. Private donations and public fundraisers
ultimately accrued---over the course of two years---a budget of more than 3,200 pesos, which the
committee spent on road and bridgework.17
By 1930, Veracruz had formed a new agency that expanded transport policy to emphasize
construction of state roads and highways. The state government broke up the Departamento de
Fomento y Agricultura, creating an independent state agricultural commission, while combining
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all infrastructure development projects into a single, public works agency. The new
Departamento de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas (DCOP---Department of Communications
and Public Works), became a powerful regional actor in Veracruz that built thousands of
kilometers of roads across the state, collected taxes for construction efforts, and played a critical
intermediary role between the state government and local communities.18
At this time, federal and state authorities across Mexico looked to develop new
collaborative programs in support of road building. Tentative measures had already been
underway as state governments increasingly moved to centralize road construction efforts into
special agencies like the CCE in Nuevo León and DCOP in Veracruz. These organizations
trained and provided experience to a growing number of civil engineers and helped establish a
dynamic regional bureaucracy that could interact with federal authorities. The national
government also proposed reorganizing the Comisión Nacional de Caminos, as part of a larger
administrative initiative to improve federal-state cooperation and budget sharing. The agency
would be renamed the Dirección Nacional de Caminos (DNC---National Road Directorate) and
come entirely under the purview of the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas.19 In
addition, this plan called for the creation of state Juntas Locales de Caminos (JLC---Local Road
Boards), individual federally recognized state-level boards that implemented construction
projects, managed road-building personnel, and corresponded with local groups about their needs
for transport infrastructure. State governors served as the president of the JLCs with the power to
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approve budget expenditures, while SCOP appointed a senior engineer who ran the day-to-day
activities of the agency and served as a liaison between the federal and state bureaucracies.20
In 1934, the national government also passed a new Ley de Cooperación por Caminos
(Law of Cooperation for Roads), which formalized many of these initiatives. Along with
reorganizing the national commission, it reworked the process for road-building appropriations,
requiring state governments to begin to contribute fifty percent of funds for the operational
budget.21 This arrangement provided incentives for both sides; on the one hand, it allowed
national authorities to decrease their heavy financial commitment to road building due to
economic pressure stemming from the global recession underway. On the other hand, it gave
state governors and business groups a place alongside SCOP in determining how new roads were
subsidized and built. The law represented a major shift in the federal government’s practical
implementation of its countrywide road network. Whereas the national commission had operated
largely separate from the state-level bureaucracy, the JLCs regionalized this work, giving state
authorities greater influence over the decision-making process and implementation of large-scale
multi-state projects, like the Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic Highways.
This process represented a limited decentralization of federal power to the states. The
Juntas Locales de Caminos served as a bureaucratic mechanism for cooperation on budgetary
and technical matters between the national and state governments. Both sides contributed funds
and had a say in how the agency operated within a given state. The administrative structure of
the new road-building bureaucracy, however, differed from state to state, underscoring how---as
Rubin notes---political power could take on “multiple regional arrangements.” In some cases,
such as Nuevo León, the Junta Local de Caminos became the only public organization in charge
20
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of building roads and assigning related contracts to private companies. In contrast, in Veracruz,
the state government---as well as some wealthier municipios---continued to fund and operate
separate road-building agencies that existed alongside the federal JLC for many years.22
State legislation that formed each JLC followed a general model, but adoption was not a
uniform process. New guidelines placed state governments in charge of local road building and
set up a coordinating committee composed of the governor, SCOP, the state Chamber of
Commerce, and regional transportation companies to supervise the JLC. Although Veracruz and
Nuevo León created local road boards in 1933, the operational structure of their regional roadbuilding bureaucracies took on notably different forms. In Veracruz, DCOP remained the
primary organization responsible for practical implementation of local and regional road
construction, and only later, in the 1940s, did the Junta Central de Caminos de Veracruz (JCCV--Central Road Board of Veracruz) emerge as a fully independent entity. In contrast, Nuevo León
re-organized the CCE from early on, transitioning everyday responsibility for road building,
including management of personnel and equipment to the JLCNL. The name “Comisión de
Caminos del Estado” continued to be used in a variety of capacities, describing the supervisory
board that the governor ran as well as the JLCNL itself, but the structure of the older
organization was subsumed into the new agency by 1934.23
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To further facilitate federal-state collaboration, SCOP established a Department of
Cooperation within the new DNC to serve as a conduit for communication between Mexico City
and the regional road-building boards. Each month, the JLC managers submitted detailed payroll
and expense reports to the secretariat in order to receive the federal government’s contribution
for roadwork. The Department of Cooperation served as a clearinghouse, forwarding the
appropriate funds to state accounts at the Bank of Mexico. These deposits usually occurred in
increments of seven to sixteen thousand pesos every two weeks, amounting to a monthly
disbursement of at least fourteen thousand pesos from federal coffers for requests ranging from
administrative and labor payroll to material and equipment expenses.24 The department provided
a clear mechanism for state-level officials to directly coordinate with central authorities in
Mexico City over regional road-building initiatives. This arrangement also allowed federal
authorities to keep close tabs on the progress that state road-building boards made. The
department, however, did not act as an arbiter, but merely a facilitator of national funds. Once
the DNC and state governor approved the JLC’s budget, these requests were usually processed
with little additional internal scrutiny.25

Everyday Aspects of Statewide Road-Building Efforts, 1930-1935
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, two major highways---the Pan-American and the InterOceanic---defined much of road-building policy in Nuevo León. In addition, Monterrey’s role as
an industrial engine and the concentration of state inhabitants living there made the city a crucial
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factor in the development of new roads. One of the key objectives of roadwork in Nuevo León
was to extend motor route access from Monterrey to regional population centers, and in turn
connect these areas to more rural and isolated areas. On the one hand, state authorities
emphasized construction of caminos vecinales to the Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic
Highways, because these trunk lines provided easy access to the state capital. On the other hand,
federal officials saw these asphalt-concrete highways as important economic conduits for the rest
of the nation. The routes highlighted Monterrey’s importance as a transshipment point with the
United States, while also opening northern Mexico to foreign motor tourism.26
Similar motivations were at play in Veracruz, but they took on distinct forms due to
differences in population distribution and regional economic priorities. Road building was less
concentrated around a single city or a handful of national highways; instead, in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, state officials and regional communities emphasized highly localized
construction efforts. Informal labor crews built low-cost dirt roads from rural hamlets to
neighboring small towns, and in turn the latter entities looked to improve access to the nearest
midsized city. This arrangement allowed smaller, but regionally important places like Córdoba,
Tantoyuca, and Acayucan to emerge as points of convergence for local road-building agendas.
Bigger or more politically powerful cities like Veracruz and Xalapa did not dominate
construction plans in the same way that Monterrey did in Nuevo León.27
The bureaucratic structure of the road-building agencies in Nuevo León and Veracruz
reveals the negotiated character of the federal-state political and economic relationship. By
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reorganizing the DNC and implementing shared funding mechanisms, these policies ceded
influence to state governments. Less a process of centralization, road building at this time
highlighted processes of compromise where federal authorities turned over aspects of the
construction of national highways to the states. In the face of the global economic challenges of
the 1930s, national and state officials formed new partnerships, coordinating planning agendas
and also contending with local demands for improved regional motor transportation
infrastructure.

Nuevo León
In late 1932, Nuevo León counted more than 1,500 kilometers of completed asphalt and
macadam roads. From the state border with Tamaulipas, the Pan-American Highway travelled
four hundred kilometers to Monterrey and continued southbound to Allende, Montemorelos, and
General Terán. It then became a macadamized gravel path for an additional 225 kilometers to
Linares, before crossing again into Tamaulipas. Two other major macadam roads left Monterrey
for Saltillo, Coahuila to the west and Cadereyta Jiménez to the east. At this time, the majority of
new road-building work occurred in the eastern and southern portions of the state. The route to
Cadereyta Jiménez represented the initial phase of local efforts on the Inter-Oceanic Highway
with planned connections to half a dozen towns including Los Ramones, Villa China, and
General Bravo en route to Reynosa, TM. To the south, from Linares, survey teams marked the
construction path for a state highway that added a dozen towns, including the agricultural and
mining region of Dr. Arroyo, considered one of the most isolated and difficult to reach areas of
Nuevo León.28
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State legislation creating the JLCNL went into effect at the beginning of 1933, and
officials tasked with setting up the new agency took over everyday management of the CCE.
SCOP appointed Salvador Toscana as head of the new agency; he brought years of experience to
this position, having previously served as senior engineer of the Pan-American Highway in
northern Mexico. The administrative changeover occurred gradually; when ordered to identify
deficiencies in transport infrastructure in the state, for example, Toscana relied on CCE technical
studies to articulate the JLCNL’s objectives. In August 1933, he reported that many communities
still lacked access to Monterrey and the state railroad network, which hurt regional economic
development:
The fundamental challenge for the state, in terms of travel, is to link---by means of
modern highways---all of the municipios within it, so that they can be connected with the
city of Monterrey. There is also an urgent need to provide an outlet to regional production,
for its transport along the general thoroughfares of the nation, namely the railroads and
highways. Likewise, the tourism factor will undoubtedly be a source of wealth for Nuevo
León.29
At the time, the DNC was in the process of drafting a new six-year plan for road building
that emphasized state-level management of new interstate highway construction across Mexico.
“The state road commission is going to carefully study the program for the six-year plan,”
Toscana told the governor, “with the objective of… reasonably considering only those roads
that---having accounted for the available resources of the state---can be finished.” He underlined
completion of the proposed extension of motor roads in central and southern Nuevo León,
framing construction of these routes within a nationally oriented perspective that characterized
them as imperative to progress on the Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic Highways.30
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The JLCNL’s budget was larger than its predecessor’s, but also reflected a general
reduction in federal commitments to road building due to the global recession. Starting in 1933,
the agency had 600,000 pesos annually at its disposal---double the average CCE budget. Nuevo
León’s contributions to the JLCNL remained largely on par with funding amounts it had
allocated to the CCE, but the national government’s portion contrasted sharply with what it had
once spent on roads in the state. Although it is unclear why state-level expenditures did not also
decrease, this new policy arrangement underscores how the national government sought to
balance its financial and political commitments with state governments. In the late 1920s, the
federal budget had allocated annually one million pesos to the Pan-American Highway, but the
sum it provided the JLCNL amounted to only a third of previous subsidies. Moreover, national
officials stipulated that the state road-building agency had to submit detailed progress reports in
order to receive allocations, and that the DNC would determine its monthly contribution based
on these records.31 In other words, the federal government’s 300,000 pesos represented the
maximum amount it afforded the JLCNL, but the actual contribution could be less if the agency
did not show adequate need. SCOP did allow an exception, however, which provided some
benefit to the JLC’s budget. It agreed to pay one hundred percent of expenses incurred in a given
month above 3,000 pesos for bridge construction and asphalt paving on national highways; it
also promised to finance long-term maintenance of these routes. Nevertheless, the majority of
roadwork rarely exceeded the monthly cost cap, and when it did the excess sums billed to the
SCOP remained under 1,500 pesos.32
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In response to this budgetary arrangement, the JLCNL set a number of key policies that
had a significant impact on state construction efforts. It prioritized all roadwork into “national”
and “local” categories; the former described multi-state projects like the Pan-American and InterOceanic Highways, which were always asphalt-concrete routes once completed. For local roads
that traveled between communities in the state, the JLCNL allowed for much greater variability
in surface quality. High traffic zones, especially near Monterrey, often received asphalt roads,
but in rural areas, the agency emphasized the construction of macadamized-gravel and simple
dirt routes. This policy provided significant cost savings, but sacrificed long-term durability and
increased vulnerability to local environmental conditions.33
Between 1933 and 1935, the JLCNL completed the road-building projects it had inherited
from the CCE. In early 1933, a field survey Toscana and another engineer conducted highlighted
the challenges facing the agency. Not only did many parts of the state lack drivable motor routes,
in some areas, they also found that as much as ninety percent of existing roads required
immediate attention to clear debris, repair potholes and resurface the route.34 The JLCNL
addressed this multi-faceted problem by dedicating a quarter of its field budget to repair and
resurface roads.35 It directed construction efforts through two statewide divisions, sub-divided
into seven regional brigades composed of twenty-two field crews, which employed an estimated
monthly workforce of more than 1,400. The first division operated across central Nuevo León
32

CCE, Informes Camino a Villa de García, AH, JLCNL (SCOP) 1932, box 6; Pablo Quiroga, telegram to Francisco
Cárdenas, 12 November 1932, Quiroga, telegram to Francisco Cárdenas, 12 November 1932, AH, Comisión
Nacional de Caminos, 1921-1959, box 1, AGGNL.
33

CCE, Informes Camino a Villa de García, AH, JLCNL (SCOP) 1932, box 6; Toscano, letter to Charles Mumm,
describing surface materials of Linares-Matehuala road, 3 March 1934, AH, JLCNL (SCOP) 1934, AGGNL.
34

Expediente: Caminos y Carreteras, Tomo I, D/661 (5-3)/10, AH, Comisión Nacional de Caminos, 1921-1959, box
1, AGGNL.
35

Cárdenas, Programa de trabajos para el mes de septiembre 1933, box 7; Toscano, Programa de trabajos para el
mes de marzo 1934, 1 March 1934, JLCNL (SCOP) 1934, box 9, AGGNL.

64

from El Jabalí in the east to the border with Coahuila, near Saltillo; the second group worked on
roads that extended from Linares across the southern municipios of Dr. Arroyo and Mier y
Noriega, en route to Matehuala, San Luis Potosí.36 Depending on experience, peones in one of
these divisions earned between 80 centavos and 1.5 pesos for a day’s labor, while crew
supervisors and specialty workers, including machine operators, bricklayers, and carpenters
could make up to nine pesos daily. In contrast, the JLCNL paid staff engineers an average
monthly salary of 308 pesos, while the chief engineer, in charge of running the division, earned
661 pesos a month.37
The Jabalí-Saltillo group was the smaller of the two divisions, but its field crews outspent
the southern brigades by as much as two-to-one. It had an estimated monthly operating budget of
14,000 pesos, which funded one survey team and three labor units that employed 450 peones.
The group also enjoyed access to a larger quantity of machine equipment, which included eight
trucks, three tractors, and a mobile concrete mixing unit. This division’s main state-level
objective was to improve local access to Monterrey, extending the central highway network to
new destinations and repaving existing macadam-gravel routes with asphalt-concrete. The area
already witnessed a high level of private and commercial traffic; for instance, whereas less
populated regions could see as few as 150 vehicles in a given month, during peak seasons on the
macadam road between Monterrey, Saltillo, and Villa de García, more than 3,500 automobiles,
470 passenger buses, and 1,500 cargo trucks travelled the route monthly.38
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The Linares-Matehuala division to the south operated in a much less densely inhabited
and largely rural part of the state. Its duties included asphalt paving of the final stages of the PanAmerican Highway to the border at Tamaulipas, and the completion of new roads through the
Sierra Madre Oriental to San Luis Potosí. An estimated monthly operations budget of just under
$30,000 pesos financed eighteen field crews, employing nine hundred peones. Despite utilizing
significantly more manual laborers, however, access to technical personnel and equipment
remained on par with the central division: only four engineers ran the Linares-Matehuala
brigades with fifteen supervisors and support staff, three tractors and eight trucks. Monthly
receipts indicate that the division spent the majority of its budget on cutting paths through the
mountainous terrain and contending with repairs to routes damaged by heavy amounts of rainfall,
which slowed overall progress. The only asphalt roads field crews completed were for the
national highway; the remainder of work in Dr. Arroyo and Mier y Noriega consisted entirely of
macadamized-gravel and simple dirt thoroughfares.39
Road building brought once-isolated rural communities greater access to health services,
public education, and consumer markets. In Dr. Arroyo, for example, citizens had long
complained of the difficulty faced in attracting medical personnel and teachers to mountain
hamlets. Although still challenging, due to the difficult terrain and distances involved, new roads
gave local residents the opportunity to travel to outside hospitals for consultations, and send their
children to neighboring communities for schooling. Access to regular bus service in times of
good weather on macadam and dirt routes was equally important as it allowed small-plot farmers
the ability to transport goods more easily to regional markets. In addition to these improvements
to local mobility, the JLCNL installed telegraph lines and built irrigation systems that helped to
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further reduce local isolation and benefit economic development.40 By the end of 1935, the
JLCNL had added more than 2,500 kilometers to the state road network. This included
completion of the local portions of the Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic Highways, consisting of
nearly 1,500 kilometers of asphalt-concrete roads. The agency also finished work on the CCE’s
1932 proposal for caminos vecinales, which opened more of the state to motor vehicle travel.41

Veracruz
From its formation during Governor Adalberto Tejada Olivares’s second term (19281932), the Departamento de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas took the lead on state roadbuilding efforts. Unlike in Nuevo León, where the JLCNL gradually replaced the CCE, in
Veracruz, DCOP remained an autonomous, state-level agency throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
It coordinated with SCOP and supervised local construction of federal and state roads, similar to
how state JLCs functioned elsewhere. Drawing on Wendy Waters and other scholars who have
studied the regional powerbase that Tejeda amassed in Veracruz, in many ways, the
Departamento reflected the governor’s priorities of agrarian reform and local engagement. Much
more than what occurred in Nuevo León, Tejeda recruited campesino groups to take the lead in
preparing sites and contributing labor to construction efforts. This work underscored the needs of
a statewide population that was not only larger, but also more widely dispersed than in Nuevo
León. DCOP, in particular, maintained active correspondence with rural communities, working
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with them closely on building programs that emphasized improvements to nearby transportation
infrastructure.42
In 1930, DCOP noted progress on 1,200 kilometers of federal and state road-building
projects. The most prominent of these was the local portion of the Mexico City-Veracruz
highway. The route departed from the national capital, traveling southeast to Puebla, before
turning northward and crossing the border into Veracruz near Perote. From there, it continued to
Xalapa and then finally to Veracruz port. At 162 kilometers in length, the Perote-XalapaVeracruz leg represented over thirty percent of the 463-kilometer national road from Mexico
City to the Gulf Coast. Responding to Tejeda’s desire that new roads improve rural mobility,
DCOP stressed in reports to the governor that the route connected over two dozen small towns
and hamlets to the burgeoning highway system. In areas where the state government built the
Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz road, it also levied a 90-cent tax on property owners to help off set
construction costs. In June, when citizens in Banderilla---a town of 2,300 (1930 census) that
neighbored Xalapa---complained it was too much, DCOP rejected their requests to suspend the
levy, raising it to 1.3 pesos for those deemed able to pay. Following negotiations that stretched
across the summer, however, the agency finally relented, reducing the tax burden by seventy-five
percent and allowing affected residents to pay the remaining amount in installments over six
months.43
The other 1,000 kilometers of roads cited in DCOP’s report represented a diverse
assortment of medium and small-scale efforts. On the one hand, the agency built a handful of
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short, direct routes between larger cities and mid-sized towns; one example being the twelvekilometer road from the state capital to the wealthy coffee growing region of Coatepec
(population: 19,000 in 1930). Similar thoroughfares extended from Orizaba, Córdoba, and
Veracruz port, improving access for communities in the countryside to these economically
important population centers. On the other hand, the agency also built longer circuitous roads
that ranged between 80 and 200 kilometers, snaking through mountainous terrain that linked
midsized towns such as Tantoyuca, Huatusco, and Zongolica (each numbering around 3,500
inhabitants) and small towns of fewer than one thousand residents with a terminus city like
Xalapa or Tampico, Tamaulipas.44
Rather than use formal statewide construction brigades to build many of these regionally
oriented rural roads, the government in Veracruz initially relied on local communities and
volunteer labor. This policy divided road building into segments, where successive groups of
area residents and businesses contributed locally sourced labor to complete their portion of a
regional camino vecinal. It utilized the faena, a traditional source of communal labor dating to
the colonial period, providing a source of cost-savings for the state government. Ejidos organized
male members into informal crews that cleared away vegetation and debris, working with
traveling survey engineers who instructed them on grading dirt roads. Images taken by DCOP
officials who documented these projects depicted scenes of intensive manual labor as
construction teams worked with pick-axes, shovels, and handcarts, adapting for roadwork the
same tools they used to farm nearby fields. Typically, a gasoline-powered tractor was the only
heavy machinery brought in to assist these efforts.45
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The caminos vecinales built in Veracruz often lacked any kind of weatherproofing or
gravel surface. The state government eschewed more costly road building, which required
additional engineering expertise and heavy machinery, in favor of upgrades to existing footpaths
to facilitate motor traffic. This arrangement allowed for the deployment of notably cheaper
thoroughfares, and the most expensive infrastructure commitments state authorities faced were
the cost of bridge construction. For example, in June 1931, the communities of Texistepec and
Oluta proposed a budget that included repair and expansion of the old rural road that traveled
through their region in the municipio of Acayucan. Both towns had populations of just fewer
than 2,500 inhabitants, and wanted better access to the midsized city of Acayucan (population:
11,811 in 1930), in order to utilize the local railroad station. The upgraded road remained a dirt
path, but was enlarged to nine meters and graded to accommodate two lanes for motor vehicles.
The local road committee estimated the thirteen-kilometer route to cost 6,450 pesos, twenty
percent of which went to materials for the construction of two bridges. The rest went to pay labor
wages; in total, this equated to a cost of 28 centavos per cubic meter of road for the project. The
state government approved the plan, funded the request, and work broke ground later that
summer.46
The construction of cheaper dirt roads, however, had long-term consequences for
regional motor mobility. Bad weather and daily use deteriorated the routes more quickly over
time and communities lobbied for state help to keep the paths open. Even prominent roads to
economically important areas---like the one between Orizaba and Córdoba---could lack
macadam or asphalt surfaces, which decreased accessibility during months of heavy rainfall. “It
45
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is not uncommon for whole regions to be left impassable due to the heavy rains, which block the
roads for cars and other vehicles,” complained one local official from Huatusco. Veracruzanos
petitioned state officials to address the problem with requests usually taking one of two forms,
depending on the size of the community. In areas with high demand for motor traffic, local
residents lobbied for existing roads to be resurfaced with asphalt and concrete; this was the
course taken by the residents of Orizaba and Córdoba in their correspondence to the governor. In
less populated areas, however, pro-road committees simply asked for the state to contribute the
materials to make necessary repairs to caminos vecinales damaged by erosion. For example, in
Xoxocotla (population: 1,483 in 1930), the president of the town council, Alfonso Romero,
wrote the governor about their needs: “With all respect, we plead that you provide us with a few
tools to make repairs to our local road. We have made this request before, but have received no
answer, so today, we respectfully reiterate our appeal to you for twelve shovels, twelve pickaxes,
and five hammers.”47
In the early 1930s, local businesses and unions also began dispatching employees to
assist in roadwork. Company managers recognized the economic potential that improved
regional transportation infrastructure could have on their earnings, and were active proponents of
road building. They reached agreements with the state government that set a monthly quota of
employees volunteered to staff construction crews. Unlike the agrarian communities, company
personnel did not work as part of the faena, but rather received their usual daily wage---typically
between eighty cents and two pesos. These employees worked alongside DCOP laborers and
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were supervised by an agency engineer in an organizational structure that resembled the system
of brigades and crews used by the JLCs.48
Labor that local businesses contributed, however, was also vulnerable to the vagaries of
the marketplace. For example, through the spring of 1933, a sugar mill in San Carlos had served
as a consistent partner on the state road that traveled through the municipios of Ursulo Galván
and La Antigua along the Gulf Coast. In July, however, the mill’s managers wrote to the state
government, informing it of the need to draw down their commitment to staff road crews due to
financial pressures from weakened demand for sugar in the economy. “We are holding out for
better times, but in this moment, we are not capable of continuing to make payments,” wrote
Harry Skipsey, the mill’s owner, to the governor, “With all of the good that I have contributed to
the construction of roads---investing thousands of pesos into them---while it would be a pleasure
to continue to do so, for now, I ask that you relieve me of this expense.”49
In Tuxpan, in 1934, a similar problem emerged. The local bus drivers’ union had
assigned some of its members to construction crews, paying them a daily wage of two pesos for
roadwork. Citing heavy and extensive damage that severe weather had caused to many area
roads, the union complained of the economic strain placed on it from continued regular
maintenance to these motor routes. “The roads that depart this city to the east and west are in
terrible conditions for travel,” explained Eulalio Gutierrez, the union’s secretary general, in a
letter to the governor, “but they are the only routes that exist for our members to work and
provide enough for their families.” Gutierrez requested that the state government take over
paying the wages of its members involved in road building; otherwise the group would be forced
48
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to reduce its labor commitment. “The work these men will be doing, in virtue, is considered a
public utility,” the secretary urged. In the San Carlos and Tuxpan cases, public officials
acknowledged the issues at hand and agreed to increase its budgetary commitment to offset the
costs to the private companies and unions involved.50
In December 1932, Gonzalo Vásquez Vela replaced Tejeda as governor, which led to a
gradual shift in the manner that the state organized labor on caminos vecinales. The new
governor’s priorities were to bring state road-building policy more closely in line with federal
procedures, and also to centralize the logistical and supervisory function of the construction
bureaucracy within the auspices of the state government. Although he did not eliminate local
influence entirely, he did reduce the level of control that smaller rural communities had enjoyed
under his predecessor. For example, in January 1933, DCOP began construction of a new state
highway that travelled thirty-eight kilometers north from Altotonga to Tlapacoyan. As occurred
on the San Carlos road, the agency eschewed the faena, responding to federal guidelines that had
already prohibited the use of coerced labor practices. Instead, it went forward with implementing
a wage labor structure in line with the system outlined by the DNC, grouping personnel into a
series of formal work crews. DCOP divided the Altotonga-Tlapacoyan route into three distinct
parts, each measuring an average twelve kilometers, and assigned a separate brigade to the
individual sections. More than eighty individuals worked on the entire highway, and the largest
company consisted of more than forty persons. Peones earned eighty cents per day shift, working
six days a week, while crew supervisors and specialty workers, including drivers, mechanics, and
masons made, on average, 1.81 pesos daily. Employment rosters did not indicate the number of
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engineers involved, but additional correspondence with DCOP’s central offices in Xalapa
showed at least two assigned to the project.51
Brigades combined the use of asphalt and macadam surfaces to build the AltotongaTlapacoyan Highway. This allowed DCOP to manage expenses, while also providing greater
protection to vulnerable parts of the route that received heavier amounts of rainfall. Workers
used dynamite to cut through mountainous terrain in the region, and also had access to a variety
of mechanical equipment and motor vehicles, including steamrollers, work trucks, and tractors.
The average monthly cost for personnel was 3,061 pesos, while materials expenses were made
on a per-need basis and could amount to as much as 1,100 pesos in a given request. Despite these
reforms, however, the venture encountered repeated delays; moreover, surviving documents in
the state archives are incomplete and do not provide clear figures on monthly progress, making it
difficult to calculate unit costs per cubic meter of highway built. Throughout 1933, Ramón Mora,
the project’s chief engineer, complained in correspondence to DCOP that the agency repeatedly
failed to make timely, adequate payments to cover payroll and supply costs, slowing
construction. Moreover, weather and difficult terrain had further exacerbated the problem; the
roadwork did not conclude until well into 1934, despite local communities’ offers to collect
money and contribute labor, which agency officials rejected.52
Initial technical problems notwithstanding, state authorities continued to move away from
informal labor contributions for new road building. Although rural communities and agrarian
groups still volunteered to clear and repair roads, stated policy emphasized a formal wage and
labor structure for agency employees. In part, this change responded to national and state
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officials who frowned upon labor arrangements viewed as “backwards” due to their reliance on
traditional, community ties over structured wage systems. Mexican authorities saw the kinds of
building practices involved for the construction motor roads as essential to the process of
producing a “modern” nation.
This shift in policy, however, did not translate into calls to abandon the existing
organizational structure of the road-building bureaucracy itself in Veracruz. DCOP continued to
play a central role in the technical and political aspects of road building. What occurred was that
the agency refined how it recorded and accounted for the costs of building roads in the state. It
gradually expanded its role as an intermediary between the state government and local
communities---corresponding with state politicians and regional leaders about planned blueprints
and budgets, streamlining the application process for building materials, visiting field sites to
address local grievances about construction efforts---aspects of the agency’s activities that is
explored in subsequent chapters. Increased popular demand for motor roads and the attendant
rise in automobile traffic in the latter 1930s created new kinds of challenges that took on social,
political, and economic dimensions, requiring dynamic policy responses.

Road Building and Motor Vehicles in Popular Culture, 1925-1935
Media coverage in the mid-1920s evolved to frame road building and automobility as
symbols of modernization critical to Mexican social and economic development. The features
and editorial pages of national and regional Mexican newspapers made these observations vis-àvis the international community---particularly the United States---arguing that good roads were
necessary for economic growth: “consumer demand repeatedly calls for better highways,
worldwide.” Travel accounts by Mexican writers included images that depicted all of the stages
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of road building: tractors plowed land for a path, completed macadam and asphalt lanes extended
to the horizon, and late-model automobiles were shown driving new routes.53 In Monterrey, El
Porvenir described urbanization as an integral process for modernization, emphasizing the role
that the construction of new transportation infrastructure played. Under the headline “We Need
Highways,” one opinion piece from 1926 opened with this preamble:
Our country has not been able to appreciate, in all of its magnitude, the benefit of
highways, because we have been unable to enjoy these routes of transportation. In
modern countries, roads have long received a greater push above all other improvements
to the collective interest, because they decisively stimulate the local economies that
comprise national prosperity.
The editorial continued by highlighting the unforeseen economic benefits that railroads
had had on the development of Monterrey. Drawing on the history of the city’s industrialization
and market growth, it saw motor highways as another chapter in this story. Not only would these
routes spur greater commercial activity, but also would bring new streams of income from
foreign tourists eager to tour the countryside of Nuevo León. It ended by asking the government
“to take notice of these needs in order to combine market energies with the perseverance
necessary” to realize highway construction.54
This call for road building came as El Porvenir also reported on the start of construction
for the Pan-American Highway. In July 1926, the state government hosted a media event in
Monterrey that gathered together many of the principal individuals involved in this work. It
underscored the binational roots of the new road-building program as one image showed
Salvador Toscano seated alongside Peter Byrnes from Byrnes Brothers of Chicago amid other
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U.S. and Mexican officials. The article presented these men as capable of building highways in
an “efficient, disciplined, and economical manner” and also noted the state’s promise to quickly
realize new roads that “will be in magnificent condition for automobile traffic.”55
U.S. carmakers utilized this narrative of modernity and technical efficiency to promote
their products to potential buyers in Mexico. The marketing stories companies told to potential
customer emphasized notions of mechanical precision in the production process of automobiles,
heightening safety and comfort as modern features designed to bring greater convenience to
travel. In 1926, Chrysler created an advertisement that drew on the nascent airline industry when
it declared: “Pilots whose lives depend on knowing how well an engine works choose the safety
and durability of Chrysler.” Ford Motor Company addressed similar notions in a 1931 ad that
introduced the Model A Cabriolet, emphasizing the vehicle’s retractable cloth hood and new
brake system. It argued that these features protected the driver and passengers in case of
inclement weather and “inspired confidence even when trying to travel along wet and slippery
roads.” The advertisement emphasized the role of technology to respond to existing
environmental challenges. In this way, it agreed with the larger contemporary narrative
constructed around road building and motor travel in which technical progress could transform
extant economic and environmental conditions.56
As Mexicans increasingly embraced new roads and automobiles, driving also emerged as
a “fashionable” and acceptable activity for women. It is a theme Joanne Hershfield has studied in
her work on consumer culture in urban Mexico and the performance of modern femininity in
everyday life. She emphasizes the transnational linkages that women in Mexico City shared with
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women in the United States and Europe as information on fashion was transmitted through
targeted advertising and special interests magazines, driving the diffusion of contemporary
cultural trends. These ads and publications drew on Parisian fashion and the American flapper in
the formation of a distinctly Mexican “chica moderna.”57
Newspaper editors ran articles that depicted young women acquainting themselves with
motor vehicles, learning to drive, and exercising proper etiquette for exiting a car. For example,
in 1926, El Porvenir published a style-centered piece titled, “Fashions for Highway Tours” with
images that included women wearing trendy, close-fitting cloche hats over bob haircuts and
pencil dresses. It conflated the popularity of nouveau fashion originating in Paris with a growing
interest in motor vehicles as part of a larger trend for greater freedom of movement and personal
choice among urban, middle-class women.58
In another case, Veracruz’s El Dictamen printed a feature during the 1931 Valentine’s
Day Weekend, titled “Marisa Learns to Drive,” that drew heavily on existing gender stereotypes.
It began with the seemingly mandatory review of women’s automobile fashion---the latest
driving gloves, scarves, and other items---then described the fictional Marisa’s successful
attempt to convince her father (a prosperous businessman) to let her drive. The article followed
the young woman as she selected an automobile, emphasizing comfort and safety as important
features. When she finally decided upon a particular model, she begged her father to buy it (and
he conceded). Then Marisa was shown learning how to operate and maintain her vehicle. Images
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published alongside the narrative depicted fashionable young women in fur shawls, bob haircuts,
and high heels driving, changing tires, and being helped from their cars by male escorts.59
Although Marisa was the main character of the narrative, men were repeatedly shown as
necessary actors in her ability to possess and drive a motor vehicle. As the article relied on
gender conventions (with humor targeted at “naïve” female drivers), however, it also expanded
the idea of who could operate a motor vehicle in society. Women were not simply to be driven,
but could also be drivers. An additional aspect of this narrative highlights the role of well-to-do
men as providers. Maria’s father was the individual who ultimately made the decision to
purchase the vehicle after considerable prodding from his daughter. This theme reinforced
notions of the hetero-normative family unit where men were viewed at the center of a network of
consumer relationships, which had women playing a supportive or secondary role. Of course, in
everyday practice these interactions were likely much more nuanced than the newspaper articles
implied; the very fact that women were increasingly the targets of consumer marketing indicates
the importance automakers placed on courting prospective female buyers (even if marketers
continued to use the foil of traditional gender tropes that privileged men in order to do so).
The representations and local impact of new technology also served as important themes
in foreign travelogues of Mexico. From the late 1920s, the New York Times regularly dispatched
foreign correspondents to cover the development of the Mexican highway system. Their stories
represented road building and automobile use as modern activities set against an “exotic” natural
landscape steeped in colonial history that invoked the “march of progress.”60 U.S journalists
contrasted the “the shuffling burro and his patient master” with the new roads that brought
“electric light, telephones, movies, radio, power of a new age.” Erstwhile “sleepy, cobble59
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stoned” towns became unrecognizable as “storekeepers rip out tinted adobe and put in plate
glass” and “the growl and rattle of trucks frighten horses… and warn strollers onto the narrow
sidewalk.”
In 1935, Times correspondent Anita Brenner wrote of how animal power had given way
to mechanization. The steamroller reoccurred as a symbol of modernity in her article,
characterizing road construction as a transformative endeavor. The “building of the PanAmerican road,” she wrote, “disturbs ancient customs.” Brenner noted that five years before the
highway arrived, Nuevo Laredo, TM had appeared “as different from its neighbor [Laredo, TX]
as if it were on the opposite side of the world,” but that was now no longer true. In Monterrey,
she described a distinct aesthetic change as the “skyline shoots up into chimneys and funnels…
dwarfing cupolas and crosses,” converting the city into one “whose people live by the clock like
their [U.S.] neighbors.” An accompanying image showed a man in a sombrero resting against a
tree, gazing upon a mountainous landscape; underneath, the caption read: “Leisurely Mexico to
which a network of new roads is bringing the Industrial Age.” Modernization and
industrialization had not only swallowed up the traditional public spaces, but also was a process
implicitly described as “Americanization.” Foreign travelogues fit Mexico within a
contemporary U.S. cultural logic that privileged notions of mechanical and material progress. 61
These depictions of road building and motor vehicle culture as aspects of modernization
and hetero-normative society would continue into succeeding decades. Much of this discussion
highlighted greater socio-economic exchange between Mexico and the United States, a trend
increasingly embraced by the Mexican political and commercial establishment in the mid-to-late
1930s. At the heart of these related trends was the notion of convergence for Mexico towards an
idealized future where greater industrialization and access to technology drove economic
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development within an ordered social space. Newspapers and advertisers depicted new roads and
motor vehicles as tools that rationalized physical space, travel between two points could be easy
and available to almost anyone. These depictions, however, did not entirely reflect the lived
experience of everyday people, as bad weather destroyed routes, car accidents occurred, and
material costs kept private automobiles out of the hands of most Mexicans. Instead, these
narratives were aspirational: they invited people to imagine greater physical mobility within the
framework of traditional social roles in a nation made prosperous thanks to technology.

Conclusion
Road building after 1925 marked a series of new beginnings for Mexico. The national
government implemented developmental policies that successfully funded and built highways
across the country. It also forged collaborative agreements with regional road-building agencies
that highlighted an important instance of federal-state cooperation and power sharing. The
emergence of the Juntas Locales de Caminos enhanced state and local voices in the planning and
construction process, in large part because they shifted the road-building bureaucracy to a
regional orientation. Moreover, the representations of this work in popular culture indicated the
potential for new roads and highways to be viewed as harbingers of modernity, promising to
usher in greater technological conveniences, all the while conforming to familiar language
related to the social order. The following chapter examines the evolution of these processes as
the day-to-day operations of the JLCNL and DCOP became more complex as demand for new
roads and motorized travel increased, creating new social and political challenges and
opportunities.

81

Chapter 4
Driving Cardenismo: Directions Old and New for
Road Building and Motor Travel, 1934-40
On 1 July 1936, the United States and Mexico celebrated the completion of the PanAmerican Highway from Laredo to Mexico City. Delegations from both countries met at the
U.S.-Mexico border to commemorate the route with a series of pubic celebrations and speeches.
In attendance were the head of SCOP and other high-ranking members of President Lázaro
Cárdenas’s cabinet, who received U.S. Vice President John N. Garner, and American trade
representatives. In Mexico City, President Cárdenas hosted an event, meeting with U.S.
diplomats and American businesspersons living in the capital.1 Building the new highway had
facilitated the creation of an expansive road-building bureaucracy that trained a generation of
civil engineers and technicians. It also supported a budding tourism industry of hotels and
restaurants across the nation that catered to a domestic and foreign clientele; state governments
and travel agencies produced bilingual driving guides that depicted points of interest along the
new route, marketing them to potential travelers from the United States, Canada, and Europe. In
many ways, although it represented the end of more than a decade of planning and construction
efforts, the opening of the Pan-American Highway from Laredo to Mexico City launched a new
era of motor tourism and binational commercial development.2
Cárdenas’s sexenio marked an evolutionary phase for the public and private institutions
that built roads and promoted motor travel. Increasingly, the Mexican federal government under
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his tenure identified motor tourism not only as an engine for commercial growth, but also as a
means to subsidize road building. Thanks to deficit spending, national and state governments
increased the budgets of the Juntas Locales de Caminos, oftentimes doubling the amounts spent
in previous years. Although Cárdenas is perhaps most remembered for popular, left-wing
policies in education and land reform, he adhered to a much more conventional model for road
building. He largely followed policies set into place by preceding administrations; in fact, his
decision to expand President Abelardo L. Rodríguez’s bond program for road building provided
ample opportunities for the private sector in Mexico to finance transportation infrastructure, and
ultimately became a vehicle for greater foreign investment in the 1940s. At the state level, new
money, old regional disputes, labor activism, and a growing role for private contractors, bus
companies, and transportation cooperatives marked the socio-economic and political landscape
in the 1930s. Amid this reworking of bureaucratic structures, Cárdenas’s 1938 decision to
nationalize the petroleum industry had a significant, but ultimately short-term impact on regional
motor travel and road building.

Public Debt, Motor Tourism, and Financing New Roads after 1934
The specter of the foreign debt obligations that had bedeviled Obregón’s ambitions to
build new roads and grow the Mexican economy remained a palpable concern for national
policymakers in subsequent years. President Calles declared that he would not allow for nondomestic sources of funding to support the Comisión Nacional de Caminos; instead, as noted in
chapter two, federal authorities asserted that value-added taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and other
items would pay for the highways that the new agency planned to construct. This arrangement
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continued throughout much of the 1920s and early 1930s, and served as a model that state
governments followed when determining how to subsidize their own road-building budgets.
As Mexico gradually amortized the debt it owed to mostly U.S. banks, national leaders
looked for new financing options for road construction.3 In 1934, President Rodríguez
announced his hope to initiate a limited pilot program of road bonds; during his last state of the
union address, he argued it was permissible because the government was successfully paying off
domestic loans, while also renegotiating the payment schedule on foreign obligations dating to
the 1910s. Ultimately, Rodríguez prevailed, and the 1934 road bond generated twelve million
pesos, which the president earmarked for the completion of the Pan-American Highway from
Laredo to Mexico City.4
The bond offering set an important precedent, which Cárdenas later expanded as
president. Initially, however, he chose not to emphasize this program, making no mention of it in
the 1935 and 1936 state of the union addresses. At the time, the national government was
engaged in negotiations with U.S. banks, talks that were settled in December 1936 and which
reduced external debt obligations valued at 267 million dollars by seventy-five percent with an
annual amortization rate of one percent.5
This deal arrived as the binational economy appeared to be making a gradual recovery.
Along the U.S.-Mexico border, the New York Times noted rising demand for motor travel. It
described the crossing stations in Texas at Laredo, El Paso, and Brownsville as the fulcrum of a
“gigantic funnel of the North American continent,” where travellers from across the United
3
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States poured into Mexico. In the summer of 1935, the American Automobile Association and a
satellite office of the Dirección Nacional de Caminos in San Antonio recorded a nine hundred
percent increase in monthly requests for cross-border motor vehicle permits.6 In Monterrey, state
officials and the print media later corroborated this trend, reporting that highway traffic in Nuevo
León was up seventy percent.7 In 1937, U.S. motor tourism to Mexico rose thirty-three percent to
roughly 50,000 annual visitors, doubling to more than 100,000 the following year.8
These reports of positive growth trends in motor tourism spurred the Mexican
government to unveil a new plan to accelerate highway construction. In March, federal
authorities issued another road bond---the first in three years---valued at fifteen million pesos.
Officials subsequently extended the offering by an additional six million pesos.9 In the 1937 state
of the union address, Cárdenas characterized the revived program as a critical component of the
way Mexico would continue to fund road building. At the time, the U.S. Export-Import Bank
also announced that it had reached an agreement with the Mexican government to make a
relatively small investment of 192,000 dollars (roughly 864,000 pesos) in road building, which
benefited half a dozen projects, including work on a new route to Tuxpan, Veracruz.10 By 1940,
Cardenas’s administration had raised a total of seventy-two million pesos from bonds to support
construction efforts. The president relied on rising motor travel as a factor, saying that the
revenues generated from foreign visitors via the gasoline tax made the debt payments affordable.
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As a means to limit exposure to international pressure, however, the national government did not
sign additional investment deals with the U.S. Export-Import Bank and only offered federal road
bonds to domestic creditors via the Bank of Mexico.11
Cárdenas’s decision to embrace public debt as a means to subsidize road construction
reflected similar policy trends already underway at the state level. In many respects, there was
less political concern about state bond issues, because these arrangements did not involve foreign
creditors, but rather occurred exclusively with either private or government-backed lenders. As
early as 1935, the government of Nuevo León had begun talks with bond agencies, including the
Compañía Mexicana de Garantías, S.A., a firm based in Mexico City with capital and reserves
valued at one million pesos. The agreement struck with the JLCNL initially provided roughly
eight thousand pesos a month to subsidize the agency’s operations; however, this figure soon
grew precipitously. By the summer of 1936, the company extended Nuevo León a monthly line
of credit of 60,000 pesos.12
At the same time, as competing firms extended loan offers to subsidize road construction,
close ties with key public officials could be important to ensure that deals remained in tact. For
example, in 1938, soon after the state treasurer who had negotiated the bond agreement with the
Compañía Mexicana was replaced, the firm received notice that its contract would not be
renewed. In that termination letter, the JLCNL stated it had begun working with the Monterreybased Compañía de Fianzas Lotonal, S.A., describing it as “an institution specially recommended
by the state government to execute all necessary bond-related activities.”13
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In Veracruz, the government turned to the Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de
Obras Públicas---which already enjoyed established ties with high-ranking state officials---to
underwrite a new set of road bonds.14 In February 1937, then-governor Miguel Alemán
announced an agreement with the bank to guarantee 1.2 million pesos worth of road bonds,
which were to be amortized at a fixed rate of seven percent interest in installments over eight
years. He also identified the gasoline tax as the mechanism to gradually repay the loan. In the
meantime, the bank agreed to disburse the funds on an as-needed basis, which went to the
completion of the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz and Córdoba-Orizaba-Veracruz highways. This deal
continued an earlier relationship with Governor Vázquez Vela who had appealed to the Banco
Nacional in 1934, asking it to extend an existing line of credit to 850,000 pesos when state
official reported that they did not have enough funds to cover construction expenses on the
Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz route. The bank’s decision to help signaled a shift in its loan policy;
founded in 1933 by presidential decree, its charter emphasized urban development and
industrialization, providing real estate credits and financial services to the federal government.
The debt agreements with Veracruz seem to have represented two of its earliest moves into the
underwriting of highway construction, which later became a much larger part of its national
portfolio after 1954.15
For the state government of Veracruz, the decision to issue the 1937 road bond allowed it
to overcome shortfalls in the budget that had previously limited its construction agenda. It is
telling that Governor Alemán singled out the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz and Puebla-Córdoba-
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Orizaba highways as the primary recipients of the monies generated by the bond. State officials
working the two projects had long clashed over spending priorities, with Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz
consistently winning the majority of state and federal funding. In addition, other planned routes
had struggled to acquire government support as the official response to requests often cited a
lack of funds due to an emphasis placed on finishing the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz road.16
The introduction of public debt to finance transportation infrastructure, alongside the
gradual recovery of the Mexican economy in the mid-1930s, corresponded with increased
spending on state road-building budgets. For example, between 1933 and 1934, SCOP’s
cooperative fund for road construction more than doubled contributions to 8.7 million pesos with
an annual growth rate that averaged thirty-five percent. In 1937, following the first round of road
bonds offered during Cárdenas’s term, spending again spiked, rising seventy-two percent from
the previous year to twenty-five million pesos.17 In Nuevo León, policymakers capitalized on
rising tax receipts to fund public debt earmarked for new transportation infrastructure. For
example, in 1935, the state gasoline tax collected 640,000 pesos, half of which went to the road
budget. For the next two years, SCOP’s office for federal and state cooperation recorded modest
growth in the amount of money allocated to construction and maintenance, which increased
fifteen percent from the early 1930s to seven hundred thousand pesos. The government reserved
this money mostly for conservation efforts on the local portions of the Pan-American and InterOceanic Highways.18 In 1937, however, federal and state officials increased their funding
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commitment by fifty percent to 1.4 million pesos as they launched Nuevo León’s six-year plan
for road construction, which included expanding and upgrading the motor route to the U.S.Mexico border via Reynosa, Tamaulipas. Likewise, in Veracruz, the JCCV estimated a total state
budget of 2.46 million pesos, more than double what the government had spent on road
construction in the first half of the decade.19

The Evolving Structure of State Road-Building Bureaucracies, 1934-1940
Notable differences persisted in the ways that the state governments of Nuevo León and
Veracruz organized their local road-building bureaucracies. Unlike the transition from the CCE
to the Junta Local de Caminos in Nuevo León, the government in Veracruz did not fold its
existing road-building agencies into the new Junta Central de Caminos, formed in February
1933.20 Instead, DCOP, the JCCV, and the Junta Local de Caminos de Orizaba---organized by
local commercial and industrial interests---continued to operate as separate entities with distinct
missions and budgets. Each of these organizations also supervised different construction
portfolios: the JCCV, directed by SCOP representative Enrique Soto, focused on projects
designated as national highways, while DCOP worked on regionally and locally oriented routes
between small and mid-sized cities. Meanwhile, the JLC de Orizaba worked on the highway that
connected the Córdoba-Orizaba region to the border with Puebla to the west and Veracruz port to
the east.
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In contrast, Nuevo León continued to operate a much more centralized organization,
using the JLCNL as the principal authority for road building in the state. In November 1935,
Salvador Toscana retired from his position as technical chief of the agency, turning over duties to
Pablo Domínguez, Jr., an engineer who had risen through the ranks of the CCE and Junta Local.
The new director maintained the day-to-day operational aspects of the organization Toscana had
established, but also faced new pressures from labor, which had organized a new state road
workers union. In addition, Domínguez allowed for a much greater level of participation for
private contractors in regional road construction efforts, which reflected an overall shift in the
balance of priorities for the JLCNL.21
Social and demographic factors fueled these distinctions. In Veracruz, the state’s much
larger and less geographically concentrated population was also much more politically engaged
thanks to years of mobilization under Governor Tejeda. Ultimately, the bifurcated organizational
structure, which divided road-building efforts across at least three distinct state-level agencies,
reflected this decentralized political arrangement in Veracruz. In contrast, the JLCNL’s smooth
management handover, followed by a long period of few significant changes to agency
leadership---Domínguez helmed the organization for more than two decades---allowed Nuevo
León to weather the tumultuous political climate of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Although
significant debates emerged over road building’s management practices, the state government
suffered fewer high profile construction delays and turnover in top management than its
counterparts in Veracruz.

Veracruz
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Governor Vázquez Vela identified six major road-building projects as part of a new sixyear plan the state unveiled in the spring of 1934. Measuring more than a total of 1,100
kilometers, these routes included the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz national highway and the PeroteVilla Cuauhtémoc-Tuxpan and Puente Nacional-Huatusco-Córdoba state highways. The program
called for the Junta Central de Caminos de Veracruz and the Junta Local de Caminos de Orizaba
to accomplish the majority of the proposed roadwork. Although the former enjoyed a notably
larger budget, it faced troubling delays and cost overages that the JLC de Orizaba managed to
avoid in its day-to-day operations. Private contractors also solicited state government contracts to
supervise and implement construction; in December, for example, the Compañía Urbanizadora
Mexicana, S.A., submitted a 1.9 million peso proposal to complete the national highway to
Veracruz, but public officials declined the offer, preferring to rely on existing state agencies and
regional road-building boards that sourced local labor for construction projects.22
Between 1934 and 1936, the JCCV spent more than 865,000 pesos on the Perote-XalapaVeracruz and Villa Cuauhtémoc-Tuxpan roads. Although the latter covered roughly 410kilometers, it only received about 72,000 pesos for 27 kilometers of roadwork over two years.
These funds paid for technical surveys, land clearing, and a gravel top surface, amounting to a
unit cost of ninety-nine cents per cubic meter. JCCV and DCOP officials in Xalapa, however,
complained about the slow progress of the Villa Cuauhtémoc-Tuxpan route in internal
government correspondence. Mario Ojeda, the head of JCCV at the time, groused that the state
was not dedicating sufficient funds to see the project to completion: “In 1934, no construction
work was carried out due to the impossibility of the state government’s finances, which have
only covered the maintenance of what was built in 1933, and the gap [in the road] between
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Atzalán and Tlapacoyan.” In many ways, Ojeda’s frustration summarized the political cleavages
that remained a persistent challenge to road-building efforts throughout the 1930s in Veracruz as
state officials---working different projects---jockeyed for limited funds, and where routes
deemed as nationally important tended to receive the lion’s share of support.23
As of July 1936, the JCCV had spent more than 730,000 pesos on eighty-one kilometers
of the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz road, clearing portions of the path and building a preliminary
gravel lane. The agency also reported that it was in the process of purchasing 70,000 pesos worth
of machinery in order to begin laying an asphalt-concrete surface from Xalapa to Veracruz port.
Despite this progress, however, the roadwork was already two years behind schedule. A key
factor in causing this delay was a failure of the JCCV to adequately assess the impact of poor
environmental conditions in formulating its construction timetable. Heavy seasonal rains and the
state’s mountainous terrain had washed out portions of the highway, which forced labor crews to
backtrack and repair damage before moving forward. The agency’s estimated per unit cost for
this asphalt-concrete road was 3.67 pesos, thirty-two percent more than the national rate of 2.5
pesos per cubic meter, most likely due to the difficult local environmental conditions,
particularly Veracruz’s climate, which could slow the paving process. Even after the state
inaugurated the opening of the highway in the summer of 1938 with an official visit by President
Cárdenas, labor crews continued to work on portions of the route until as late as 1940.24
In contrast, the JLC de Orizaba appeared to run a much more cost effective operation that
remained largely independent from the rest of the state road-building bureaucracy. Originally
founded in 1929, the organization formed in response to the long-standing regional dispute over
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where to build the national highway to Veracruz port. Although Xalapa’s supporters ultimately
won that fight, commercial interests in Orizaba and Córdoba went forward with plans to build an
alternate route. From 1934 to 1936, the agency spent an average of 23,000 pesos a month with
funds contributed by a variety of public and private backers. For example, in February 1934, the
local business community subsidized thirty percent of the JLC de Orizaba’s 19,000-peso
construction budget for a road between Orizaba and Tehuacán. The federal government covered
an additional thirty-eight percent, while support from the state of Veracruz accounted for only
eighteen percent of costs. The Junta Local acquired the remainder of the Tehuacán budget from
state officials in neighboring Puebla.25 In 1936, as part of Veracruz’s six-year plan for road
construction, the agency supervised work on the 117-kilometer Puente Nacional-HuatuscoCórdoba highway, which connected to the national road en route to Veracruz from the southwest.
Based on monthly expenditures, this asphalt-concrete road carried an estimated unit cost of 2.33
per cubic meter, slightly below the national average.26
Miguel Alemán’s arrival as governor of Veracruz at the end of 1936 led to new policies
that improved financial conditions. In the following year, the statewide road-building budget
increased to 2.1 million pesos, fifty-six percent of which went to the Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz
highway. Alemán divided the remaining funds across the other projects named in the six-year
plan, including Xalapa-Coatepec-Xico (300,000 MXN), Coatzacoalcos-Acayucan (280,000
MXN), and Córdoba-Orizaba-Puebla (100,000 MXN). In 1938, the state spent almost three
million pesos on road-building efforts. The new governor also adjusted how the state accounted
for budget contributions stipulated by the Ley de Cooperación por Caminos. The JCCV began
25
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calculating local payments to road building as part of the state’s portion, which allowed for the
state government to reduce its actual commitment in real terms by as much as twenty-five
percent while ensuring that overall funding levels remained constant. 27
Personnel and management problems, however, continued to plague the JCCV
throughout this period. In January 1937, then-director Miguel Cataño Morlet rebuffed an attempt
by DCOP to delegate additional tasks to the JCCV: “I am sorry to tell you that my office does
not want to be responsible for any work related to roads the state will build on its own, especially
when it has not properly arranged the technical staff, and is unclear on which routes will be
under its control.”28 Later that year, scandals involving JCCV workers generated intense public
scrutiny that coincided with a management reshuffle and a high-profile resignation. In
November, a woman from Las Vigas filed charges against a senior worker assigned to the nearby
highway to Xalapa, alleging that he had sexually assaulted her niece after threatening her with a
pistol. Then, less than two weeks later, in early December, another scandal surfaced: the parents
of a fourteen-year-old girl from Coatepec accused four highway workers of assault. They
claimed the men had attacked and raped their daughter while she was walking home from a vigil.
The public demanded that law enforcement and the judiciary act swiftly and harshly condemn
the individuals involved in the crime. Shortly thereafter, the JCCV announced plans to
restructure the agency’s management, reducing the number of supervisory positions in its
executive staff, citing a desire to improve internal accountability. Then, on 18 December, Cataño
Morlet abruptly resigned as head of the Junta---less than a year after taking over the position---in
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order to run a private contracting firm that worked with the agency.29 This departure, however,
was short-lived; months later, in 1938, he reappeared in official correspondence as the state’s
director general for road building, involved with planning efforts for a new route from Minatitlán
to Coatzacoalcos. The scandals, management reorganization, and the abrupt---albeit brief--resignation of the agency’s highest ranking official took their toll, contributing to work delays
and missed deadlines in its construction schedule.30
The planning efforts behind the Minatitlán-Coatzacoalcos road further highlighted
Alemán’s failure to consolidate the disjointed organizational structure in the state bureaucracy.
The entire project occurred largely outside the auspices of the JCCV and DCOP; in 1938, a
regional executive body, the Comité Pro-Carretera Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlán (Pro-Highway
Committee of Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlán) was established to fund and build the route much like
the Junta Local de Caminos de Orizaba. The group set up its own management and personnel
structure, financing operations that averaged 20,000 pesos a month via payments from the
regional business community. It employed, on average, ninety workers, all of whom served in
various capacities on construction crews. It also paid personnel differently; for example, peones
received two pesos a day---twenty-five cents more than the JCCV’s standard wage. While the
committee sourced much of its financing, labor, and management locally, the state did supply it
with a supervising engineer---similar in function to the SCOP representative to regional JLCs---
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who handled day-to-day technical matters and corresponded with Director General Cataño
Morlet on the progress of construction efforts.31
Amid the organizational problems that divided the state road-building bureaucracy,
ejidatarios remained active participants in highway construction, forming committees to lobby
public officials in favor of new routes. Their correspondence with DCOP officials showed an
appreciation for highways as points of convergence for local and national developmental
priorities. In 1937, ejidal committees from the municipio of Ángel R. Cabada organized a
regional association, calling itself the “Ejidatarios del Rio de Tecolapan,” for the purpose of
“discussing the greatest problems that affect the region… so that they may be delivered into the
hands of President Cárdenas who will be arriving soon to Veracruz.” The association called for
continuation of the 64-kilometer Laredo-Catemaco highway, which travelled through Ángel R.
Cabada, conflating local demands for better transit options with the need to support the national
leadership. “We decidedly support the President…” wrote the committee’s leader, Silvano
Reyes,” with the understanding that he makes it possible for the peasantry to enjoy what is
guaranteed to them by right.”32
Ejidal committees often took charge of basic road building and maintenance in rural parts
of the state. In September 1938, more than a dozen groups with membership in the League of
Agrarian Communities (LCA) and the Farmers Unions from around Zongolica convened a
special meeting to build a framework of demands to deliver to DCOP. Constituent committees
insisted on more equipment from the state to open and repair roads; they also wanted a guarantee
from the governor ensuring public authorities followed through on any promises made. In
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October, Anastasio González, president of the Rancho Nuevo ejidal committee, requested that
DCOP provide hand tools to make road repairs. The department forwarded the query to Adolfo
Omaña, director of the state office for indigenous affairs, who supplied twenty used pick-axes
and shovels. On 28 November, he wrote a local official in Zongolica of the decision: “This
equipment---like what I have previously sent---will be used exclusively for highway repairs, so I
recommend you safeguard its intended use, but of course, this will ultimately be the farmers’
responsibility.”33
Cost savings are difficult to calculate due to a lack of financial data included in the
official correspondence with the ejidatarios. What these cases indicate, however, was that the
state reduced expenses for road maintenance by often supplying used equipment to local groups.
The campesinos involved in this work articulated their needs within the context of mutual
welfare associations that relied on labor donations to conduct regional civic improvements.
There is no indication that many ejidatarios were ever compensated beyond the tools that
officials contributed. Although the state had largely ended official use of the faena to build
highways, it may have remained as an unstated policy for local road building and maintenance
well into the 1940s.

Nuevo León
Thanks to Monterrey’s size and its position as the political and commercial hub of
Nuevo León, state policymakers largely avoided many of the sectional complications that
Veracruz officials faced. Unlike the JCCV, the JLCNL did not have to compete with rival roadbuilding organizations that received support from moneyed interests ensconced in regional

33

Petitions from ejidal committees in Zongolica, Exp. 115/112, 1938; Adolfo Omaña, letter to Alejando Montalvo,
28 November 1938, box 4, 1937-41, Asuntos Indígenas, AGEV.

97

footholds. Instead, although Monterrey’s commercial elite was engaged in a bitter political battle
with President Cárdenas over gubernatorial elections in 1935 and 1936, they at least agreed on
how the highway map should look.34
The president had stoked the ire of local commercial elites when he invalidated the 1935
state vote count, which had been poised to deliver the governorship to the son of the exiled
leader Calles. The conservative business community interpreted the decision as a power grab by
Cárdenas, whom they also feared was a socialist with designs to undermine their regional and
national power. The political fight between the two sides carried into the following year when a
new vote in the spring of 1936 made Anacleto Guerrero governor---the candidate Monterrey’s
elites opposed as a pawn of the national government. After the election, the political climate
remained anxious, despite attempts by the new governor and Cárdenas to alleviate the tension.35
The acrimonious relationship between public and commercial leaders appeared to have
little impact on the road-building agenda, however. The records of the budget that financed the
JLCNL provide a number of interesting clues as to the political and economic climate in Nuevo
León. Until 1935, combined federal and state contributions to the agency remained at 600,000
pesos; the following year, at the height of the election dispute, this amount increased by 100,000
pesos. Then, in 1937, the agency budget grew fifty-eight percent to 1.2 million pesos. New
construction certainly benefited the industrial and commercial sectors, and Alex Saragoza notes
that rapprochement was an objective for Cárdenas and Guerrero after 1936. In this sense, the
financing of road construction provided an area where groups that often clashed over other socioeconomic and political issues could find common ground. The delivery of additional
developmental funds helped to smooth over outstanding conflicts by injecting money into
34
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regional economies, which provided new jobs, and may have been a way to circumvent
additional calls for political opposition.36
Private companies often took the lead in lobbying the government about road building
proposals. In 1937, the Compañía Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey, S.A. coordinated
efforts with other local firms, including Fábricas de Cementos in Hidalgo, NL in support of a
new highway from the state capital to Mina, a municipio on the northwestern border with
Coahuila.37 The companies hired A.W. Villarreal, who ran an engineering consultancy in
Monterrey, to make the case for the route to the governor. In August, he framed the proposal as a
public-private initiative, emphasizing broad support among local communities and transportation
companies from across the region. He proposed the formation of a new committee to discuss
logistical details, and encouraged the JLCNL to begin surveying the route. Villareal also
suggested charging a “subscription fee to local residents who could afford to pay” to help finance
construction. He described a region ripe for industrialization and tourism:
I am confident that there are many people who want to help… the road will reduce travel
distances by at least forty percent. It will be extremely useful to Fábricas de Cemento, the
regional transportation companies, and the creation of future businesses that will certainly
benefit from easier access to natural resources. It will also bring tourism to the banks of
the Rio Salinas and to the nearby mountains with their mild climate and vistas.38
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Although the government initially stalled the proposal, it agreed to go forward with
construction in the early 1940s.39 At the time, the JLCNL increasingly looked to private
contractors to support and expand road-building efforts. In 1940, it signed an agreement with the
Monterrey-based Compañía Construcciones Nacionales, S.A. that marked a departure from the
way it utilized private sector companies. Tomás Williams, the general manager of
Construcciones Nacionales, already had years of experience working in Nuevo León’s roadbuilding sector. In 1935, Salvador Toscano had hired his company---then called Carreteras de
México---to build drainage systems to reduce erosion along the Laredo-Mexico City highway.40
This new offer was much different, however. Whereas outside firms had long operated as
equipment and materials suppliers or contributed roadwork to existing state-run projects, the
contract put Construcciones Nacionales directly in charge of building an expansion of the
Reynosa-Monterrey highway. The structure of the plan was simple: much as the DNC funded
state road boards, the JLCNL apportioned funds to the company, which, in turn, used them to
finance hiring workers, buying equipment, and building the route. In July 1940, Construcciones
Nacionales began work with an initial budget of 40,858 pesos, which increased to an average
112,000 pesos a month for the rest of the year.41
The company modeled its personnel structure after the JLCNL. It divided operations into
eight labor crews, employing more than 180 individuals, seventy-eight percent of whom were
peones. The remainder of the workforce included supervisors, machinists, drivers, and clerical
staff in the field office. Most peones earned the 1.75 peso minimum wage, while more
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experienced hands made two pesos a day; crew supervisors received the highest per diem wage:
nine pesos. For equipment and material, Construcciones Nacionales did not use outside vendors,
but rather made all purchases through the JLCNL, which rented or supplied tractors, motor
vehicles, tools, gasoline, and other items.42
The execution of this road-building program, however, revealed bureaucratic tensions
between company officials and federal and state authorities. Following established accounting
procedures, SCOP and the JLCNL required Construcciones Nacionales to provide monthly
progress reports to justify expenses and make new financing requests. Soon after work began,
Gilberto del Arenal, a top official at SCOP’s Department for Cooperation, complained that
financial reports for Reynosa-Monterrey were poorly composed, failing to clearly itemize
expenses: “To protect this board’s interests and the fifty percent contribution by the federal
government, in my opinion, invariably, monthly statements must correspond with the
contractor’s activities.”43
The department also wanted original copies of the company’s incorporation papers and
the contract it signed with the JLCNL for accreditation. During the fall of 1940, official
correspondence depicted Pablo Domínguez caught between an increasingly frustrated SCOP and
a private contractor accused of ignoring repeated requests for information. In October, Próspero
Castro, a high-ranking SCOP official, threatened to terminate federal contributions to the
arrangement if nothing was done. Domínguez urgently wrote two letters, one to Castro, chiding
the national bureaucracy for a lack of clear instructions on what information it wanted, and also
for not having brought these concerns to him sooner. The second letter went to Williams,
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ordering an immediate response: “I’m writing for you to inform me---in the shortest time
possible---about the status of this required documentation.” Two days later, although making no
apologies for the previous delay, Construcciones Nacionales finally forwarded the forms to the
JLCNL for delivery to SCOP.44
These accounting and clerical problems indicated that the company may have been
unprepared for the scope of supervising and building an important motor highway. Domínguez
had also criticized the company for failing to conform to technical specifications agreed upon in
the contract, noting that state engineers had found inconsistencies in the asphalt-concrete paving
on the highway.45 Notwithstanding these problems, neither the JLCNL nor SCOP called for the
removal of Construcciones Nacionales from the project. In fact, by 1941, the agencies had
increased the Reynosa-Monterrey operational budget to two hundred thousand pesos, and the
firm continued supervising work on the route until its completion at the end of the summer.46

Road-Building Labor Unions in Nuevo León and Veracruz
In 1936, as the JLCNL debated new construction plans, road workers organized into a
powerful new state union to advocate for better pay and benefits. “We have been suffering from
consistent delays in our wages,” wrote Manuel Saldaña, the organization’s secretary general, to
SCOP, “which oftentimes amount to three months of back pay owed to us… not only does this
hurt workers, it hurts the reputation of the Junta Local de Caminos, adding to all of the miseries
our families have experienced.” He endorsed the plan to issue more road bonds as a means to
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stabilize the Junta Local’s payroll schedule. In addition to demands for timely pay, workers also
pressed for better medical coverage and the promise of financial aid to families in the event of an
accident. Under Toscano, the agency’s policy had been limited at best, transferring incapacitated
employees to a civilian hospital in Monterrey with a brief form letter explaining their ailment.
For example, when one worker fell ill during roadwork at Los Muertos, the director wrote to the
admitting hospital, “I hope that you will be able to find the time to provide medical attention for
Tereso Zapato… who became ill, while carrying out his duties.”47 In June 1934, at least half a
dozen employees were hospitalized for work-related injuries and illness, but treatment costs
remained only a fraction of the budget; agency ledgers only recorded monthly expenditures of
twenty-five pesos for medicine---in comparison, the JLCNL typically spent three times that
amount on office materials.48
The Sindicato de Empleados y Obreros Constructores de Caminos de Nuevo León
(SEOCC---Union of Employees and Construction Workers for Roads in Nuevo León) provided a
mechanism for workers to obtain more state support for themselves and their families. For
example, in 1936, members Pedro Silva and José Salinas were killed and one of their friends
hospitalized following a motor accident. The union representative wrote to Domínguez,
complaining of high prices for goods at work camps and a lack of public transportation:
The men had to use one of the trucks leased for road work to visit their families in
[nearby] Cadereyta to obtain enough food for the week; another truck that was traveling
in the wrong direction, however, struck the men, killing them, while injuring Silvestre
Coronado, who remains hospitalized and unable to earn any money. He was the sole
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provider for his family; we ask sincerely that you provide them with some help through
this difficult situation.49
Although Domínguez discussed the case with SCOP’s Department for Cooperation, it is
unclear from the official correspondence what decision was ultimately made. What became clear,
however, was that the state government did react to these complaints, moving to address the
larger policy framework around the ways it treated workers. In 1937, Governor Guerrero cited
many of the outstanding issues raised in SEOCC correspondence when he extended all benefits
afforded to industrial laborers via the 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo to road workers. This
included financial indemnities, free transportation for workers and families, seniority ladders, ten
days of paid vacation for all workers, and a daily minimum wage of 1.5 pesos. The governor also
announced significant changes to health coverage, guaranteeing a full-time professional staff of
medical personnel attached to the JLCNL. A medical director and three assistants were appointed
to make weekly visits to job sites. In addition, the agency began covering seventy-five percent of
all medication costs for up to one year for technical and administrative staff, and fifty percent for
laborers.50
Another policy that proved popular with rank-and-file employees was the creation of
intramural basketball and baseball teams, which officials characterized as a means to encourage
good health, reduce drinking, and improve the work place environment. Steven Bachelor finds
similar strategies at work in the 1950s and 1960s as U.S. automobile manufacturers sponsored
sports teams and organized other kinds of community events for workers and their families to
forge ties with employees that extended beyond the shop floor as a means to reinforce company
loyalty and defuse tensions with management. In this way, even as road workers participated in
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agency-backed team sports, these groups functioned within a broader policy agenda designed to
boost morale and position the JLC as a benefactor of “healthy” social activities to the public in
Nuevo León.51
In addressing the union’s grievances, the state government also rewarded it for its
political loyalty. SEOCC had been an organizational ally of Vicente Toledano’s Confederación
de Trabajadores de México (CTM), which sided with Cárdenas and Guerrero during the 1936
election, agitating against Monterrey’s commercial elites. Although the CTM successfully
launched a series of industrial strikes, which disrupted private commercial production in Nuevo
León, no similar incidents among road crews appeared in official correspondence.52
Following the SEOCC’s successful entreaties to extract more benefits from the state
government, however, management disagreements strained its relationship with the JLCNL. In
1937, controversy erupted when Domínguez fired Pedro Ramírez---who served as a member of
the union’s executive committee---alleging that he had mismanaged warehouse inventories.
Ramírez defend himself, filing a formal complaint with the Inspector’s Office at SCOP, and also
collected testimony from co-workers in support of his actions. The subsequent investigation,
however, ruled against Ramírez, and the men he cited as supporting witnesses formally retracted
their statements or claimed he had forged their signatures. The SEOCC tried to have his job
reinstated, but Domínguez refused: “I gave him a chance to keep the issue from going further,
offering to dock one month’s pay [as a penalty]… but he used the letter I wrote on his behalf to
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abuse the good faith of the [union] assembly, making himself appear as a victim due to labor
organizing, and proving, once again, his lack of scruples.”53
The union also fought to increase the minimum wage paid to workers at the JLCNL. In
spring of 1938, Leopoldo Banda, the SEOCC’s secretary for conflict resolution---in his free time,
he also served as second-string captain for the road workers’ intramural baseball team, Los
Caminos del Estado---drafted a letter to agency management, arguing that drivers and machinists
were being under paid. To bolster the case, Banda included the DNC’s official wage scale for
these jobs, which was as much as two pesos higher, and also noted that the Juntas Locales de
Caminos in Coahuila and Tamaulipas paid their workers the appropriate amounts.54 Domínguez
countered, arguing that there was not enough money available, because the state was two and
half months behind in payments, which forced the agency to take on 200,000 pesos worth of debt
to cover outstanding expenses. The SEOCC vowed to petition Cárdenas, and also wrote
Guerrero, urging the governor to address the problem; ultimately, the union relented due to the
financial pressure weighing on the country after nationalization of the petroleum industry.55
The following year, however, the union launched a new drive for higher wages that went
beyond its initial demands. Rather than limit the raise to two classes of workers, the SEOCC
called for a general increase in what the agency paid all employees. The negotiations reflected a
long-standing grievance; for example, before the formation of the JLCNL peones had earned
between 1.25 and1.5 pesos daily, but after 1933 this amount decreased to as little as eighty cents
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with most laborers making no more than one peso per day. By 1939, gradual improvements
raised the pay scale back to 1.25 pesos, but the SEOCC argued that this was barely enough to
cover living expenses. They demanded two pesos a day for peones as well as corresponding
increases in wages for all other workers. Some within the DNC resisted the move, arguing that
raising the minimum wage to two pesos would make JLCNL employees some of the highest paid
road workers in the country. Negotiations continued, and later in the year, the state government
and the SEOCC agreed on a minimum wage of 1.75 pesos.56
In many ways, when Guerrero had promised to improve employment benefits, he also
invariably reframed the JLCNL’s mission. Alongside building roads, the agency soon became
much more invested in providing workers with new social services. When the JLC failed to
fulfill expectations, however, rank-and-file employees openly voiced their disapproval. Although
at times seemingly mundane, complaints indicated a labor force that actively engaged
management in building the JLCNL’s personnel environment. For example, in an undated letter
to management, more than a dozen workers formally protested the quality of the cafeteria food
and the actions of its head cook, Carlos Sánchez. The complaint stated: “I. The food that this
man provides, generally, is poorly prepared and sometimes unhygienic. II. Said individual
[Sánchez] is usually in a bad mood and for the most part treats his clientele poorly. III. Many
times employees receive their food very slowly or are denied service. For these reasons, we ask
you to replace this cook.”57
In contrast to what was underway in Nuevo León, in Veracruz no group similar to the
SEOCC existed during the 1930s. Instead, road workers used the state’s existing network of
agrarian and labor associations to petition the state government for their needs. This arrangement
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highlights three notable differences between the two states; first, whereas Nuevo León had
consolidated construction efforts into only one road-building agency by 1933---the JLCNL--Veracruz saw sustained activities from at least three major organizations---the JCCV, JLC de
Orizaba, and DCOP---well into the new decade. In this way, there was not one, unified
management structure that workers appealed to in Veracruz, but rather a multi-polar one that did
not necessarily coordinate pay scales or other labor policies with one another. As a result,
although labor organizing in Veracruz lacked a central, coordinating office similar to the
SEOCC, road workers in the state relied on a number of smaller groups allied to powerful
regional, state, and national organizations.58
Second, regional demographics help explain the differences in labor organizing structures
between Nuevo León and Veracruz. In the former, much of the state population was concentrated
in and around Monterrey, which served as major source of workers. The JLCNL largely formed
road-building brigades, which then travelled across the state working on construction projects,
instead of being constituted at the local level by local boards. In Veracruz, even after Vázquez
Vela began the process of reforming the state’s existing bureaucratic structure in 1933, the
JCCV, JLC de Orizaba, and DCOP continued to source labor via local sources. The state
archives indicate that many communities formed pro-highway committees that not only
petitioned for construction and maintenance funds, but also formed teams of day laborers for
road building. For example, the regional chapter of the Confederación Sindicalista de Obreros y
Campesinos del Estado de Veracruz (CSOCV---Union Confederation of Workers and Farmers of
Veracruz) that represented Orizaba and Córdoba coordinated with the JLC de Orizaba and the
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state government to ensure that enough workers were available for construction projects along
the route for a road being built to Huatusco.59
Lastly, and most importantly, Veracruz already had a strong and established base of
popular political activism, which predated the formation of federal and state road-building
agencies, and acted as foundation for the organizing of road workers. The Liga de Comunidades
Agrarias and the CSOCV---of which the latter was associated with the influential Confederación
Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM)---served as political and negotiating partners for a large
number of smaller organizations. In 1937, La Voz del Campesino, a radical newspaper published
in Xalapa, counted nearly three thousand different ejidal commissions and popular organizing
committees, including twenty-seven regional unions for workers and campesinos across the
state.60 In addition to these groups, the transportation and driver’s unions that emerged in the
1920s represented the rights of local road workers. For example, in 1934, the Unión de AutoTransportes de Córdoba complained to the state government that local managers in charge of
road building were not paying workers in a timely manner and were also not doing enough to
ensure sufficient funding for existing construction projects.61
Heather Fowler Salamini argues that since at least the early 1920s, workers in Veracruz
were some of the most active in labor politics thanks to support from Adalberto Tejeda during
his two terms as governor. Born in Chicontepec and trained as a civil engineer with experience
as a state land surveyor, Tejeda was familiar with rural politics and the impact of infrastructure
development on local communities. He encouraged agrarian organizing and successfully formed
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a powerful social and political movement that increased his national profile that backed his failed
bid for the presidency in 1934.62 Existing rural and labor organizations accumulated considerable
influence and played an integral role in state road-building politics throughout the decade. For
example, even after Vázquez Vela replaced Tejeda as governor, the state continued working with
CROM, appointing its members to represent workers’ interests on road-building boards.63
Nevertheless, the groups that had allied themselves with Tejeda gradually lost power during the
1930s as succeeding governors increasingly turned to Vicente Lombardo’s CTM to form new
partnerships. By the early 1940s, as Mexico entered the Second World War, the CTM emerged
as one of the principle federal labor organizations, operating through regional unions such as
Federación de Trabajadores del Estado de Veracruz, to represent road workers’ needs in the
state.64

Popular Demand for Motor Travel and the Role of Regional Transport Services
As new highways opened, the investments made in road building paid dividends in terms
of rising popular demand for regional motor travel. In the 1930s, however, very few Mexicans
could actually afford the vehicles that U.S. carmakers advertised in the domestic media. At the
time, a standard four-door sedan sold by Ford Motor Company cost 3,346 pesos, roughly the
annual salary of a mid-level, white-collar worker. Between 1934 and 1940, an estimated 79,000
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automobiles circulated nationally, which amounted to one car per 203 persons.65 Instead of
buying personal motor vehicles, inhabitants of rural communities and many urban working-class
and middle-class Mexicans turned to private bus companies and regional transport cooperatives
to take advantage of the country’s burgeoning network of asphalt and macadam routes. During
the 1934 Easter weekend, for example, the Mexico City daily El Universal reported record levels
of motor vehicle traffic on the roads that departed the capital. Bus companies with routes to
popular tourist destinations including Puebla, Cuernavaca, and Acapulco sold nearly 14,000
tickets for the holiday, running roughly 250 trips to these cities each day. Demand was so acute,
in fact, a vehicle shortage occurred, forcing managers to hastily rent any available trucks that
nearby firms had available.66
Bus companies responded to growing demand for motor travel by offering regional and
multi-state travel routes with tiered levels of service that catered to middle-class and workingclass passengers and tourists. In Veracruz, in 1938, two firms had established regional service
between Veracruz port and Xalapa, charging 3.6 pesos for round-trip, second-class tickets. At the
time, Autobuses de Oriente (ADO) also launched one of the first routes that travelled the full
length of the national highway from the Gulf Coast to Mexico City.67 At the border, in 1939,
Transportes Frontera offered three daily trips from the federal capital en route to Laredo, Texas
via Monterrey, charging twenty-six pesos for one-way fares.68
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Transportation cooperatives, composed of independent motorbus owners who pooled
resources into a single organization, typically ran operations that emphasized regional
connections between mid-sized and larger cities and rural communities. In Nuevo León, the
Sociedad Cooperativa de Transportes Monterrey-Cadereyta-Reynosa, formed in 1937 with seven
vehicles, but soon doubled its fleet to fourteen, offering up to ten daily trips back and forth to the
border. In Orizaba, Veracruz, fourteen former railroad and textile workers started the Unión de
Camioneros with regular service to Santa Rosa Necoxtla---modern-day Camerino Z. Mendoza--a municipio on the border with Puebla that number 10,000 residents. In December 1936, they
wrote to the state government, using strikingly political language that captured their motivations
to launch the association:
In order to emancipate ourselves from bourgeois control and never again be its victims,
each of us acquired buses to transport passengers. These vehicles constitute our entire
assets… representing great sacrifices due to the high cost of this business, which has
forced us to often deprive our homes of necessary goods.69
Despite a difficult beginning, this cooperative became successful. At the time of writing
the government, the members had already paid off all of the loans they incurred to purchase the
vehicles, and employed seventy workers to maintain equipment and provide regular service to
Ciudad Mendoza. In fact, current operations had outgrown the existing location used in Orizaba,
and the group wanted the government to grant it legal control of a larger, ostensibly abandoned
building in the city. At the beginning of 1937, state officials finally seized the property and
turned it over to the cooperative to serve as its new headquarters.70
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Rural areas, in particular, relied on transport cooperatives to carry out a variety of
necessary services. Not only did they move passengers and goods, but also took on key political
roles, advocating for roadwork with public officials. In Huatusco, Veracruz, the Unión de AutoTransportes wrote President Cárdenas, asking for special subsidies after local crews ran out of a
money building a road. It argued that without the route completed, residents had to travel the
remaining twenty-five kilometers to deliver goods to the closest train depot on horseback. The
president’s office agreed to the request, and work restarted soon after.71
Ultimately, rural bus companies and transport cooperatives enhanced everyday use of the
nation’s growing system of highways by lowering the cost of motor travel. Even if automobiles
were out of reach for most people, the price of a second-class ticket offered equivalent forms of
access. Moreover, these firms expanded intermodal transportation across the region, connecting
rural communities more easily to the regional railroad network when animal conveyance had
previously been the only available option. By the end of the decade, growing popular demand
had facilitated a forty percent increase in bus travel with more than 10,000 vehicles in circulation
nationwide, serving urban and regional routes.72

Oil Expropriation and its Impact on Road Building and Motor Travel
The gradual economic recovery underway during the middle years of Cárdenas’s sexenio
drove political optimism in support of infrastructure development. The president had already
made clear in national addresses that building new roads provided capacity for greater levels of
motor tourism, making it easier for foreign visitors to access the country. At the same time,
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however, growing domestic concern looked to address Mexico’s economic future and the
exploitation of its natural resources, particularly oil extraction. In 1935, with the formation of the
Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Petroleros this issue moved to the forefront in national politics,
as oil workers pressed for better wages and working conditions, while other sectors of Mexican
society also recoiled against the foreign-dominated petroleum industry.
In May 1937, seventeen thousand oil workers launched a twelve-day strike that stopped
gasoline production and shutdown motor transportation across the country. Gas stations and
refineries closed as strikers took to the streets carrying red and black flags, and demanding a sixpeso daily wage. In Mexico City, half of all buses were out of service and automobiles with
empty tanks were abandoned along the streets. The New York Times reported that hundreds of
American tourists were stranded, desperately trying to contact nearby U.S. consulates for help to
return to the northern border. By the second day of protests, the Mexican Automobile
Association had acquired emergency gasoline shipments from the United States, which it
provided to the Americans. In Laredo, border stations recorded only fifteen motor tourists
crossing daily into Mexico since the strike started, down from an average of five hundred.73
Although Mexican public opinion largely disapproved of the industry walkout at the
time, this event foreshadowed looming political battles with the foreign oil companies that
ultimately marshaled popular support for the strikers. On 18 March 1938, after U.S. and British
managers refused to respect a Supreme Court ruling that ordered them to pay higher wages to
workers, Cárdenas announced that he had begun taking steps to nationalize the petroleum
industry. In a public address following the decision he stated, “The oil companies, despite the
government’s best attitude and considerations, have waged a deft and skillful campaign… [to]
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inflict serious economic injury to the nation and to nullify the legal determinations made by the
Mexican authorities.”74 Thousands of Mexicans took to the streets in support of Cárdenas’s
decision as the U.S. and British governments called for a general embargo on Mexican products.
The Pan-American Highway became a space where popular sentiments also manifested
themselves against the new economic sanctions. In August, billboards appeared on the border
road that read: “The money you spend outside of Mexico, your children will not have later.”75
The expropriation issue, in conjunction with shortages brought on by the embargo,
affected national road construction efforts and motor travel. Between 1935 and 1937, the size of
the national road network increased by forty-three percent from 4,260 kilometers of highways to
7,510 kilometers; in contrast, from 1938 to the end of 1940, this rate of growth fell by a quarter,
adding about 2,500 km. Likewise, in 1938, despite initially optimistic projections, foreign
tourism decreased twenty-percent percent from the previous year, not recovering to preexpropriation figures until 1941.76 The peso also fell to its lowest value vis-à-vis the dollar,
which left transportation companies faced with rising commodities prices. In Monterrey, regional
cooperatives and bus companies complained that costs for some goods were five times higher
than they had been two years before. By the early 1940s, gasoline expenses had increased fortyfive percent, while motor vehicle prices rose 150 percent. Initially, the government had capped
local transit fares, but ultimately it reversed this policy, allowing companies to raise charges
from 7.5 to ten cents per ticket.77
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The acute short-term impact of the embargo, however, appeared to only have a limited
effect on road-building efforts and related policy. Amid the oil crisis, as noted earlier, the JLCNL
launched work on the Monterrey-Reynosa highway, employing the CCN as a principal
contractor, while the road worker’s union won a wage raise. In Veracruz, regional construction
efforts on the national highway continued apace, showing increased spending during Alemán’s
tenure, in which work on the routes to Veracruz port and Tuxpan was finished. Furthermore,
although no federal road bonds were issued in 1938, Cárdenas announced new rounds of
offerings in 1939 and 1940. Under his successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho, this financing program
emerged as an important area for negotiation and collaboration between Mexico and the United
States as the two countries revisited economic and diplomatic ties in the early 1940s.78
Despite complications as well as reductions in intensity, oil expropriation and the
retaliatory embargo did not change the general trajectory of road-building efforts in Mexico.
Although rising budgets and slowed expansion in the national highway network correlated with
higher commodity prices, the drive to inject more money into the program also indicated a desire
on the part of public authorities not to allow the crisis to halt roadwork. Moreover, by continuing
construction of new motor highways to the border and the Gulf Coast, the Mexican government
signaled recognition that its economic development relied on foreign partners; the relationship
with the United States remained an important aspect of long-term policy, even if political
rhetoric in the short-term painted a more dismal picture. By 1941, Washington had quickly
squelched oil company complaints for harsher penalties, reversing course and negotiating new
agreements that provided Mexico with millions of dollars in infrastructure investment in return
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for access to its natural resources during wartime. In this case, roadwork belied general trends
that had pointed to further erosion in political and economic ties between the United States and
Mexico. Instead, it indicated that although significant obstacles remained, both sides were
committed to ensuring the survival of the bilateral relationship.79

Conclusion
The Cárdenas years represented an important period of transition and growth in the
national and state bureaucracies that built roads and promoted motor travel. Much less a
transformative president in this arena than in others, Cárdenas largely worked within the policies
that his predecessors had pioneered. Two of the most important road-building decisions he made
were to approve new public bonds to fund construction efforts and ensure that the U.S.-Mexican
binational economic relationship remained intact despite tension over the oil expropriation issue.
Some of the most notable changes that occurred during this period, however, came at the state
level, as Nuevo León reworked the objectives of its road-building agency, fashioning it into an
organization with a wider mission that included social programs and greater space for private
contractors. In Veracruz, sectional divisions continued to sow political discord that complicated
construction efforts; however, Governor Alemán addressed extenuating budget problems and the
JCCV reorganized its management structure, allowing for a period of stability after 1938. The
following chapter examines how a new president, Manuel Ávila Camacho, navigated the
binational political and economic climate inherited from his predecessor, as well as the impact
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that new diplomatic accords had on state and local road building as Mexico entered the Second
World War.
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Chapter 5
Routes of Conflict: Road Building, Binational Engagement, and
Motor Travel in Mexico as the World Goes to War, 1940-1945
In Mexico City during December 1941, President Manuel Ávila Camacho received
Governor Jorge Cerdán’s 1942 state budget for road building in Veracruz. The proposal
earmarked two million pesos for construction efforts, including an expansion of the MinatitlánCoatzacoalcos highway to Tampico. Extending for four hundred kilometers across the length of
Veracruz, this road would serve as a major transportation artery that connected southeastern
coastal cities with the state capital and ports in the north. In making the case for the route,
Cerdán drew on concerns over unfolding global events, writing that the proposed Gulf Highway
represented a “strategic value to the White House’s plan for defense of the continent.” He argued
that the road was necessary to repel a potential Axis invasion and also to improve supply lines
for any war efforts. Moreover, he framed the state’s industrial capacity as nationally important
for prospective military planning: refineries in Minatitlán and Tampico produced high-grade
lubricants for aviation and heavy machinery, and the highway would facilitate the government’s
ability to export wartime goods and equipment. Ávila Camacho approved the proposal and
construction began the following year.1
Just months earlier, in Monterrey, Nuevo León’s governor, Bonifacio Salinas, hosted a
formal dinner that drew visiting dignitaries from Texas, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas. It was one of
a series of binational gatherings inaugurating the Monterrey-Reynosa portion of the InterOceanic Highway, which ran from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to Mazatlán, Sinaloa. Mexico City’s
metropolitan police mariachi band and an orchestra from Laredo, Texas played at special events
across the region, while hundreds of people came to the state capital to participate in the
1
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festivities, enjoying music, parades, and public speeches. Amid the revelry, more than three
hundred regional automobile enthusiasts caravanned from the U.S.-Mexico border to christen the
route. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce of McAllen, Texas ran full-page advertisements in
El Norte and El Porvenir, promoting the city of eleven thousand as a nearby tourism and
shopping escape for middle-class and wealthy regiomontanos.2
These highways---and the surrounding events---stand as tangible examples of the
potential for bilateral engagement between the United States and Mexico. Reflecting both
strategic and socio-economic aims, the routes emerged amid the political battles over oil
expropriation. The drive to repair economic and political ties damaged in 1938, however, was
neither easy nor certain, as vocal sectors of society in both countries opposed rapprochement. In
a multitude of ways, negotiations over infrastructure spending---particularly U.S. investment in
Mexican road bonds---provided diplomatic common ground for the governments of Manuel
Ávila Camacho and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Between 1940 and 1945, Mexico added, on average, 1,250 kilometers of new motor
highways, spending an estimated fifty million pesos per annum.3 Despite economic hardships,
the federal government achieved consistent progress in its plans for road infrastructure
development thanks to a combination of deficit spending, foreign investment, and taxes on
gasoline, beer, and other goods. In his first state of the union address in 1941, Manuel Ávila
Camacho declared, “it is not possible to truly integrate a sense of the nation without an ample
road network that facilitates economic exchange [and] connects human groups.” By equating
2
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road building with nation building, the new president signaled agreement with the general
attitude many contemporary elites shared.4 However, this growth did not occur solely as part of a
top-down process of political centralization that imposed a specific vision for how roads should
be built across the nation. Instead, while Ávila Camacho set a particular political tone through
effective use of national media and propaganda, he left state governments to determine building
projects within their road-building bureaucracies. For their part, while the states enjoyed latitude
in determining specific institutional and policy characteristics, their agencies took on an
increasingly robust role in dealings with local actors. In both Nuevo León and Veracruz,
authorities asserted state regulations outlining public use of spaces along roads and looked to
clearly define how regional groups could request funds for infrastructure development. In the
face of these new rules, everyday citizens crafted creative political responses that sought to shape
road-building priorities to fit their needs.
The direction of road building in Mexico during the early 1940s sheds light on the
connected nature of international, national, state, and local socio-economic and political
processes. Foreign-imposed economic embargoes, new bilateral accords, and the outbreak of
global war brought new dimensions to everyday local concerns. State officials, agency
bureaucrats, and community leaders engaged one another over strategic allocations of roadbuilding budgets, complained about material shortages, and looked for ways to ‘market’ new
highways in a shifting wartime political landscape. By emphasizing local and regional issues,
this chapter grounds the binational economic and diplomatic negotiations of this era in an
understanding of the everyday logistical and social challenges that came with new roadwork in
Nuevo León and Veracruz.
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Pathways to Resolve the Petroleum Question
State support for motor highways underscored the capacity for enhanced political and
economic engagement between the United States and Mexico. It contrasted markedly with the
growing nationalist rancor over the issue of oil expropriation, which threatened to further strain
the existing bilateral relationship. Standard Oil of California and its industry rivals had united
behind the political drive to impose a trade embargo on Mexico, which Washington granted in
the summer of 1938. In response, the Mexican government announced plans to seek out alternate
trading partners, ultimately signing new deals valued at more than ten million dollars to barter oil
for machinery and industrial goods with member nations of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The
decision transformed Germany into the primary destination for Mexican petroleum exports by
early 1939. Concurrently, U.S. exports of heavy equipment to Mexico, including automobiles,
fell markedly and stoked fears of an irreparable breach in relations between Mexico City and
Washington.5
The pivot toward Germany, however, proved temporary. Despite worsening economic
affairs, Stephen Niblo argues that Mexico ultimately did not want this problem to spread to its
geo-political ties with the United States.6 In the summer of 1939, President Cárdenas had already
begun signaling to the Americans a desire to slow the erosion of the bilateral relationship.
Although popular resentment against the United States over the embargo remained pronounced,
Cárdenas refused to suspend military cooperation with Washington and also informed U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he had rebuffed an invitation from Mussolini to participate in
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a joint aviation mission.7 Then, in August, the Mexican government halted negotiations on any
new oil deals with Germany, citing the worsening situation in Europe; the following year, it
canceled an agreement with Japan, calling the decision “an act of continental solidarity” with the
United States and its allies.8
These announcements opened an opportunity for bilateral reengagement, and the
financing of roads and other infrastructural and industrial investments emerged as key
negotiation points. Despite hostility to rapprochement from U.S. oil producers, President
Roosevelt overruled their demands for greater Mexican economic concessions. In February
1941, he forced them to accept a one-time payment of thirty-seven million dollars from the
Mexican government as part of a broader set of agreements on trade and investment. This initial
deal cleared the way for continued talks, which culminated with the signing of a new bilateral
economic accord on 19 November. Specifically, it provided significant U.S. investment in the
Mexican economy. Washington promised to buy Mexican silver, stabilizing the peso, and
instructed the U.S. Export-Import Bank to extend more developmental aid, including a ten
million dollar bond (worth approximately forty-five million pesos) for road building. This money
guaranteed continued work on the Pan-American Highway to the Mexican border with
Guatemala and also provided for the purchase of new heavy equipment for road construction and
maintenance projects.9
Although the Mexican government heralded the pact as a major victory for national
sovereignty, the domestic press expressed doubts. On 22 November, days after the public
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announcement of the deal, Excélsior published an editorial titled, “Economic Cooperation
Without Benefits,” criticizing the amount of money paid to resolve the expropriation issue versus
what it saw as comparatively meager Export-Import Bank investments in Mexican industry and
infrastructure. Moreover, the article feared the impact of war on existing commodity shortages
and complained that the deal made Mexico much more reliant on the United States as a source of
investment aid. On the one hand, Excélsior’s concerns were borne out the following year as the
diplomatic accord set into place the economic and diplomatic framework that facilitated
Mexico’s entrance into World War II as a U.S. ally. On the other hand, however, the long-term
ramifications of the deal were more nuanced as wartime U.S. investment in transportation
infrastructure helped the Mexican government to build thousands of kilometers of new motor
roads.10

Policy, Propaganda, and Popular Reactions during World War II
In June 1942, Mexico formally joined the conflict as a member of the Allied forces,
following the sinking of two PEMEX tankers by German submarines. National and state
politicians had used the attacks to channel public support for the war effort, and the country’s
roads served as one of the stages where citizens expressed anger over the naval attacks. After an
official transfer at the border, where Mexican authorities recovered the remains of the victims
from the Potrero de Llano and the Faja de Oro from the U.S. Coast Guard, they launched a
highly publicized mourning campaign that included highway motorcades to deliver the bodies to
Mexico City. These caravans gave average Mexicans a public ritual to help them connect to the
events affecting the nation. Press images showed people in rural communities lining the highway
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to catch a glimpse of the vehicles, while in Monterrey, large civilian gatherings filled the city’s
streets and parks as the trucks arrived for a ceremony at the cathedral.11
During World War II, political propaganda urged national cohesion and socio-economic
mobilization. Although initially expressing doubt about over-reliance on the Americans,
Excelsior quickly reversed course. It depicted Ávila Camacho as a patriarchal guardian of a
nation at the vanguard of Latin American countries united with Washington against the Axis
powers. The weekly magazine El Tiempo framed wartime U.S. investment in Mexican road
building and industrialization as a means to transform the countryside and improve the living
standards of average citizens. State governors printed obsequious statements of support for the
president in national and regional newspapers. Governor Cerdán hyperbolically declared that all
of Veracruz’s population was behind Ávila Camacho and acknowledged the need for a "noble
and humanitarian political unity during this time of responsibility."12 The Gaceta Oficial de
Veracruz reinforced this theme with a full-page declaration that read, “We are at war! Farmer:
sharpen your sickle. Worker: take up your hammer… Industrialist: increase your production…
and in this way, united in supreme effort, wills strained, firm in purpose, we march with Mexico
for liberty!”13
Industries associated with motor travel reinforced calls for greater social sacrifice in the
name of patriotism. Whereas advertisements by Ford, General Motors, and Nash had previously
featured smiling families and lush, drivable landscapes in pre-war times, marketing embraced an
austere tone after 1941. With the slogan “Take care of your car or walk,” PEMEX promoted the
11
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purchase of higher-quality lubricants to ensure that engines lasted until the war’s end. It stated,
“such care is unnecessary under normal conditions, nevertheless this current emergency not only
justifies it, but demands it.”14 Another advertisement, for Veedol Lubricants, depicted a Howitzer
squadron in the heat of battle with the headline: “Here’s the 1943-model car you didn’t buy!” It
conflated engine maintenance with the ongoing conflict in Europe and reminded consumers,
“The new car you didn’t buy this year is a vital part of the labor towards victory. You have the
right to feel proud that you’re contributing to this cause.” By transforming images of an
automobile into heavy artillery, it tied reduced motor mobility to an individual’s ability to endure
economic scarcity, signifying a patriotic commitment to the nation.15
This overall pivot to an emphasis on military preparedness against the threat of Axis
attack reflected a shifting policy landscape that had significant repercussions for civilian motor
travel. Tourism suffered greatly as travel restrictions prohibited able-bodied U.S. males from
leaving the country due to the war effort, while the U.S. government also limited the number of
entrance visas available to foreign visitors (fearing so-called “fifth-column” infiltration by
Japanese and German agents). Hotels, restaurants, and other businesses along the Pan-American
Highway suffered as a steep drop in vacationing motorists and other travelers led to a collapse in
the Mexican tourism industry, affecting an estimated 100,000 jobs. U.S. and Mexican authorities
along the border also came to view highways as spaces vulnerable to enemy subversion.16 In
Nuevo León, officials increased border surveillance with the help of U.S. government-outfitted
automobiles that used special equipment to monitor civilian radio transmissions. This program
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heightened fears about the potential for sabotage when it discovered an alleged Japanese agent
making unauthorized broadcasts in the area.17
While the war provided a political and budgetary impetus to planning projects, roadbuilding engineers still faced wartime commodity shortages that threatened to delay their
construction agendas. A lack of gasoline was one of the most severe problems, which caused
considerable headaches for JLCNL officials. They calculated that the agency’s projects
consumed an average of 20,000 gallons of petroleum each month; however, existing official
guidelines for requisitioning basic commodities did not clearly address wartime policy that
privileged military needs ahead of others. Federal and state coordination efforts were strained as
a result, forcing road officials in Nuevo León to compete with urban transit authorities and JLCs
in other states for limited gasoline shipments. In 1944, fearing that the JLCNL would be forced
to suspend operations due to shortages, state officials reached out directly to U.S. energy brokers
in Brownsville, Texas to ensure that the agency would have access to oil reserves.18
World War II also generated budgetary problems due to shortfalls in tax revenue. In
Nuevo León, the JLCNL wrote to the Dirección Nacional de Caminos to request an additional
50,000 pesos a month from SCOP’s cooperative fund to cover anticipated budget deficits in
1945. When that inquiry proved unsuccessful, the governor intervened, writing directly to
Maximino Ávila Camacho, the president’s brother and head of SCOP, about gaps in the state
budget tied to wartime disruptions in oil production. He emphasized that a large portion of state
contributions to the JLCNL was funded by a gasoline tax, which had failed to meet budgetary
needs due to a reduction in collected revenues. The DNC’s Department of Cooperation, however,
rejected the governor’s request, stating that all available monies for the incoming year had been
17
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allocated and that there were no additional funds available to accommodate this increase in
federal contributions to the JLCNL.19
These administrative tensions over wartime scarcity affected how public officials
prioritized funding of roads, citing usage concerns and a mistrust of counterparts in other states.
In 1944, for example, Governor Arturo de la Garza delayed approval of Nuevo León’s
contribution for a new route to the state border with Tamaulipas, wanting to ensure that the
neighboring state had allocated enough money to continue construction. Otherwise, he would
instruct the JLCNL to stop roadwork at the town of General Treviño, seventeen kilometers from
the state border. His advisors had warned that the road would be underused if Tamaulipas did not
follow through with construction to make the route accessible to U.S. motor tourists. Ultimately,
SCOP reassured de la Garza that Tamaulipas would honor its part of the plan and road-building
efforts continued.20
Commodity shortages and reduced usage also damaged the regular economy,
significantly affecting everyday life for average citizens. Bus companies, transit authorities, and
private automobile owners were forced to cut back on vehicle use and long-distance travel due to
a lack of access to gasoline and rubber tires. By the spring of 1943, more than 240 of the 785
passenger buses that operated in Veracruz and neighboring states had been sidelined because of
shortages. Moreover, rationing forced many Mexicans to pay increasingly higher prices for basic
goods; for example, consumer list prices reveal that a single automobile tire could cost as much
as a quarter of monthly income for a middle-class worker at the time. Angry over the lack of
much-needed supplies, labor unions that served the transportation industry took to the streets to
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protest this issue and a proposed increase in usage fees on remaining transit routes. They
threatened strikes in Monterrey and elsewhere, as city streets became tense spaces for popular
anger where citizens rallied against extended commodity shortages and other economic
deprivations.21
While not always clearly articulated by the groups involved, public anger directed at
transport infrastructure may have indicated the extent of tension between civilian governments
and society over the wartime toll of commodity shortages, reduced service routes, and increased
usage fees. For example, in Veracruz, in the summer of 1942, unidentified vandals destroyed
traffic signals across the capital, Xalapa. The mayor, Luís Benítez, responded with a general
warning that framed the problem as another front where subversive elements threatened civil
society. He declared the acts of vandalism "disgraceful" and called on the culprits to end the
destruction of public property. Printed in the Gaceta Oficial, the advisory used language
inflected with notions of modernity with the mayor characterizing the damage as “counter to
civilization" and denounced the offenders calling them "persons entirely lacking in culture."22
Against this contrasting landscape of national propaganda and popular dissatisfaction
with the war, however, local leaders drew on cultural and economic themes that pre-dated the
conflict to articulate road-building pleas. In correspondence from rural communities to state
officials, pro-road groups emphasized the logistical challenges to motor mobility, which
negatively affected regional economic development. In 1943, the mayor of Huiloapan, Veracruz--a hamlet of fewer than 500 residents---drew on these themes, contextualizing them with the
community’s history in a letter to Rubén Bauchez, tourism chief, at DCOP:
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Perhaps you know that this pueblo is one of the oldest in the state… originally called
‘Ostotipec.’ [It is where] Hernán Cortés, during the expedition to Honduras, stopped to
marry La Malinche to Captain Juan de Jaramillo. The marriage… occurred in the chapel
here, and from that time forward the town has been named ‘Huilo-apan’ which means:
‘Doves together in the water.’ Over the years, however, this place has been forgotten and
has not progressed… because enough has not been done to publicize it. Mr. Secretary, we
await your help for the good of this community; with national and foreign tourism, all
manner of cars could pass through this area if it were not for the terrible conditions of the
highway.23

They looked to the broader significance of road building as a means to better connect
themselves to outside markets and used the potential tourist draw of their local history as a
selling point. Whereas national and state authorities had quickly altered their message to
accommodate a closer wartime relationship with the United States, local leaders remained much
more consistent. They highlighted reduced isolation, the ability to transport goods more easily,
and the potential for tourism as chief benefits of road construction, which underscored the longterm aspirations they attached to new infrastructure. For example, in April 1943, in El Ojital,
Veracruz, the Comité Municipal Antinazifascista wrote national officials, who in turn contacted
Governor Cerdán. The town asked that them intervene on their behalf with PEMEX, which had
delayed delivery of asphalt and concrete to pave the local road to Tuxpam. “We are being
gravely damaged in our ability to conduct the harvest,” explained the committee’s president,
“due to the lack of an easily traversable route.”24 Similarly, in March 1944, in Papantla, the local
Chamber of Commerce wrote the governor about building an extension of the Mexico-Tuxpan
highway to their town. The group argued it would allow residents “to conveniently take
advantage of all of the commercial, agricultural, and tourism opportunities that this highway has
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to offer.”25 While local and national actors espoused different end goals in support of road
building, their agendas shared elements that allowed for significant cooperation across all levels
of Mexican society.

Organizational Structure of State Road-Building Efforts after 1940
In October 1941, Manuel Ávila Camacho appointed his older brother, Maximino, to head
the SCOP. The new chief began by accepting the resignations of all active federal directors at the
agency and appointing a new leadership cadre, which included Carlos I. Betancourt as SCOP
deputy secretary and Carlos Bazán as federal director general of roads. He also announced plans
to personally survey the countrywide highway network, meeting with state governments to
discuss budgets and logistical needs for construction efforts. Within weeks, Ávila Camacho
made Nuevo León an early stop on this national tour. He arrived in Monterrey on 19 October,
promptly setting out on the border highway to Reynosa and reviewing plans for two new motor
bridges along the route. In a speech to local political and labor leaders, the secretary addressed
federal-state cooperation efforts, pledging SCOP as a partner “irrespective of party affiliation.”26
The visit marked an important charm offensive for President Ávila Camacho, following a
hotly contested presidential election that had divided Mexico politically. El Norte defended his
elder brother’s qualifications to be SCOP chief, challenging accusations of nepotism and making
no mention of the man’s popular reputation as an obstreperous womanizer:
As we all know, the public always interprets the government’s actions in the worst ways.
The appointment of the president’s brother to carry out such an important post at the
Ministry of Communications can bee seen purely as nepotism, but that is not the case
here. On the contrary… everyone remembers that this new minister---during his tenure as
25
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the governor of Puebla---was applauded by all of society for what he achieved… bringing
wealth and prosperity to the state… attacking the false promises of the old political
bosses… and forcing them to follow the law. A man with these qualifications deserves to
be named minister in any administration that wants to take advantage of men who have
worked for the good of the nation.27
Under Ávila Camacho’s tenure as SCOP chief, the agency continued to allow states
significant latitude in decisions about the organizational structure of their road-building
bureaucracies. In Nuevo León, employment rosters indicate that the JLCNL made few major
changes to hiring and labor practices: field crews remained thirty to fifty men, most of whom
were engaged in clearing and paving routes, while between one and three engineers supervised
construction brigades made up of at least half a dozen teams. Monthly salaries paid to top staff
and engineers ranged between 350 and 750 pesos, while peón wages rose slightly to two pesos
per day by the mid-1940s. Moreover, the JLCNL continued its program of paternalistic social
activities intended to foster a sense of esprit de corps within the agency. Pablo Domínguez’s
personal correspondence shows that the junta chief sent out wedding and baptismal
congratulations to workers and their families, wrote letters of recommendation for specialists and
peones alike, and continued to authorize the popular intramural baseball team, “Los Caminos del
Estado.”28
The activities of the Sindicato de Empleados y Obreros Constructores de Caminos likely
ensured that the JLCNL remained responsive to personnel needs. At this time, the union
advocated for---and won---extended medical assistance beyond the agency’s standard coverage
for grievously injured employees. For example, in August 1942, Francisco Herrera---a crew
supervisor with a distinguished fourteen-year record at the JLCNL---suffered a work-related
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accident on the road from Monterrey to El Jabalí when he lost control of the truck he was driving
and the vehicle crashed. First responders stabilized his condition and transferred him to a
hospital in the state capital where doctors ultimately amputated part of his left leg. While Herrera
convalesced, the union wrote to the JLCNL as well as Governor Salinas, arguing that more
needed to be done for the man: “Our comrade finds himself in difficult financial conditions due
to the needs of his wife and eight children. We ask of you… in a humanitarian sense that you
provide him with a just amount of assistance, which is his right by federal labor laws.”29
Domínguez ultimately agreed. The agency moved Herrera to Mexico City for months of
additional therapy, including an artificial limb; it also provided financial help to the family. The
following year, the director received a letter from Herrera, personally thanking him: “I’m already
getting along in my recovery and… the great part of all of this I owe to you for the concern you
took in my health. For that I give you my sincere thanks as well as my children’s appreciation for
all that has been done for me.” Herrera’s expression of gratitude to Domínguez, viewed through
the context of union activity, highlights the delicate balance that workers and agency managers
tried to maintain. Operating within the paternalistic framework of the JLCNL, the union
successfully pressed the organization for greater concessions, all the while doing so in a manner
that credited the state bureaucracy.30
State financial reports indicate that Nuevo León was spending notably more on the
JLCNL, which may have afforded Domínguez the power to extend additional worker benefits
when deemed necessary. Upon taking office, Governor Bonifacio Salinas (1939-1943) made
road building a top priority, growing state contributions to the budget from 900,000 pesos in
1939 to 1.2 and 1.5 million pesos in 1940 and 1941, respectively. He hoped to use a ten million
29
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peso road bond---initially approved by the state legislature in 1941---to support further spending,
but needed to gain the imprimatur of the federal Secretaría de Hacienda to do so.31 In March
1941, he dispatched Prisciliano Elizondo, an agent of the Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de
Monterrey, S.A., to locate a bank in Mexico City to act as fiduciary for the state bond. Soon
after, Salinas won the bond agreement.32
By 1942, he increased the state budget for new roads to two million pesos and was
pressing federal officials to match those allotments. Ambitiously, he later proposed an eight
million peso cooperative fund for 1943. The governor’s determination, however, appeared
designed to stave off threatened federal budget cuts. At the time, Hacienda wanted to reduce
national contributions to Nuevo León’s road program by 500,000 pesos. They may have felt that
the state had already won enough concessions after having gained the ten million dollar bond. In
fact, Salinas alleged that the secretariat, which was in charge of delivering annual payments from
the bond to the state, was doing so too slowly.33
Ultimately, this tension between Hacienda and the governor had a real impact on how the
JLCNL funded operations, igniting a separate dispute between the agency and its road worker’s
union. In March 1942, field crews complained about slow payroll procedures, arguing that the
JLCNL was often late in distributing funds. In response, some peones had begun selling their
time cards to pawn shops for cash, but were later disciplined by supervisors. The SEOCC came
to their defense, arguing that delays in processing submitted time cards had forced some workers
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to wait more than a week to be paid. Although JLC supervisors agreed not to terminate the
individuals involved, they nevertheless refused to permit workers to pawn their time cards, citing
potential abuse by third-party lenders.34
This problem over wages reflected larger pressures that confronted the state government
over coordination efforts with federal authorities. Although both sides ostensibly agreed on the
necessity and importance of road building, institutional inertia, wartime austerity, and the
potential for personal acrimony could affect how the bureaucratic process operated. Hacienda
successfully resisted Salinas’s attempts to continue growing Nuevo León’s budget; in fact, by the
fall of 1942, the governor was writing SCOP to request special line items in the next federal
budget to pay for the completion of two motor bridges that had remained unfunded.35 Ultimately,
state and federal officials agreed to the status quo ante: Nuevo León’s 1943 cooperative budget
was neither cut nor dramatically boosted, but rather remained at the previous year’s spending
level of roughly four million pesos.36
Within this context, union efforts to extract concessions from the JLCNL highlight the
kinds of agreements labor and management could reach. In Herrera’s case, the agency initially
delayed additional aid, but finally provided it after the SEOCC urged Domínguez and Governor
Salinas to do so. No set deadline affected the decision, however. In contrast, the payroll dispute
was not about whether to increase worker compensation, but rather to simply meet its obligations
in a clear and timely manner. Given that the state government was already grappling with late
payments from the national treasury, it is likely that the JLCNL simply could not accede to union
34
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demands. By agreeing not to pursue further actions against the workers caught selling their time
cards, while also remaining firm against the use of third-party lenders, both sides seem to have
tried to reach an understanding given outstanding budgetary limitations during the war.

Veracruz
Whereas Nuevo León’s organizational structure remained largely consistent with that of
the prior decade, in Veracruz, public authorities took significant measures to address problems
within the statewide road-building bureaucracy. By January 1940, they released guidelines that
governed all work on motor highways, empowering new regional committees to collect tax
revenue and locally direct construction projects. The format of these groups resembled SCOP’s
structure for the Juntas Locales de Caminos: representatives of the state governor, local
chambers of commerce and industry, labor unions, and regional transportation companies sat on
an executive board, while the state director general of roads---at the time, Miguel Cataño Morlet--appointed an engineer as technical chief. The guidelines also required committees to begin
collecting local taxes within seventy days of formation, depositing the funds into an account with
an area bank.37
The reorganization of the state road-building bureaucracy can be interpreted as a
capitulation to the persistent administrative problems at the JCCV, which had slowed roadwork
and forced bailouts in the 1930s. In essence, Veracruz officials elected to follow the model set by
the local groups that ran construction of the Orizaba-Córdoba and Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlán
highways. Under the new guidelines, each committee took charge of an individual road-building
project, handling day-to-day operations in conjunction with the state director general of roads.
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The JCCV remained as a logistical partner, supplying field crews and equipment to build the
routes that these regional boards approved. The arrangement---shifting aspects of road-building
management out of the JCCV---appeared successful. Between 1940 and 1943, although the Junta
Central cycled through eleven different directors---some of whom served only a handful of
weeks---Veracruz added 350 kilometers to the state highway network and increased spending for
new roads to two million pesos annually.38
Alongside creating new regional committees for motor highways, the state government
also enhanced the authority of the Departamento de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas. In 1940,
Luis G. Rendón joined the agency as its new head of the road-building section, having
previously acquired significant regional experience as a technical manager at the Jalapa Railroad
and Power Company in the 1920s and early 1930s.39 He served in the position until 1943, after
which he took over the JCCV for two months before going into the private sector.40 During his
tenure as road-building chief, the agency centralized decision-making for aid requests under the
auspices of his office, and also standardized the application process for communities to obtain
materials and equipment for local repairs. For example, in January 1942, Donato Miranda,
municipal president of Chicontepec, a county numbering 12,000 inhabitants in northwestern
Veracruz, wrote an urgent letter to the state government requesting shovels, handcarts, pick-axes,
hammers, and supplies to repair the local motor road and public buildings. Eight days later,
Rendón dispatched a succinct reply, informing him that the government could not act until the
municipio formed separate road and civic improvement boards---composed of “honorable” local
38
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residents---to file these requests. Miranda organized the required committees, reapplying in
March; this time, with all documentation in order, Rendón accepted the requests and dispatched
the construction tools and supplies.41
The agency also ruled on financial disputes that communities lodged against the state,
and dispatched inspectors to evaluate outstanding cases. In Jesús Carranza, Veracruz, citizens
demanded that the one-peso duty collected on area beer sales should go to local road repairs and
other civic improvements. Community leaders argued that the monies were going to support
construction on a road more than 130 kilometers away, which had little benefit for their town.
DCOP denied the request and reiterated the policy that the road commission in Coatzacoalcos
controlled the dispersal of regional funds. In response, the town turned for help to Victoriano
Andrade, a deputy from Veracruz in the federal Congress with a reputation for defending
indigenous rights. Andrade reached an agreement with DCOP and Governor Cerdán, which kept
the one-peso tax in place, but provided a monthly stipend of 500 pesos to Jesús Carranza to cover
local road repairs.42
As part of its regionally oriented perspective, Rendón’s DCOP established regional
offices staffed by junior and mid-level engineers who travelled within a given jurisdiction to
conduct field surveys and evaluate concerns brought forward by individuals and groups. They
inspected locally cleared paths in advance of road construction and also investigated allegations
of corruption.43 For example, in Xico, Guillermo Samaniego, who worked as a technical
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inspector for the agency, uncovered abuses and fraud committed by the local road board
president; he also learned through discussions with area residents that exasperated farmers had
formed an unofficial comité pro-camino to generate local funds for a much-needed road project.
After receiving Samaniego’s report, Rendón revoked the original committee’s credentials and
extended official recognition to the alternate group.44
In December 1944, Adolfo Ruíz Cortines became governor of Veracruz and presided
over another transition within the organizational structure of the state road-building bureaucracy.
DCOP continued in its capacity as the primary agency involved with evaluating and coordinating
local requests for financial aid, materials, and equipment. State and federal officials, however,
adjusted the mission focus of the JCCV, putting it clearly in charge of conserving and repairing
all national highways in Veracruz. This shift appeared to bring some stability to the agency’s
management structure by providing the organization with a clearer assignment that focused its
efforts. For example, Eusebio Rendón Jarillo, who was appointed JCCV chief in May 1943,
remained in that position for three years---easily one of the longest terms up to that point in the
organization’s history. Succeeding directors also stayed for longer periods of time, helping to
mold the agency into an important actor in Veracruz’s road-building program in the latter half of
the decade.45
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During the early 1940s, road-building agencies in both states played an increasingly
active role in regional and local mediation related to spatial concerns and environmental impact.
As construction crews enlarged the highway network and extended new roads to a larger
segment of the population, these efforts also led to new social tensions as affected individuals
and groups responded to the impact of road building. In Córdoba the pro-highway committee
wrote SCOP about the growing problem of roadside advertising, specifically emphasizing their
fear that an increased use of billboards detracted from the region's natural landscape and hurt the
burgeoning tourism trade. The agency’s reply made no promises to respond to their request
beyond a simple reminder to the committee to review federal guidelines on the use of
commercial marquees to determine compliance.46 While it is unclear whether Córdoba’s
residents pressed the issue further, evidence from Nuevo León indicates that advertisers' abuse of
public space was a palpable concern for both communities and state-level officials. Pablo
Dominguez wrote companies ordering them to remove advertising erected too closely to
highways due to the danger posed to drivers' safety, and threatening that the state would do so
itself after the deadline elapsed.47
This assertive state regulatory agenda extended to other forms of roadside construction
that affected public uses of space and the natural environment. While representatives of the roadbuilding bureaucracy and local communities sought to resolve outstanding problems, they often
clashed over the long-term impact of construction projects that significantly affected existing
land use arrangements. In Nuevo León, access to water emerged as a serious point of contention
between residents who lived along highways and the road engineers that threatened local
environmental needs when drawing plans for new motor routes. On the route from Monterrey to
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Saltillo, residents had dug ditches to carry water to their farms; gradually these irrigation
networks had drawn closer to the highway’s shoulders. When the JLCNL decided to widen the
existing lanes, it claimed that a better road took precedence as a matter of public safety.
Domínguez ordered the affected municipalities to move the irrigation works; he added that road
crews would fill in any ditches not moved after a certain date.48 In Apodaca, twenty-two
kilometers northwest of Monterrey, José Treviño Sandoval confronted a related issue when
motorists struck cattle he owned as the herd tried to cross the freeway that separated his ranch
from a nearby water source. He wrote the state government to remind it of a neglected promise
the road commission had made to install tubing beneath the highway to move water to his
property. A subsequent memorandum from the government’s administrative chief, Armando
Arteaga y Santoyo, ordered Domínguez to fulfill the promise.49
When road crews damaged local property or a resident accused the government of
illegally acquiring land without paying for it, political confrontations threatened to delay
roadwork and could force financial settlements. In the summer of 1941, when the JLCNL
appropriated a portion of Ernestina Díaz de Leal’s land for the highway to Reynosa, she filed a
lawsuit against the junta, arguing that it had done so without her approval. While she ultimately
lost her case against the JLCNL due to a procedural technicality the agency exploited, she
nevertheless forced a work stoppage on the highway until a judge ruled on the matter.50
Other people who lacked Díaz’s means to wage a court battle had fewer options to block
work. Petra and Maria Rodríguez were among residents who lost their modest homes when road
48
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crews leveled the properties to open space for the highway that connected their town, Villa de
China, to the capital. “We’re old women who have no men to help us,” they pleaded to the road
commission, adding the hope that “…due to our advanced age and lack of support, we have no
doubt you will know how to help us.” While the archives do not reveal how this case was
resolved, they do indicate that municipal officials hesitated to reimburse individual losses for
fear of setting a costly precedent.51 In Cadereyta, forty kilometers east of Monterrey, local
authorities wrote to the governor advising him to reject a resident’s request for an indemnity.
Otherwise, the mayor argued, any financial compensation given out over the construction of the
highway would generate additional claims and strain the city’s limited finances. Ultimately,
however, official correspondence revealed that in many cases, if a landowner or resident did not
win her or his case outright, states typically settled for an indemnity despite concerns from
municipal officials.52
In Veracruz, landowners also emerged as some of the most vocal critics of road-building
projects, lodging complaints that alleged property damage inflicted by construction crews and
demanding compensation. Rodolfo Zamora, a coffee and orange grower from Coatepec protested
to Governor Cerdán that DCOP’s road crews had damaged his crops when they converted a
portion of his property into a makeshift quarry to supply paving materials for nearby roadwork.
He had workers on his land block completed portions of the road in protest until the state
promised to reimburse him for the losses incurred. In Xico, Veracruz, a wealthy landowner,
Dario Soto Peredo, opposed a seven-kilometer stretch of road under construction, which reduced
travel times in the region, because the route cut through a ranch he owned, which, he argued,
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placed his entire investment in jeopardy if completed. He complained to DCOP that the road
would be too dangerous due to mountainous terrain and the threat to drivers of cattle crossing
since none of the neighboring ranchers adequately fenced their properties.53 While Zamora and
Soto may only have stalled roadwork to press for state remuneration, their cases highlight the
social rancor infrastructure development sometimes generated.54
Amid economic and political challenges, everyday citizens made creative appeals that
drew on national ideals when applying for funds. In Comalteco, Veracruz, for example, the local
League of Agrarian Communities wrote to interim-governor Fernando Casas Alemán (19391940) to lobby his contacts in Mexico City on their behalf for highway funds and civic
improvements around Tuxpan. Casas Alemán was a close associate of Miguel Alemán Valdés,
who had retired from the governorship to coordinate Manuel Ávila Camacho’s presidential
campaign. Three months later, the state government ordered two thousand pesos from the road
commission diverted to rebuild a regional hospital near Comalteco. Then, in 1940, Casas Alemán
earmarked ten percent of state road-building funds to complete the highway from Jalapa to
Tuxpan.55 Likewise, citizens utilized President Cárdenas’s populist legacy, invoking his name in
order to strengthen their pro-highway proposals. In 1941, in a letter to DCOP, the Nautla
highway committee wrote: "Doing honor to the previous administration, we remember that
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President Lázaro Cárdenas earnestly recommended this matter [the construction of the TexcocoNautla national highway project]."56
In addition to the immediate impact of road-building efforts, the long-term consequences
of entropy on finished projects affected the trajectory of local economies. Depending on whether
a route was poorly maintained, towns and hamlets that had enjoyed access to motor
transportation could see these benefits literally erode over time. In 1942, the route that connected
Doctor Arroyo, Nuevo León and neighboring settlements to the Pan-American Highway had
deteriorated significantly due to lack of state upkeep. Mountainous terrain and heavy seasonal
rains further aggravated the problem and interfered with farmers’ ability to transport produce.
Motor transport had become so difficult residents feared a reversal in economic growth and a
return to the regional isolation they experienced prior to the road’s completion ten years prior. A
local civic improvement committee implored the government to repair the road, arguing it could
mean the difference between “life and death to the region’s communities.”57
Another point of contention emerged at this time between public officials and regional
communities over motorists’ excessive speeds traveling the highways from Monterrey to the
border. State newspapers reported with grisly detail on auto collisions, often involving pedestrian
deaths due to driver distraction or intoxication, which stirred significant public safety concerns.
By the mid-1940s, authorities had raised fines against drunk driving and pushed to widen roads
to reduce the risk of collision from on-coming traffic. Local communities continued to demand
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that the state provide more highway patrols to police highway traffic and also to clearly post
speed limits.58
Regional law enforcement, however, remained lax, perhaps due to state policies favoring
motor travel and long-distance commerce at the border. The results could be tragic; in one case, a
bus traveling to Reynosa from Monterrey struck and killed a six-year-old girl walking along the
highway that ran through her town. Residents of Paso de la Loma discovered that the driver
lacked a proper license and had little experience operating large passenger vehicles. In the
subsequent public outcry to the Junta Local de Caminos, the dead girl’s family and neighbors
reminded the commission that this accident was not the first they had suffered from state neglect
and blamed the problem on reckless driving by motorists passing through the region.59
Ultimately, these kinds of tragedies pushed state authorities to limit road uses that did not
conform to official guidelines. In the latter half of the decade, they would increasingly seek to
regulate how everyday Mexicans could use roads, often privileging motorists’ right-of-way and
demanding that farmers keep their cattle off highways. State politicians made great strides to
portray roads as a modern convenience, casting ordinances that limited access as part of the
public interest in safety. In many ways, however, these policies clashed with a parallel political
aim: to harness roads as showcases for popular unity around state leadership that championed
motor highways as a key to regional prosperity. For example, in the 1943 gubernatorial race in
Nuevo León, Secretary of State Arturo de la Garza campaigned at the head of a long motor
caravan and gave speeches from a truck promising to continue his predecessor’s policies of
infrastructure and economic development. Yet, as the following chapter will show, the
definitions of “prosperity” and “development” associated with road building were tied to
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facilitating the creation of corporate supply lines and motor tourism. When farmers adapted
roads to specific needs not envisioned by government officials, they challenged the state’s
narrowly proscribed vision for highway infrastructure, which often espoused ersatz populist
rhetoric in favor of postwar corporate interests.60

Conclusion
In his last official state of the union address, delivered in 1946, Ávila Camacho equated
the “progress of a nation” with the “cumulative effect of its public works” and cited road
building as a key metric. In the preceding twelve months, as the Second World War came to an
end, his administration had overseen, nationwide, more than fourteen thousand kilometers of
road-related projects and granted almost five thousand new heavy vehicle permits to private
companies in the transportation industry. Federal and state officials, aided by foreign investment,
had cooperated in an ongoing program of land surveys, path clearing, paving, and road
maintenance. Ávila Camacho saw this work as a means to transform Mexican society and
improve material conditions for the nation’s citizens: “If schools can liberate us from ignorance,
then highways… can help to liberate us from misery.”61
As the Second World War helped to reset U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations, the
subsequent postwar epoch further solidified these bonds. The following chapter examines how
road-building policy evolved through the prism of Cold War concerns about the Soviet threat as
Washington looked for ways to invest in the Mexican economy. The programs that emerged out
of these geopolitical calculations had a profound impact on the course of road building efforts
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and motor mobility in local and regional postwar Mexico. They also set the foundation of the
modern North American economic relationship.
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Chapter 6
“Those Who Do Not Look Forward are Left Behind”:1
Building Roads for a Golden Age, 1946-1952
At five o’clock in the afternoon on February 15, 1949, a Catholic priest, Carlos Alvarez,
led a procession through Monterrey’s new R.E. Olds Motor Car Company assembly plant,
blessing the 10,000 square meter facility capable of producing 150 motor buses monthly. Joining
him in this benediction were powerful and influential members of the local elite alongside U.S.
visitors that included John Clarke, president of REO Motors, and Edwin Jones, chief executive
of Wells Fargo Bank. President Miguel Alemán and Nuevo León’s governor, Arturo B. de la
Garza, sent personal representatives to deliver speeches and inaugurate the factory, while
América Domínguez de Garza, widow of Arturo Garza---who had originally brought REO
Motors to Monterrey---broke a champagne bottle over the first truck to come off the production
line. XEMR, a local radio station, broadcast the entire ceremony live and El Porvenir dedicated a
full page of its society section to the event.2
During a speech at the gathering, Manuel Suárez Mier, director general of REO’s
Mexican subsidiary, placed the new facility within the context of national postwar road-building
policy: “In the coming years, this country will open more than 100,000 kilometers of new
caminos vecinales, which will undeniably require efficient and comprehensive transport
vehicles.” To achieve this end, he emphasized a new private initiative to invest twenty million
pesos into regionally focused road-building efforts across Mexico. He framed this program as
part of a broader drive to modernize the nation: “These routes and motor vehicles will carry
1
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Progress to all parts of the Republic like blood circulating vigorously through the arteries of a
young nation, providing inexhaustible wealth, which we are just now beginning to realize.”3
Mier’s poetic words captured the zeitgeist of the late 1940s in Mexico as the nation
looked forward to enjoying the fruits of industrialization and economic modernization. The first
half of the decade had witnessed wartime shortages and a public call for austerity, which
contrasted sharply with the subsequent discourse of prosperity forwarded by President Alemán
and his supporters after 1945. Between 1946 and 1952, the rate of growth for the national
highway network rose eighty percent to an average of 2,250 kilometers of new roads annually.
This increase occurred largely thanks to national and state policies that emphasized the
construction of caminos vecinales, boosting regional access to Mexico’s motor highways.4
When President Alemán took office in December 1946, the Secretaria de
Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas estimated that about one-fifth of the nation’s landmass was
connected to a major motor route like the Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic Highways. At the
time, critics argued that this figure represented too little progress given the scope of the decadeslong road construction program. They emphasized that geographic isolation still remained a
palpable challenge for much of Mexico. In response, Alemán supported new construction
programs that focused on building routes to local communities, ensuring them access to modern
motor transportation. By the end of the following decade, his administration had set into motion
policies for caminos vecinales that ultimately connected almost thirty percent of the country to
the national highway system. In total, this included a dense network of regional highways across
central Mexico and nearly a dozen key motor routes travelling to the northern border with the
United States. An additional dozen routes connected the country to its ports on the Gulf Coast
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and Pacific Ocean. As they built new roads, federal and state officials used the growth of this
infrastructure as a key metric to highlight Alemán’s Mexico as a modern nation to domestic and
foreign audiences alike.5

The Road to Postwar Prosperity and the Re-Presentation of Modernizing Mexico
As early as 1942, Mexicans had begun envisioning the long-term opportunities for
economic development that came with joining the United States in World War II. In May, El
Norte argued that Latin America was on the cusp of a major re-alignment in trade as Washington
increasingly looked to the Western Hemisphere as a source for raw materials. In an editorial
titled, “Quien no mira adelante, atrás se queda (those who do not look forward are left behind),”
it urged Mexico and the rest of the region to recognize the shift underway:
Not long ago, the United States imported its wool from Australia, but now it will come
from Uruguay, Chile and Argentina; zinc, copper and lead will come from Mexico, Chile
and Peru; tin from Bolivia; magnesium---essential for steel production---from Cuba and
Brazil. The United States, in turn, will invest credit and provide manufactured goods that
Latin America still does not produce. At the same time, this powerful Anglo-Saxon
nation will help the rest of the New World in building highways and fomenting its
industry.
The newspaper saw the need to rebuild a war-torn Europe as the impetus for greater U.S.
reliance on its hemispheric partners. “This will offer significant opportunity, on a grand scale, for
new markets that… both Americas could collaborate in to great advantage.”6 To achieve this end,
it saw U.S banks as playing an integral role in driving early postwar economic and infrastructural
development. The newspaper cited Siegfried Stern, vice-president of Chase National Bank, a
leading voice in favor of a vision for postwar Pan-Americanism that emphasized “sustained

5

Caminos y Desarrollo, 59, 74.

6

Emphasis added.

150

internal political stability” and “fiscal policies perfectly in accord with the protection of capital,
allowing for new U.S. investment and credit in equal cooperation with national partners [in Latin
America].”7
Likewise, in 1943, El Tiempo predicted rising postwar living standards and reduced
income inequality as rapid economic modernization---relying on the United States as model and
facilitator---transformed the countryside.8 At a summit that year, in Monterrey, Presidents Ávila
Camacho and Roosevelt framed wartime bilateral relations as one part of a much larger socioeconomic whole that embraced Pan-Americanism as a basis for postwar development. Speaking
of the United States and Mexico as equal partners, Ávila Camacho declared, “Geography has
made us a natural bridge for reconciliation between the Latin and Saxon cultures of the
continent. If there is a place where the thesis of the Good Neighbor policy can be tested, it is
right here in the juxtaposition of these two lands.” In his own remarks, Roosevelt touched upon
themes of modernization that echoed El Tiempo’s view: “The grand Mexican family is on a path
to greater progress, which will allow all of its members to enjoy security and opportunity. The
United States government and my fellow citizens are ready to contribute.”9
When the war ended, these contributions came in the form of new public and private
investment, much of it targeting infrastructure needs in Mexico. In February 1947, following
another bilateral summit---this time in Mexico City---U.S. President Harry S. Truman promised
to extend Mexico additional loans via the Export-Import Bank to help fight persistent high
inflation, confront the epidemic plaguing national cattle stocks, and build roads.10 Truman
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emphasized the “Good Neighbor” policy as a critical bilateral policy that opened Mexico to
infrastructural and industrial investment by the United States.11 Supplementing U.S. ExportImport Bank loans, the Bank of America of California granted the Mexican government a nine
million dollar line-of-credit specifically to build new motor highways.12 The American Embassy
in Mexico City championed this combination of capital investment and infrastructure
development as part of a larger, geopolitical strategy against the Soviet Union: “A prosperous
neighbor is better than a poor one… and won’t be so easily smitten with Communism.”13
President Alemán used renewed U.S. investment, and an internal bond issue worth one
hundred million pesos, to boost spending on roads above wartime levels. In 1947, the SCOP
allocated 150 million pesos for road construction, a fifty percent increase over the 1945 budget;
by 1948, the federal government doubled road funding to 300 million pesos. In its first two
years, Alemán’s administration oversaw construction of thousands of kilometers of new roads.
Projects included the Matamoros-Monterrey-Mazatlán highway that connected the Gulf Coast to
the Pacific Ocean, the completion of the Mexican portion of the Pan-American Highway, and
other highways from border communities Ciudad Juárez, Piedras Negras, and Nogales to Mexico
City. The federal government also funded smaller projects, including the 50-kilometer TampicoTuxpán highway and a 64-kilometer route between the ports of Veracruz and Alvarado, which
facilitated regional shipping. Echoing the sentiments of local leaders from Huiloapan, Veracruz--
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-noted in the last chapter---federal and state officials saw these roads as opportunities to rebuild
the Mexican economy, spurring trade and tourism.14
Political surrogates in the federal Congress expounded on Alemán’s vision for the nation,
imbuing it with cultural and historical significance. In the response to the president’s 1949 State
of the Union address, Armando del Castillo Franco, leader of the Chamber of Deputies, harkened
back to Ávila Camacho’s last speech before that body. He drew the parallel between the use of
public schools to enrich the intellectual and scientific capacities of the citizenry to the work of
road construction. Castillo Franco congratulated Alemán on this aggressive public works agenda
and declared: “In the ongoing work of building highways [and] roads… you are achieving, Mr.
President, the basic premise of the Mexican Revolution: to unite, not divide, Mexicans in matters
spiritual and moral as well as material.” This assertion that Alemán had fulfilled the revolution’s
promise to develop Mexico is significant; it reinforced the notion that the nation’s well being
could be measured tangibly by the number of public works it produced.15
Likewise, U.S. media accounts of Mexico in the latter 1940s reflected this narrative of
progress promoted by Alemán’s government. In many respects, foreign travelogues highlighted
representations of Mexico at a time when the language of armed mobilization receded and
familiar stories of modernization based around motor tourism returned to the fore. Reporting
from Mexico City in 1949, Roland Goodman painted a vibrant portrait of “the roads newly ready
for the everyday motorist,” drawing on a recognizable narrative of modernity and technological
progress to emphasize the impact of recent highway construction. Whereas old routes had only
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been traversable on horseback, he wrote that the Pan-American Highway connected “ancient”
mountainous settlements more easily “to the outside world.” At the same time, however, he
provided practical advice, pointing out where roads had all-weather, asphalt-concrete surfaces
conducive to motor travel, while warning visitors away from other paths: “Though buses now
operate along this route… tourists are warned that two brief mountainous stretches [to the]
north… will be rough on their tires.”16
Graphical representations of travel in Mexico provided visual clues to American travelers
about what to expect on a visit south of the U.S. border. A map that accompanied Goodman’s
article showed the Mexican highway system with a key for paved, all weather and dry weather
paths as well as routes still under construction. It also provided enhanced detail on central
Mexico from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, depicting regional cities and state capitals
linked to the road network. The drawing of a four-door sedan driving along a pristinely paved
road with a mountain range in the background filled a portion of empty space on the map,
reiterating the theme of motor tourism as an aspect of technological progress vis-à-vis nature.
In the fall of 1952, the Times printed another of Goodman’s travel reports to
commemorate the end of Miguel Alemán’s tenure as president. The story detailed the progress
Mexico had achieved in recent years building new roads that opened large swathes of territory to
American tourists. Alongside mention of the Pan-American Highway, Goodman listed a series of
accomplishments such as a new airport and a “gigantic” 105,000-seat stadium in the federal
capital, which he speculated could signal Olympic aspirations from Mexico in the future. He
hailed air-conditioned bus service from the border as a welcome introduction, but cautioned
readers, after listing a series of smaller settlements, that “none of these latter towns has had time
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to develop modern hotels.” Striving for a positive spin, nonetheless, Goodman stressed “local
color” and “low prices” as the selling points of destinations along newly paved routes that had
yet to develop a more “mature” tourism economy.17

Building State and Local Roads for a Golden Age
In 1946, as a presidential candidate, Miguel Alemán campaigned on a domestic platform
that emphasized road building as a means to spur economic growth and also distribute these
gains to rural communities. On the one hand, his policy represented a return to pre-war
developmental messages that emphasized market access and motor tourism as key economic
drivers. On the other hand, however, his political rhetoric was strongly influenced by the
memory of years of economic austerity that had confronted Mexico after nationalization of the
oil industry and then during the war. In speeches to everyday Mexicans, he acknowledged that
industrial and infrastructural modernization was lacking in rural areas and promised to address
this challenge during his term. In many ways, the question was not whether Mexico would
modernize. The contours of that debate had already been settled after two decades of
infrastructure development alongside the formation of new programs that ultimately brought in
significant foreign aid. The question at hand for Alemán was how his government would
distribute the gains of economic and industrial modernization now that Mexico had emerged
from seven years of national austerity.18
The general interpretation of the new president by historians has emphasized his
headlong commitment to modernization, preferring to put money into the hands of those who
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would invest it.19 Although Alemán certainly favored Mexico’s industrialization and supported
private business as the sine qua non for economic modernization, he employed nuanced political
language that sought to involve ejidatarios and workers in a subordinate developmental role.
Under the idea of national unity, which had served as a policy platform during his election
campaign, Alemán acknowledged farmers’ and labor union rights, but asserted that growing the
economy must take precedence in planning efforts.20 Highlighting this argument, sociologist
María Antonia Martínez submits a revisionist view of Alemán’s sexenio that takes into account
his pro-business and internationalist tendencies, but situates them in an understanding of a
discursive framework the president fashioned to articulate ideas broadly to all Mexicans:
Miguel Alemán spearheaded a type of economic development that based itself in the
preeminence of the State as an economic agent, which utilized strategies that sought to
protect the domestic market and its potential to industrialize via import substitution. In
political terms, the model was rooted in the use of democratic rhetoric in concert with the
prevailing [contemporary] discourses of the international stage and a practical tendency
in favor of consolidating greater control over distinct actors.21
Drawing on this perspective, I argue in the following sections of this chapter that
Alemán’s primary focus was not solely on reorganizing the Mexican state in favor of private
enterprise, but rather looked to further consolidate the government’s political power domestically
by a variety of means. In this way, his road-building policies, which invested extensively in
caminos vecinales that created additional transport linkages between Mexico’s countryside and
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its cities, served to address rural demands for more economic aid, looking to bring labor and
campesino groups into Alemanismo as subordinate---but nevertheless important---developmental
partners.
An important part of this political project included convening national conferences that
drew on a broad base of participants to fashion President Alemán’s policy program during his
sexenio.22 For example, in April 1947, SCOP opened a national congress to address roadbuilding issues, inviting state officials, labor groups, and ejidal associations to join the discussion
determining best practices for construction efforts and also identify regions most in need of
attention by the national government.23 That same month, Mexico also sent a special delegation
to the Second International Commission for Local Transportation in Geneva, Switzerland. The
group, comprised of representatives from the public and private sector, included Alonso
Lazcano---one of Monterrey’s most prominent industrialists---as well as a dozen delegates from
the Alianza de Camioneros de México, an organization with eight thousand members, which
coordinated issues for bus and truck drivers across the nation.24 In his first state of the union
address in September, Alemán highlighted the establishment of a new federal initiative with the
state Juntas Locales de Caminos: “The Survey Department for Local Road Projects was created
to reach out to the small communities it finds economically and culturally isolated from the rest
of the nation.” To that end, at the end of 1947, the government extended seven million pesos
worth of subsidies to caminos vecinales to Juntas Locales de Caminos across Mexico, which
helped to pay for new roadwork and conservation efforts in the following year.25
22

Ibid., 11-12, 45-51.

23

“La construcción de caminos vecinales es vital para la recuperación del país,” 15 April 1947, El Porvenir.

24

“Representará a los camioneros mexicanos en la Segunda Comisión Internacional de Ginebra,” 30 April 1947, El
Porvenir.

157

Nuevo León
Private and public sector groups embraced Alemán’s plan to build roads, developing
creative solutions to quickly open new motor routes. On 11 December 1946, days after becoming
president, Alemán received a proposal from the Comité Pro-Carretera Monterrey-García, a group
made up of leading state politicians---including retired governor Bonifacio Salinas Leal---and
members of prominent regiomontano families like the Garzas, Treviños, and Lozanos. The
committee’s president, Jenaro Garza Sepúlveda, discussed the construction of a new motor road
between Monterrey and Paredón, Coahuila, which would run through Villa de Garcia by using a
path already cleared and graded by the Ferrocarril Central Mexicano for a rail line it never
completed. Garza called the project “easily executable and cost effective,” noting that the
president needed only to transfer control of the land from the federal Department for Railroads to
the SCOP. The state government had completed feasibility studies and the plan already enjoyed
the support of local landowners along the route: “We are sure that this [road] will help drive
regional agriculture and ranching, allowing for no less than thirty thousand hectares of land to be
cultivated. It will also attract tourism, since there are many picturesque sites along the short route
from Monterrey to Villa de Garcia.”26 Almost two weeks later, the committee received the
president’s decision: Alemán agreed to the project, transferring it to SCOP after 27 December.27
In the same week that Jenaro Garza made his case for the Monterrey-Garcia-Paredón
road, Governor Arturo B. de la Garza delivered a separate report to President Alemán in support
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of a new central highway from the border at Piedras Negras, Coahuila to Mexico City. The plan
had emerged out of a broad working group composed of the state governors of Nuevo León,
Coahuila, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Querétaro. They proposed
construction of a series of extensions to the existing Pan-American and Inter-Oceanic Highways,
opening a new route to the United States and also improving motor travel options between the
cities of Matamoros, Monterrey, Saltillo, Matehuala (San Luis Potosí), Guadalajara (Jalisco), and
León (Guanajuato). In total, the plan called for more than one thousand kilometers of new motor
roads across northern and central Mexico, and suggested raising the gasoline tax by two cents to
pay for the work.28
When Alemán’s authorization for this road project came soon thereafter, it represented
the culmination of years of careful planning by public and private supporters. In 1944, the state
Chambers of Commerce and Industry from Guanajuato, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and
San Luis Potosí---in conjunction with the Mexican National Association for the Lions Club---had
submitted a similar proposal to President Ávila Camacho. It had arrived, however, the same day
that Jose Antonio de la Lama y Rojas, an artillery lieutenant and right-wing extremist, made an
attempt on the president’s life. Amid the chaos generated by a failed assassination attempt in
wartime, the request was overlooked and languished until the governors’ working group revived
it after 1945. In a letter dated 17 December 1946, the Club de Leones de San Luis Potosí echoed
many of Jenaro Garza’s sentiments in favor of the Monterrey-Garcia road when it thanked
President Alemán for approving the Piedras Negras-Mexico City Highway plan:
For more than eight years, this chamber of commerce has represented the economic needs
of the state, calling for the construction of a federal and international highway that unites
the cities of Piedras Negras, Saltillo, San Luis Potosí, San Luis de la Paz, Querétaro, and
Mexico City. It will provide inestimable commercial and industrial benefits to the
28
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Republic, putting the major consumer and distribution centers of the capital in direct and
easy contact with all of the communities that extend along the border with the United
States of America. It will provide an outlet for all of the goods produced in this part of
the country, which had long lacked transport options to larger consumer markets.29
Once approved, the Piedras Negras-Mexico City Highway required effective regional
coordination between state governments over the financing extended for construction. In 1947
and 1948, however, complications---reminiscent of similar challenges during the war---arose
between Nuevo León and Tamaulipas over budget allocations for the highway. At the time, the
Junta Local de Caminos de Nuevo León reported that it had worked with federal authorities to
jointly invest 5.9 million pesos, roughly sixty-five percent of the regional project’s estimated
cost. In contrast, Governor de la Garza complained that Tamaulipas had only contributed 1.5
million pesos, leaving a seventeen percent deficit in the budget. Ultimately, Alemán resolved the
issue---per de la Garza’s suggestion---by extending a two million peso road bond to Tamaulipas,
covering the remainder of the expenses.30
In 1949, when Ignacio Morones Prieto succeeded Arturo de la Garza as governor of
Nuevo León, the Monterrey-Garcia and Piedras Negras-Mexico City routes became parts of a
larger six-year plan for road building in the state. The JLCNL listed nine new routes that drew
funds from the federal-state cooperative budget and camino vecinal construction program,
representing a combined cost of forty-three millions pesos. In addition, the agency estimated
state conservation expenditures for these routes to equal 2.25 million pesos per annum. In total,
Morones Prieto planned to build almost 2,000 kilometers of new roads in Nuevo León, drawing
on a combination of federal and state bond subsidies, plus tax revenues from petroleum and
29
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tourism. Between 1945 and 1948, contributions Nuevo León received via the federal gasoline tax
increased roughly eleven percent per year from 1.8 million to 2.5 million pesos, respectively. At
this rate of growth, state officials could expect contributions to exceed three million pesos by
1950, and reach 5.5 million by 1955---more than half of the estimated 9.2 million annual budget
for road-building.31
The JLCNL proceeded with construction efforts that relied on 735 kilometers of national
highways in the state as a foundation to expand its network of caminos vecinales. By the early
1950s, it had extended regional access by 367 kilometers, building six new local routes: SabinasParás-General Treviño, Saltillo-García-Monterrey, Monterrey-San Miguel, Cadereyta-Allende,
Galeana-Linares, and Villa China-Terán. This roadwork represented more than just the creation
of simple dirt paths in rural areas, but rather included the deployment of largely asphalt-concrete
paved routes, which were to be supported by drainage systems to reduce the chance of flooding,
and also included the construction of at least half a dozen motor bridges. Moreover, the agency
highlighted three future asphalt routes, which would pass through thirteen southern and western
counties in the state, growing Nuevo León’s road network by more than 300 kilometers.32
Local enthusiasm remained strong throughout this period. For example, in 1949, the
municipal president of Agualeguas, Eleuterio Salinas, wrote to Governor Morones Prieto about
the road to Parás: “Our communities are prepared to help the government carry out this work,
although what we can offer is very small we have organized committees that will allow all of our
residents to participate according to their economic situation.”33 In many cases, these
31
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organizations included chambers of commerce and civic associations, which helped to coordinate
area labor and make formal requests to state and federal officials to provide greater financial
support to local construction projects.34 In Sabinas Hidalgo, which was located at the opposite
end of the same road that ran through Agualeguas from Parás, Margarito Raymundo Salinas lead
planning efforts. A local commercial and agricultural agent, he enjoyed financial ties with the
Mercantile Bank of Monterrey and owned properties that contained five thousand head of cattle.
Salinas offered all of his “moral, material, and economic” cooperation for the road, which would
not only serve as a key camino vecinal for the state, but also do much to provide greater market
access for his goods and those of the rest of the regional community.35
This drive to connect once-isolated populations to the state highway and camino vecinal
network, however, could also devolve into acrimonious political disputes. As rival local groups
sought to assert their own vision for regional road-building plans, there existed the possibility for
lawsuits and lengthy court battles that slowed progress. The legal disputes that stemmed from the
construction of a road to Villa de Santiago, Nuevo León serves as an illustrative case study of
this problem. In the fall of 1948, Melquíades Sanchez, the local municipal president, wrote
Governor de la Garza, denouncing an area landowner who had opposed the planned road:
“Alvino Valdés has been extorting the men involved in this project since the beginning,
confusing some farmers about his true intent. He is an enemy of progress to this region.”
The planned camino vecinal in question connected a dozen rural communities to
Monterrey, thirty-eight kilometers away, and gave residents easier access to the Pan-American
Highway. In 1947, Pedro Reyna, head of the Grupero de Fruteros Nacionales, had organized a
34
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comité pro-camino to coordinate local support for the construction project. At the same time,
however, as the plan developed, Alvino Valdés had begun a campaign in opposition to it,
convincing small-scale cultivators in the isolated and mountainous territories west of Santiago to
deny monies for a local tax that supported the construction plan. He alleged that members of the
pro-highway committee in the villa were corrupt and regularly misappropriated the collected
funds for their own personal use.36 Reyna’s road committee subsequently wrote to the governor
defending itself, arguing that Valdés had impugned their reputations and requesting that the local
judiciary order the release of these withheld tax funds.37
In 1949, Reyna submitted a long report to the state government, detailing the course of
this political battle over the preceding eight months. At the time, Valdés had brought another
lawsuit before the court in Cadereyta, forcing a work stoppage. He argued against completion of
the route through the mountains to Santiago at Cola de Caballo, a nearby waterfall and potential
tourism destination; instead, he advocated for an alternative path with its terminus at Cañón de
San Francisco farther north. A local contractor, Diego Saldívar, further complicated matters
when he offered to build this other road for less than the already agreed upon budget for the Cola
de Caballo project awarded to the construction firm Caminos Desmontes, S.A. Despite a survey
by the JLCNL attesting to the technical impracticality of building through Cañón de San
Francisco, state officials in charge of overseeing the funds cancelled the more expensive deal and
gave Saldívar their backing.38
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This change of course created new delays as the entire construction schedule stretched
into 1949. First, Saldívar repeatedly missed deadlines to present a working plan for his project.
Then, the pro-highway committee in Santiago discovered that the terminus for this alternate road
ran alongside commercial property Valdés owned; they accused him of trying to benefit
financially at the expense of providing road access to a greater part of the region’s population.
As a result, the Grupo de Frutero Nacionales brought a counter-suit against Valdés in Cadereyta,
ordering him to stop opposition to the road tax meant to fund the project and to personally
reimburse the amount that had been withheld from revenue collectors. Reyna further implored
the governor to dismiss Saldívar's contract as an "imaginary project" and restore the agreement
with the original company to finish the road at Cola de Caballo.39
In December 1949, two weeks after Reyna delivered his second complaint, the new
governor, Ignacio Morones Prieto, finally backed the initial road. Following more than a year of
personal acrimony and public debate, advocates for the first project linking rural western
communities to Santiago gained the needed political endorsements to see it to completion.
Construction crews broke ground in the spring of 1950; in May, El Norte reported that the state
government had invested 150,000 pesos in the project and that the Grupo de Fruteros Nacionales
contributed an additional 80,000 pesos for work expected to take the summer to complete. Once
finished, the newspaper predicted:
Villa de Santiago will become an important tourist destination. Hidden within this
municipio is great natural beauty, once almost inaccessible and unknown to the public.
Thanks to new roads, these places… will be in reach for visitors to experience.40
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Although the state governor had played a key role in deciding the fate of the route, this
case underscores the fact that local actors retained considerable agency in developing and
contesting construction plans. Much was at stake for the local communities that hoped to benefit
from the national government’s program for caminos vecinales, and as such, they actively
engaged the agencies in charge of this work to ensure their voices were heard.

Veracruz
In the spring of 1946, when Miguel Alemán campaigned across Veracruz, he
acknowledged the difficulties of traveling the state due to the poor conditions of its many local
caminos vecinales. In Tantoyuca, a municipio in northern Veracruz, he promised the farmers
gathered to listen to his speech that he would address local challenges to motor mobility. For
years, residents had complained that many of the region’s roads were in poor condition and
largely impassable by motorbuses during the rainy springtime months. Candidate Alemán
declared a commitment to finish the Tuxpan-Tampico highway, which ran through the lower and
upper regions of the Huasteca Veracruzana to the state border with Tamaulipas. Pro-road groups
saw the project as a key driver for economic development, not only since it linked to important
regional ports, but also because it supported a network of roads that added access for interior
municipios to the coastal highway.41
Six months after the election, however, it appeared to many of these constituents that the
project was not proceeding as they had originally hoped. In a letter dated January 1947, they
reminded the new president of his pledge: “This region is the very heart of the Huasteca
Veracruzana, the cradle of the Revolution. Sadly, we have learned that the plan for the highway
has changed completely… as someone who knows this area and its problems… we ask that you
41

Comité Cerro Azul, letter to Miguel Alemán, 27 January 1947, AGEV.

165

intervene on our behalf.” 42 The new route bypassed Cerro Azul and six other isolated
communities clustered in a densely forested and mountainous part of the Huasteca Baja.
Subsequent correspondence indicates that road engineers had made the decision to reroute
construction because of the logistical difficulty of building in the area and the potential for
delays. Instead, it appears that federal and state authorities emphasized a series of caminos
vecinales that linked the county seats of the interior municipios, including Tempoal, Panuco, and
Chicontepec, which created a junction of motor roads in northern Veracruz between the
Tampico-Tuxpan and Perote-Xalapa-Coatepec highways.43
Alemán’s promises as a candidate contrasted with the application of policy during his
presidency. His rhetoric drew on populist language, calling for equitable social renewal and
postwar economic growth through infrastructure and industrial development. Ultimately, the
Tuxpán-Tampico case highlights the local realities of Alemanismo: federal and state
governments prioritized the construction of new roads and highways that enhanced access to
Mexico’s ports and production centers above concerns for equitable distribution of public
spending. If a rural zone happened to benefit, then the president would gladly take credit; in the
1948 state of the union he declared: “The Department for Planning and Development of Regional
Highways (Carreteras Vecinales) launched activities with a vision to link---with the great federal
roads---the most isolated regions. They have begun work on twenty-nine road routes that unite
seventy population centers across various states.” At same time, however, local leaders in the
Huasteca Alta, including the municipios of Chicontepec and Tantoyuca complained to the state
government about material shortages that forced communities to share much-needed tools and
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equipment. Citing limited budgets, the best Veracruz’s DCOP could do was to triage problems,
and shift resources from one area to another.44
In many ways, this case of road-building promises made and amended in the Huasteca
Veracruzana is emblematic of the confluence of everyday needs and national policy during
Alemán’s sexenio. On the one hand, much of the political rhetoric promoted state and local
needs within the program for caminos vecinales; on the other hand, however, the optimistic
language of this period obfuscated the underlying political tensions at the regional level that had
marked road building efforts since the 1920s. Not everyone could benefit equally from the
investments being made; towns with greater political cachet won out over others---despite the
president’s language favoring aid to economically and culturally isolated communities.
Moreover, as became clear in Veracruz at this time, the latter 1940s emerged as a period of
growing reliance on private sector contractors to meet stated public needs.45
From 1944 to 1950, state leadership---first under Governor Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, and
later Ángel Carvajal Bernal---enacted new reforms that proved crucial to the activities of the
road-building bureaucracy in Veracruz. First, public officials more clearly defined the role of the
JCCV, putting it in charge of maintenance and repair of seven branches of the national highway
network in the state. The agency also began working more closely with DCOP on construction of
new federal highways, providing survey and logistical support for the Tuxpán-Tampico,
Conejos-Huatusco, and Córdoba-Veracruz roads, among others. Through the JCCV, the SCOP
set up research laboratories in Veracruz to test soil conditions and construction materials. These
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latter facilities were important to regional efforts to build roads that could withstand the heavy
seasonal rains and challenging topology of the state.46
Secondly, the state government consolidated road construction efforts, reducing the
number of agencies involved, while also enhancing the role of DCOP. Official documents make
no mention of the Junta Local de Caminos de Orizaba or the independent committees like
Coatzacoalcos that enjoyed greater organizational autonomy in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
Instead, it appears that federal and state authorities divided the responsibilities of these regional
associations between the JCCV and DCOP; for example, both agencies worked together on
expanding the Córdoba-Orizaba-Veracruz highway with no reference to the JLC de Orizaba.
Where the JCCV remained focused on maintenance and construction of motor highways, DCOP
took charge of caminos vecinales in Veracruz. This policy gave the agency significant influence
in how planning and implementation of local roads occurred across the state; in many ways, it
represented an extension of the duties it carried out in previous years, but now with greater scope
thanks to increased federal support for regional motor routes. In addition, DCOP supervised the
execution of state contracts with private companies brought in to supply technical support and
labor. It also managed delivery of heavy equipment and motor vehicles to job sites, leasing items
like trucks and tractors to contractors.47
Lastly, the expanded role for private contractors marked one of the biggest changes in the
road-building bureaucracy in Veracruz. In some cases, engineers who had formerly worked for
the state government formed their own private firms that provided technical support to DCOP. In
October 1946, Luis G. Rendón and two other engineers---including his son, Luis Rendón Jr.--46
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presented a formal letter of solicitation to then-agency head, Gustavo Rocha, listing the services
they offered, including survey work and construction supervision. They also submitted a
proposal to conduct advance reviews of a series of new roads in central and southeastern
Veracruz that would expand the established Coatzacoalcos-Alvarado route constructed during
the war. They estimated a weekly budget of 810 pesos to pay for technical staff and peones in
four separate survey and construction brigades. It is unclear, however, whether the government
approved the plan since no record of DCOP’s response to the Rendóns was included in the file at
the state archives.48
At the time, Veracruzano officials were receiving a number of bids for contract work
from private groups from across the country. In July 1946, the state government signed a
lucrative deal with Carlos Hernández y Hernández, a Mexico City-based engineer who ran a
private contracting firm that built motor roads and bridges. They put the company in charge of
implementing blueprints for caminos vecinales in the state, a process closely supervised by the
DCOP; a federally backed state road bond subsidized construction efforts. In 1948, when
Hernández renewed his deal with the state, DCOP wrote a nineteen-page contract that dictated
specific terms for the relationship from construction timelines and requirements for expected
progress to setting price levels for labor and materials charges---the company was required to
make all purchases through official channels and could not use outside vendors.49
The construction of the Conejos-Huatusco road serves as an example of how each of
these different aspects of the state road-building bureaucracy came together. Started in 1948, the
road travelled ninety-five kilometers from central Veracruz to the Gulf Coast, crossing the
48
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Perote-Xalapa-Veracruz highway via the municipio of Puente Nacional. Engineers faced
challenging terrain and environmental features. The western terminus of the route was in a
mountainous region of the state 1,300 meters above sea level with forty-one inches of annual
rainfall. It then descended through thick evergreen forests to the coastal municipio of Úrsulo
Galván, twenty meters above sea level, with a humid tropical climate that received thirty-nine
inches of yearly precipitation. Technical crews used the SCOP laboratory in Xalapa to conduct
initial soil analysis, which had determined that the land was satisfactory for construction in its
current conditions, and could support a provisional macadam-gravel path ahead of the
application of a more permanent layer of asphalt and concrete.50
DCOP assigned Hernández’s engineering firm to build the road. It set the preliminary
budget for the project at one million pesos, which funded a construction brigade that employed
up to thirty-four laborers---who worked eight to twelve hour shifts, typically six days a week--with average weekly payroll expenses of 1,200 pesos.51 Hernández leased vehicles through the
state government to transport workers to the job site, paying six pesos a day for the equipment.
In addition, DCOP assigned Paulino Ceballos as a supervising engineer to travel with the
contractors and provide regular progress reports to Director Rocha. Work proceeded from the
early summer months and into the fall of 1948, with much of the road completed by the end of
the year. One of the chief complaints among local residents, however, had nothing to do with the
planned route, but rather the behavior of the road workers, who visited nearby communities in
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their off-hours and caused public commotions. In September, Rocha wrote Ceballos ordering
him to address this problem:
It has come to my attention that workers on the Conejos-Huatusco highway are
frequently causing local disturbances, generating scandal that reflects poorly on this
agency. You must ensure they cease their disorderly behavior after hours, reminding
them that you are authorized to discipline any personnel involved.52
Rocha’s letter provides further indications of the notable changes to the everyday work of
the state road-building bureaucracy at this time. DCOP had not only allowed private contractors
to form and direct construction brigades, but this personnel was being sourced from non-local
areas. It was a major departure from two decades before when Governor Tejeda empowered rural
communities to provide labor through a variation of the faena. Moreover, it showed contrasts
with the late 1930s and early 1940s, which continued to have significant participation from local
businesses, agrarian groups and other regional associations driving construction efforts.
Although local communities still played a role in road building, especially in advocating for and
maintaining routes, in many ways, the Conejos-Huatusco project highlights the shift towards
centralization of decision-making under the auspices of the state government as well as greater
use of private construction firms.
This move towards centralization in some aspects of state road building then makes
policy decisions where it did not occur more notable. On the one hand, there is definite evidence
of a significant reworking in how Veracruz organized and directed construction efforts. On the
other hand, although the state took a more robust role that either diminished or eliminated
regional agencies like the Junta Local de Caminos de Orizaba, this concentration of decisionmaking power did not necessarily apply to standardization of policy. For example, the JCCV and
DCOP paid the same job categories different daily rates; in the late 1948s, both agencies had
52
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increased wages for peones, but the former paid them two pesos per shift while the latter paid 3.5
pesos. It is unclear why this occurred, but a review of payroll records indicates that pay scale
differences persisted throughout the second half of the decade. Private firms also used DCOP’s
pay scale, which may imply that although their contracts were structured along guidelines set by
the Dirección Nacional de Caminos, and funded by a combination of federal and state subsidies,
state-level officials ultimately had the final say on these matters.53
Ángel Carvajal Bernal’s brief two-year term at the end of the decade as interim governor
proved to be a productive one for road building. In 1949, he boasted that during his tenure the
state had constructed more than 720 kilometers of new roads, with well over half of these routes
fully paved and an additional thirty percent described as “perfectly drivable” dirt paths. He had
also invested more than 4.5 million pesos into these projects.54 The following year, when he left
state office to become Alemán’s energy secretary, he orchestrated an elaborate farewell tour of
communities that had benefited from his developmental policies. In April 1950, as he visited
Huatusco, El Dictamen described how “campesinos from all of the surrounding communities
lined two kilometers of the road into the city to applaud” as his motor caravan passed. Later that
day, Dr. Vinicio Méndez specifically mentioned the impact of the Huatusco-Conejos highway
during a toast at the banquet honoring the departing governor:
The work of this highway stands out as essential in uniting Huatusco with all of the
principal populations of the state, providing opportunities to the city and the surrounding
communities. It brings them closer together with all of Veracruz in a manner both
physical and spiritual.55
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Contrasting Narratives of Postwar Modernity in Road Building & Motor Travel
Road building served a dual purpose that reflected the ambitions of postwar Mexico.
First, new motor highways and caminos vecinales played a key practical and logistical role,
providing improved regional access to markets and connecting the nation more closely with
foreign economic partners like the United States. Second, they worked as a stage to signal
Mexico’s embrace of modernization to national and international audiences. This latter aspect
was a crucial component that informed how many people thought about the importance of road
building and motor travel. As Manuel Suárez Mier framed the point in his speech
commemorating the REO assembly plant in Monterrey, new roads “carried Progress to all parts
of the Republic.” It was propaganda shared by members of the federal Chamber of Deputies,
many of who saw highway construction as a measure of President Alemán’s work to fulfill the
tenets of the Mexican Revolution.56 On the one hand, political and commercial leaders rarely
shied from the opportunity to characterize new roads as tangible example of their vision for the
nation. They could draw on poetic language and populist rhetoric when making their case for the
benefits of modern transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, highways and caminos
vecinales were not static monuments, but rather dynamic spaces that played an integral role in
everyday life and evolved due to usage and weather long after initial construction ended.
Broken roads, motor vehicle accidents, and poor maintenance threatened to undermine
the narrative of modernity and progress that public officials and others hoped to project. J. Brian
Freeman has explored this issue in his work on the cross-country motor rallies that used the
course of the Pan-American Highway from Guatemala to the U.S.-Mexico border. In the late
1940s, President Alemán and other race promoters saw the competition as an opportunity to
56

Castillo Franco, Contestación al Tercer Informe de Gobierno, 1 September 1949, 143; “Mejorarse la industria de
autotransportes en México,” El Porvenir.

173

showcase the prowess of Mexican modernity through the nation’s transportation infrastructure.
The annual event drew large crowds and generated considerable media attention as drivers from
across the world came to participate. High profile motor accidents, however, gradually changed
the image away from one intended to portray Mexico as a modern tourist destination. Instead,
international media coverage produced a counter narrative that conflated the accidents with
stereotypes of the country in a way that portrayed Mexican roads as dangerous and unregulated
spaces. By 1951, President Alemán quietly withdrew his support for the competition and
organizers ultimately shut down the events due to the negative attention generated by media
coverage of the accidents.57
State and regional leaders shared this sensitivity about how transportation infrastructure
reflected the nation. The development of Mexico as a tourist destination required a belief that
travel in Mexico was reliably safe. When domestic or foreign media accounts questioned road
quality and undermined public confidence in travel safety, public authorities and news media in
affected regions responded with strong rebuttals. For example, in December 1948, after rumors
circulated in Mexico City that the highways around Xalapa and Veracruz port were poorly
maintained and dangerous, local authorities and the local press denounced the allegations as
false. El Dictamen stated that all of the highways leading to Veracruz, Córdoba, Orizaba,
Gutiérrez Zamora and Tecolutla were “perfectly paved.” Moreover, it stressed that the roads
were in “magnificent condition” and “very secure” and also reminded readers of the state’s
reputation for hospitality.58
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The growing number of motor vehicles and foreign travellers on Mexico’s roads also
posed acute practical challenges. High profile accidents undermined the image that federal and
state officials hoped to project of the nation as a modern, postwar tourist destination. For
example, in the summer of 1950, a serious crash occurred near Ciénaga de Flores, Nuevo León,
involving a family of six American tourists from Pennsylvania. El Norte reported that on the
afternoon of 4 June, as their 1949-model Packard sedan negotiated a sharp mountain curve the
vehicle collided with a cargo truck travelling in the opposite direction. Two young women,
eighteen and twelve years old respectively, died at the scene, while Red Cross ambulances
transported the injured to a local hospital for treatment.59
State accounts noted the prevalence of reckless driving as a major problem. In Monterrey,
in May 1950, transit authorities blamed a forty-five-year-old motorist for a crash involving a
school bus. He had been travelling at excessive speeds and failed to yield at an intersection,
colliding with the larger vehicle and causing it to roll onto its side; four students---ages ranging
from eight to eleven---were injured in the accident. Likewise, in Veracruz, two youths from
Banderilla---a community near Xalapa---were killed instantly and another left near death when
an out-of-control trailer hit them as they waited to cross the highway. The truck driver, Angel
Marquina, who had not been traveling at excessive speeds, was forced to take quick defensive
actions to avoid another car accident in front of him. In the process of evading this collision,
Marquina lost control of his vehicle and hit the youths. The one surviving youth, Isabel
Caballero, later died of her injuries.60
Although reckless driving was blamed as the cause of these accidents, they nevertheless
served to depict motor roads as potentially dangerous spaces. State regulation, drawing on
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concerns about public safety, reflected the dual narratives of modernity related to motor
highways and caminos vecinales. Transit authorities in Nuevo León and Veracruz launched
vehicle inspection programs to ensure that cargo trucks and motorbuses were in proper operating
order, while state governments increased penalties for driving under the influence, recklessness,
and speeding. Moreover, state officials also passed new ordinances that sought to exert greater
control over the ways that people used roadways. Although transit agencies did not keep detailed
statistical data on the issue, newspaper reports and official correspondence indicate that motor
collisions with farm animals in rural areas were a growing concern. In both Nuevo León and
Veracruz, farmers and ranchers were prohibited from using state highways to herd cattle and
other ungulates, citing public safety rules that prioritized motorists’ right-of-way. 61
Heavy rains and flooding also brought these kinds of concerns to the forefront, igniting
popular debate on whether government officials were doing enough to address public needs. In
October 1950, a hurricane made landfall along the Gulf Coast at Veracruz, inflicting significant
damage to the highways and caminos vecinales that ran between the ports of Los Tuxtlas,
Alvarado, and Veracruz port as well as the roads that travelled inland to Xalapa and Córdoba.
Initially, the federal and state governments responded slowly, and the issue was compounded by
what El Dictamen described as years of poor maintenance that had left many roads along the
coast around San Andrés Tuxtla in poor condition. Enrique Llorente and Juan Cañedo, federal
officials stationed in Xalapa, however, claimed that media reports exaggerated the problem,
stating that “at no moment have normal traffic flows been suspended along these routes."
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Nevertheless, local drivers complained of long travel delays due to routes pockmarked with
potholes, pools of standing water, and large quantities of mud.62
Only after President Alemán announced plans to visit Veracruz in December 1950 did
public officials appear to redouble efforts to manage the crisis. In mid November, El Dictamen
reported that the JCCV had activated more than one hundred service trucks to move materials
and workers to key sites along the president’s expected route from the state capital to the Gulf
Coast. Local communities criticized this policy, arguing that the state had failed to
comprehensively address the damage wrought by the hurricane. They called the existing
conditions around Los Tuxtlas “disgraceful,” due to insufficient maintenance policies that
“abandoned roads once completed, leaving them only minimally traversable” when bad weather
struck. In the face of this public reproach, road-building officials defended their work, stating
that limited resources forced them to prioritize repair efforts; by early December, they finished
cleanup of the Xalapa-Veracruz and Veracruz-Alvarado-Los Tuxtla highways, while the
Córdoba-Veracruz road and caminos vecinales not used for President Alemán’s visit were
cleared and patched by early 1951.63
In a broad sense, road conditions spoke to the results of policies that had touted the
spread of “progress to all parts of the Republic.” Broken highways rendered inaccessible due to
bad weather and poor maintenance stood as tangible examples of a counter narrative of
modernity that inverted the symbolism of these transportation infrastructures. There existed the
possibility that media accounts and popular opinion could ascribe notions of backwardness,
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reinforcing negative stereotypes of regions that lacked the resources to sustain acceptable and
accessibly thoroughfares. Moreover, the decisions to triage state responses to problems that
emerged due to structural failures could ignite popular resentment that pitted different
communities against one another as they strove---if not for equal treatment---at least for better
access to emergency aid.
These issues arose especially in the postwar years, which had witnessed a sharp rise in
motor travel and foreign tourism in Mexico. In 1946, the federal government logged a record
number of motor vehicles in circulation on the nation’s roads: 120,906 automobiles, 12,915
motorbuses, and 71,613 cargo trucks. That same year, the number of tourists entering Mexico
reached more than 255,000 persons---most arriving form the U.S.-Mexico border---marking a
record high since federal officials began collecting statistical data in 1929. By the early 1950s,
these figures continued to grow. Tourism rose roughly fifty percent with an average 435,000
foreign visitors arriving per year, while the number of motor vehicles in circulation increased to
more than 402,000, on average, annually.64 This raw data translated into swelling rates of motor
traffic on the nation’s highway network. For example, in 1950, SCOP recorded usage of the
Laredo-Monterrey and Xalapa-Veracruz roads that averaged 1250 and 750 vehicles per day,
respectively; a roughly fifty to sixty percent increase compared to rates at the start of the
previous decade.65
The theme of control--and the lack of it--is an important aspect of these narratives. Many
media accounts mentioned that there was little a driver could do when an animal, pedestrian, or
some other obstacle appeared at the last second, making the accident unavoidable. In many
respects, these problems emerged thanks to the confluence of two factors: successful road64
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building campaigns that extended highway access to more areas and the deployment of larger
and more powerful motor vehicles. On the one hand, automobile advertisements and newspaper
features on road building positioned their subjects as things that contributed to greater efficiency
in everyday life. Cars were supposed to run properly and highways were supposed to be clear,
unobstructed spaces that facilitated speedy travel between locations. Scientific imagery
reinforced these ideas as advertisers placed images of rockets alongside new car models and
editorials heralded road building as the “conquest” of human ingenuity over the natural
landscape. On the other hand, however, traffic accidents undermined the assumptions that
privileged the narrative of efficiency connected to material progress. They raised the specter of
technological unreliability and pointed to the potential for modernization to run amok due to
human error, environmental conditions, or other extenuating circumstances.
While advertisements targeting Mexican audiences characterized technology as
something with the capacity to supersede environmental hazards, automobile marketing was
quick to remind consumers of the importance of choosing the right vehicle to ensure their safety.
In 1936, Studebaker promoted its President and Dictator models as the world’s first cars to offer
automatic brakes as a standard feature, while Hudson’s 1942 Drive-Master “worked better, lasted
longer, and cost less.” The vehicles were described as elegant, but also rugged and durable
machines that would provide their operators with years of reliable service. In 1946, Nash
Brothers released the 600-series vehicle, boasting that the company’s engineers “conform to the
standards employed in the construction of the most modern trains and airplanes,” which allowed
them to produce an “extraordinarily strong” chassis. The 1952 Ford Consul’s ad listed five
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reasons to buy the car, which included the hydraulic braking system and unibody steel frame as
key safety features.66
Advertisements created the impression that the dangers and discomforts stemming from
modern motor travel could be solved through the embrace of new technologies and services. In
1949, Goodyear-Oxxo Tires released a print cartoon that depicted a woman driving along a beat
up motor road. In the first scene, she is shown in a vehicle vibrating uncontrollably due to poor
quality tires. In the second scene, a dove arrives with a set of Goodyear-Oxxo brand tires, and the
car is now portrayed as driving comfortably and smoothly on a row of clouds. In the center of the
ad is an illustration of the product and the company’s logo with slogan: “Like floating on air: the
new Super-Cushion by Goodyear-Oxxo---Mexican Industry.”67
An advertisement for Servicio Automotriz Nacional, an automobile maintenance
company, combined technical language with practical advice in its pitch to protect against
potential road-related dangers. Under a banner that read “And you can believe it!” the ad
featured three cartoons: the first showed the sun and earth over a caption saying, “Light travels
through space at a distance of 200,000 kilometers a second!” In the next frame, a man with a
frustrated expression was unable to see while driving at night because his car lights were not
properly adjusted. The caption read: “Notwithstanding, you shouldn’t drive at any speed if your
car lights don’t give you sufficient visibility.” The last cartoon asked the reader to “come bring
your car for a visit for a necessary adjustment and take advantage of the entire beam of light.” It
depicted an automobile on the highway with bright lights---properly leveled for maximum
visibility---that revealed a cow standing in the distance.68
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The implication: thanks to maintenance from Servicio Automotriz Nacional, the driver
had the right equipment to be able to identify the danger on the road and respond with sufficient
time to avoid an accident. As the company used the trappings of scientific discourse to frame its
pitch, it deftly played on common frustrations with automobile use and also raised the specter of
road-related accidents. The entire narrative is draped in modernist symbolism, pointing to the
role of proper care to ensure that equipment functions correctly. In advertisements like this,
technological failure became deeply intertwined with everyday life in modern society as
something that had to be protected against to ensure safety, reassert control over the
environment, and avoid accidents.
The visual and descriptive components of print media narratives portrayed varying
characteristics attached to modernity. On the one hand, they trumpeted the “positive” aspects of
technology as an indication of the “march of progress” in Mexico. New roads and growing
numbers of automobiles were seen as important drivers of the national economy as part of the
larger plan for the modernization and industrialization of Mexican society. On the other hand,
although not explicitly associated with the specter of modernity, accident narratives and related
stories were an integral part of the discursive project of technology use. Public anxiety stemming
from road-related hazards was an underlying and recurring theme of modern life reported in
newspapers. Rather than reject the project of modernization, however, advertisers played on
these concerns to market their products, while other media outlets simply eliminated the dangers
of “progress” in order to produce sanitized visions of motorized mobility.

Conclusion
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President Alemán’s sexenio marked a period of great optimism in Mexico after years of
economic austerity due to the diplomatic row over oil expropriation and later the impact of the
Second World War. The latter 1940s represented a time where Mexicans hoped to capitalize on
the promises of industrialization and economic modernization that had been promised for years
by federal and state politicians. Building roads fit into this calculus as the state characterized
them as necessary to facilitate market growth by increasing regional access to motor travel. In
many ways, the government was successful in this campaign. The SCOP and state road-building
agencies successfully deployed hundreds of new kilometers of asphalt-coated thoroughfares
thanks to a combination of heavy public spending and private investment from domestic and
foreign creditors. Alemán’s term also represented the culmination of years of gradual shift in
favor of greater use of public debt and private contractors to support infrastructure development.
The bond program began by President Rodríguez---and expanded under Cárdenas---continued as
a major conduit for U.S. investment into Mexico. Likewise, the JLCNL and DCOP relied
extensively on external engineering firms to survey and build routes, while also coordinating
state efforts more closely with federal officials.
Nevertheless, the broad promises made on the 1946 campaign trail did not live up
entirely to popular expectations. The injection of new financing brought additional highways and
caminos vecinales, but oftentimes divided communities over where these roads should be built.
Public criticism also emerged over an apparent emphasis on construction efforts that overlooked
long-term maintenance and repair. These issues highlight the complexity of narratives around
road building and motor travel, revealing a “modern” portrait of mobility that did not always
evolve as national and state elites hoped.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Charting the Contours of Power and ‘Progress’ in
Modern Mexico’s Road-Building Efforts
In the 1950s, when drivers planned a shopping trip to Laredo or a weekend getaway to
the beach in Veracruz, they may have purchased a highway guide in one of the motor stations
that catered to travelers. The Guía automovilista de carreteras, the General Motors’ Guide to
Mexico’s Highways, and the PEMEX Guía de carreteras included maps that depicted the
principal highways that crossed the nation with bilingual travel listings for hotels, restaurants,
gas stations, and other points of interest. What the unsuspecting traveler could not have gleaned
from these documents, however, were the fights between state officials and property owners over
where to build roads, labor tension between engineers and road crews, or the budgetary
squabbles that often defined construction efforts. Instead, the guides presented an uncluttered
image of Mexico with bold lines representing the motor roads that linked major towns and cities
together; drawings of automobiles, tour buses, and airplanes decorated the pages and reinforced
notions of modernity tied to motor travel. In doing so, these documents contributed to the
dominant narrative that government officials and businesses promoted, which rendered the
political and technical challenges of road building invisible and envisioned highways primarily
as conveyors of progress.1
Roads were not simply physical paths depicted as steadily drawn lines on maps, however.
They were part of a dynamic social, political, and economic process in Mexican society, in
which people debated the merits and effects of national modernization. Between 1920 and 1952,
Mexicans built thousands of kilometers of federal and state highways and caminos vecinales in

1

Fondo Comisión Monetaria, box 894; Fondo Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales, Serie
Informes de Extranjeros Expedientes Provisionales, box 739, AGN, Mexico City.

183

Nuevo León and Veracruz. This work established a foundation for economic growth that
connected regional markets and reduced the cost of travel for average citizens, foreign visitors,
and private businesses. Road building served as an important stage on which to improve ties with
the United States and promote export-oriented industrial growth, and the Mexican government
channeled millions of pesos of investment into regional transportation infrastructure projects that
helped to boost national productivity.
The framework of negotiation and compromise behind road-building efforts affirms
Rubin’s assertion that the Mexican state relied on “a distinct combination of bargaining, coercion,
and alliances” to assert its power.2 Federal and state road-building officials coordinated with
state governors and local road committees to formulate budgets, determine potential routes,
recruit labor, and build roads. This arrangement was inclusive of many different kinds of voices,
evinced by the ample correspondence among federal, state, and local actors as they discussed the
need for new road building and maintenance of existing routes. The handling of disputes
highlights the uneven power relationships tied to the political process behind road building.
Coercive policies were most evident in the interaction between state governments and local
communities, as public officials sought to control how towns directed tax money collected for
road building; state engineers also could seize local property for construction projects and define
what constituted acceptable road usage. Local citizens were not entirely without power, however;
they used the courts, friendly politicians, and work stoppages to defend their rights and extract
compensation for the intrusions of the government.
The political negotiation that occurred around road-building efforts highlights the
limitations of the central government’s power. Whereas regional and national leaders were at

2

Jeffrey Rubin, “Decentering the Regime: Culture and Regional Politics in Mexico,” Latin American Research
Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1996), 86.

184

odds over land reform in the postrevolutionary period, they typically agreed on the need to build
new motor roads to facilitate economic development. This meant that, in principle, the national
state was free to implement its vision for the construction of a network of highways and caminos
vecinales that linked Mexico City, state capitals, and regional centers of industrial production
with the nation’s coastal ports and overland borders. Everyday decision-making power, however,
was much less clearly controlled by federal officials, who often relied heavily on their state and
local counterparts to craft and implement developmental plans. This arrangement put
considerable power in the hands of state governors who presided over much of the funding and
planning decisions for the regional road-building apparatus. For example, in Nuevo León, as
chairmen of the committee that supervised the road-building agency, state governors controlled
the organizational budget and also had final approval over personnel decisions.
The limitations of national power become even clearer in Veracruz, where regional elites
formed locally oriented road-building boards to tackle infrastructural needs that state agencies
did not address. This arrangement emerged largely because of the multipolar, distributed nature
of wealth and population in the state. Whereas Monterrey dominated Nuevo León, no single city
exerted that same amount of influence in Veracruz. When the federal government decided to
build the national highway through Xalapa en route to the port of Veracruz, this plan frustrated
the commercial leaders based in Córdoba and Orizaba. Their support for the Junta Local de
Caminos de Orizaba indicates that while enthusiasm for road building was common, differences
emerged over the contours of the transport infrastructure system. It also shows that state
authorities in Veracruz---compared to those in Nuevo León---were largely unable (or unwilling)
to exercise the same kind of centralized control over statewide road-building efforts. By the early
1930s, at least three major organizations built roads in the state, while additional regional
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committees also presided over local aspects of planning, financing, and building caminos
vecinales. Moreover, Veracruz had a history of social engagement by ejidal councils and worker
cooperatives, nurtured by the political philosophy of its radical governor Adalberto Tejeda, who
had encouraged campesinos to organize road-building brigades since the late 1920s; a practice
that persisted well into the subsequent decade.
Local-level participation in road-building efforts further highlighted the potential for
individual agency, undermining the notion of a hegemonic postrevolutionary state. Rural
organizations, labor unions, and drivers’ cooperatives not only contributed workers to help build
motor highways and caminos vecinales, they also successfully lobbied federal and state
authorities for local aid to extend and maintain the burgeoning road network. In addition, they
formed powerful political coalitions with state legislators and wealthy regional elites that could
force road-building authorities to revise construction plans, adjust tax policy, or provide
indemnities in the case of damaged or expropriated property. In both Veracruz and Nuevo León,
local communities played a critical role in forming road boards that helped state agencies to
identify regional infrastructural needs, provide input into land surveys, and ultimately distribute
resources to maintain and repair motor routes.
When local groups disagreed over national or state plans for a given road, however, they
could frustrate construction efforts, requiring political and legal intervention to sort out matters.
Wealthier landowners hired lawyers from the state capital or Mexico City, lodging suits against
road-building authorities in federal court that forced work stoppages. Ejidal committees and
labor organizations may also have hired legal representation or appealed directly to elected
officials to intervene on their behalf. Moreover, local groups did not necessarily act with one
voice, but sometimes may have splintered into competing factions that pursued different visions
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for a planned motor route. When this occurred---such as the Villa de Santiago case from chapter
six---state authorities could be caught between local rivalries that levied suits against one
another, forcing public officials and the courts to work through a series of bitter recriminations to
determine the best course of action.
These cases speak to the fact that the Mexican national state could not act independently
of regional factors, and its power was often circumscribed by the need to collaborate with state
and local actors to achieve construction efforts. In order to build roads the government required
broad cooperation from across different sectors of Mexican society. National elites often had to
display sensitivity to the needs of discrete groups, drawing on the language of democratic
mobilization and economic modernization to speak to campesinos and workers as well as
wealthy landowners and private investors.
The distinct directions taken in the formation of the road-building bureaucracies in Nuevo
León and Veracruz indicate that the national government was willing to allow local
experimentation and improvisation. In many ways, the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras
Públicas and its Dirección Nacional de Caminos enjoyed largely supervisory roles in a decisionmaking process dominated by state capitals and regional committees. Although they may have
occasionally threatened to cut funding when political gridlock arose, they nevertheless had
already ceded considerable influence to state governors to form the executive committees that
presided over state Juntas Locales de Caminos and permitted these groups to write budgets and
manage personnel. This arrangement emerged out of logistical factors that favored political
expediency. Many state governments already operated their own road-building agencies, while
the decision to create the JLC system came during the early years of the Great Depression in
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order to pool financial resources, allowing governors a greater say in national road policy in
exchange for contributions to the federal-state cooperative fund to build motorways.
As viewed from Xalapa and Monterrey, 1940s Mexico witnessed greater political
consolidation of the decision-making process at the state level. Presidents Ávila Camacho and
Alemán promoted robust financing of new motor highways and caminos vecinales, but
ultimately entrusted the specific contours of these plans to state governments. As a result, state
governors emerged as some of the principle benefactors of a political framework that respected
state-level power, allowing them to take a relatively free hand in how they constituted their roadbuilding agencies and agendas. In this way, the Mexican national government supported a
cooperative model that shared power with the states, ultimately fostering a decentralized federal
bureaucratic structure. States capitalized on this policy, experimenting with different kinds of
organizational structures that evolved in response to idiosyncratic political and socio-economic
priorities.
Drawing on this framework of negotiation and compromise exercised by the Mexican
state, I have also sought to revise general interpretations of the sexenios of Lázaro Cárdenas and
Miguel Alemán. In many ways, these presidents stand as examples that contrast the progressive
and conservative camps of the postrevolutionary epoch. Yet, their record on road building
indicates that both leaders exercised pragmatic agendas that used nuanced social and economic
discourses to speak broadly to constituents and also implemented evolutionary---rather than
revolutionary---policies that took into account the political and developmental programs of their
predecessors. For example, Cárdenas pursued pro-business policies, emerging as a benefactor of
private investors by expanding President Rodríguez’s road bond program to generate more funds
for construction efforts through deficit spending. In fact, this embrace of private investment
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created the framework that President Ávila Camacho used to repair diplomatic relations with
Washington after nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, opening Mexican infrastructure to
considerable U.S. financing during World War II. In addition, Cárdenas did not intervene in two
other key trends underway: the state-level move to systematize personnel relationships within the
road-building bureaucracy and its growing reliance on private contractors to assist in
construction efforts. In Veracruz, these developments ultimately weakened the influence rural
groups had enjoyed over road building in the late 1920s and early 1930s, increasingly
concentrating the power to form construction brigades and negotiate labor terms within statelevel agencies.
In contrast to scholarly tradition, data on road building in the 1940s indicates that
President Alemán embraced a program for construction efforts that actively reached out to
campesinos and rural communities. Building on María Antonio Martínez’s study of
Alemanismo’s political articulation of industrial and economic modernization, my work finds
that the president incorporated a discourse of democratic mobilization into his developmental
platform. The key to this arrangement was the emphasis placed on building caminos vecinales,
characterized as a means to “democratize” economic growth by increasingly connecting the
Mexican countryside to the nation’s network of motor highways. Alemán’s supporters
appropriated the populist language of the era, arguing that the president was fulfilling the “basic
premise of the Mexican Revolution: to unite, not divide, Mexicans in matters spiritual and moral
as well as material.”3 They specifically identified road building as an essential aspect of this
work, and when Mexicans celebrated the opening of a motor highway or camino vecinal the
president was not loath to take credit in his national addresses. He commended the work of the
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Survey Department for Local Road Projects, which his government had created to “reach out to
the small communities it finds economically and culturally isolated from the rest of the nation.”4
This was not simply hollow rhetoric, however. The Alemán administration could point to
tangible examples of road building in support of its rural developmental agenda. During the
sexenio, the national government built an average of 2,250 kilometers of roads annually, and
boasted that its program for new caminos vecinales provided an additional thirty percent of the
country with access to the burgeoning highway system. It also twice doubled the amount of
money SCOP allocated to motor highways and local roads, investing more than 300 million
pesos per year by 1948. As some of his key achievements, Alemán pointed to the completion of
the Inter-Oceanic and Pan-American Highways during his tenure as well as the construction of
new roads that improved Monterrey’s access to the U.S.-Mexico border and expanded routes
between inland cities and regional ports in Veracruz. Moreover, he did not radically change the
federal policy structure for road building, but rather followed a model established by his
predecessors over the previous thirty years. He utilized a combination of federal-state-local tax
revenue, public debt spending, and private investment to piece together the funding initiatives
necessary to finance new transportation infrastructure.5 His signature contribution evolving this
framework was to carry significant U.S. support for Mexican road-building efforts into the
postwar period, framing it within a discourse that expounded the importance of pro-capitalist
economic development. In this way, road building went hand in hand with efforts to “modernize”
local markets, building partnerships with U.S. businesses that promoters saw as necessary to
improve economic conditions for all Mexicans. As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is a
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September 1948, IP, CD, DSI (2006), 63-65.
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view that the Monterrey-based director of REO Motor’s Mexican subsidiary summarized nicely:
“In the coming years, this country will open more than 100,000 kilometers of new caminos
vecinales. These routes and motor vehicles will carry Progress to all parts of the Republic...
providing inexhaustible wealth, which we are just now beginning to realize.”6
Road building served as a flexible space for the postwar national government to adjust its
commitments to the myriad competing social and economic factions within Mexican society.
Although scholars have rightly noted that Alemán’s agricultural and union policies were often
been at odds with the interests of poor and working-class Mexicans, his road-building program
emerged as an area where his administration sought to balance developmental policies, creating
an opportunity to incorporate into its governing philosophy of “national unity” the same groups it
had excluded elsewhere. In this way, the campaign to emphasize the construction of more
caminos vecinales did not only make good business sense, but it also allowed the government to
engage local communities and point to the benefits they were bringing to these places through
improved transportation infrastructure.
These road-building policies in the postrevolutionary period, which found common
ground among commercial and popular sectors of Mexico, also enjoyed enthusiastic support
from foreign actors. Ironically, President Calles’s decision in 1925 to establish a new roadbuilding bureaucracy that pursued construction efforts as a nationalist endeavor exclusive of
foreign financial commitments was gradually transformed into one of the critical spaces for
Mexico and the United States to forge stronger binational ties. For example, when the Americans
responded to the Mexican decision to nationalize the oil industry with an economic embargo of
the country’s petroleum exports, factions on both sides of the border called for an escalation in
the brewing trade conflict. Despite this hostile rhetoric, the Mexican government never stopped
6

“Mejorarse la industria de autotransportes en México,” 16 February 1949, El Porvenir.
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building the highways that expanded access to the northern border and connected regional
markets to coastal ports. When the Roosevelt administration---wary of Axis influence in the
event of war---looked to rapprochement with Mexico City, it used financing of road construction
as a key negotiating point to repair diplomatic relations damaged in the aftermath of 1938. For
his part, President Ávila Camacho seized this opportunity, signaling Mexico’s solidarity with
American calls for “continental defense” against the Axis powers via road building and other
forms of infrastructure development characterized as necessary to the mobilization and supplying
of the Allied forces. Moreover, he used renewed bilateral relations between the two countries to
set the foundation for postwar industrial development, envisioning Mexico as an economic
partner with the United States in order to facilitate modernizing ambitions across the nation.
In this way, at the level of international and national political calculations, road building
ultimately served a status quo that favored regional economic development within a framework
of transnational market growth bound to private investment. Although they often disagreed on
the specifics of a given project or articulated the needs for road building within competing
discursive frameworks, ejidatarios, workers, industrialists, and chambers of commerce across
Mexico agreed broadly with the premise that new motor highways and caminos vecinales were
essential to the promotion of economic prosperity. As a result, road-building policy provided
national leaders like Alemán---who otherwise supported pro-business growth often at the
expense of other groups---political cover to articulate a developmental message that was
inclusive of campesino groups and organized labor. Likewise, progressive politicians like
Cárdenas could emphasize the corporatist benefits of road building for ejidatarios and other
popular constituents, all the while pursuing construction of transportation infrastructure networks
that provided greater benefits to Mexico’s private sector.
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When Alvaro Obregón first promised to rebuild and expand Mexico’s road system, he
likely grasped the enormity of the task at hand. A decade of armed conflict and institutional
neglect had left the nation’s transportation infrastructure in terrible condition. Although Obregón
failed to carry out the plan he set before the country, his successors adapted this vision for new
motor highways, building the national institutions that ultimately fulfilled his promises. Road
building was wrought with national significance that extended beyond purely economic
conditions. It became a symbol and a metric of material progress and a means for national, state,
and local actors to articulate whether the government was achieving the promises of the
revolution to build a prosperous and equitable society. New motor highways and caminos
vecinales certainly achieved the first half of that binary ambition. They connected regional
production centers to urban industrialization, gradually becoming more closely integrated with
transnational markets over the course of three decades. It is less clear whether they distributed
this prosperity in an equitable fashion. On the one hand, many local groups actively lobbied for
and successfully built motor roads that extended the reach of their communities, improving
regional mobility and providing access to neighboring cities and ports. On the other hand,
logistical and budgetary limitations meant that difficult decisions had to be made about where
and when to build roads, which could leave some rural parts of the country underserved by
regional transportation infrastructure for years.
Despite these practical challenges, for many Mexicans, new motor highways and caminos
vecinales remained the sine qua non for regional development. They recognized the potential for
new transportation infrastructure to provide dramatic change to the ways in which people moved
and communicated with the rest of the nation. As a result, road building remained a critical factor
in Mexico’s process of social, political, and economic engagement after the revolution as
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disparate groups coordinated---and clashed---with one another in negotiations that helped to
define the fundamentals of national economic mobilization in the twentieth century.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Growth of the National Federal Highway Network, 1928-1952
(Kilometers)
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Source: 50 años de revolución mexicana en cifras (México: Nacional Financiera, 1963).

Appendix B: National Gasoline Consumption, 1925-1952
(Millions of Liters)
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Appendix C1: Registered Motor Vehicles In Circulation Nationwide, 1924-1952
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Appendix C2: Registered Motorbuses in Circulation Nationwide, 1924-1952
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Appendix D1: Motor Vehicle Traffic: Nuevo León Highways, 1940-1950
(Maximum Daily Vehicles)
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Source: Secretaría de Obras Públicas, Caminos y Desarrollo: México, 1925-1975 (Mexico City: Secretaría de
Obras Públicas, 1975).

Appendix D2: Motor Vehicle Traffic: Veracruz Highways, 1940-1950
(Maximum Daily Vehicles)
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Appendix E: National Minimum Wage
(Pesos)
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Appendix F: Value of the Peso to the Dollar, 1920-1952
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Appendix G: Foreign Tourism to Mexico, 1929-1952
(Thousands of Visitors)
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Appendix H1: Federal Highway Network: Nuevo León, 1938
(Asphalt-Concrete Routes Shown)

Sources: Junta Local de Caminos de Nuevo León; Public domain map used as base, available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yucat%C3%A1n_en_M%C3%A9xico.svg [Retrieved: 10/25/13]
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Appendix H2: Federal Highway Network: Veracruz to Mexico City, 1940
(Asphalt-Concrete Routes Shown)

Sources: Junta Central de Caminos de Veracruz; Departamento de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas; Caminos y
Desarrollo; Public domain map used as base, available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yucat%C3%A1n_en_M%C3%A9xico.svg [Retrieved: 10/25/13]
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